Mike, Thanks for the reference, which I will study further. As many know, the Texai KB is currently crisp and symbolic, and will have to stay that way until after the bootstrap English dialog system is developed. I want Texai to be implemented in a cognitively plausible manner, and articles such as this one are very pertinent to my longer range plans for Texai, especially regarding the scoping and organization of agent knowledge. When the future Texai deals with a dog that it sees, visual representations of dogs must be close at hand.
More comforting with regard to my current symbolic-only approach is this quote from the paper: Although skepticism that discrete amodal symbols underlie conceptual processing in the brain continues to increase, there is little doubt that the brain is a symbolic system. Unlike cameras and video recorders, the brain uses categorical knowledge to interpret regions of experience that contain agents, objects, actions, mental states, and so forth. The brain does not achieve its powerful forms of intelligence by processing holistic images. Stephen L. Reed Artificial Intelligence Researcher http://texai.org/blog http://texai.org 3008 Oak Crest Ave. Austin, Texas, USA 78704 512.791.7860 ----- Original Message ---- From: Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [email protected] Cc: dan michaels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, April 20, 2008 12:17:00 PM Subject: [agi] Concepts - Cog Sci/AI vs Cog Neurosci DIV { MARGIN:0px;} Current Directions in Psychological Science – April 2008 – In Press http://www.psychologicalscience.org/journals/cd/17_2_inpress/Barsalou_completed.pdf THE DOMINANT THEORY IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE Across diverse areas of psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy, the dominant account of the conceptual system is the theory of semantic memory (e.g., Smith, 1978). According to this theory, the conceptual system is a modular memory store that contains amodal knowledge about categories. Semantic memory is viewed as modular because it is assumed to be separate from the brain’s episodic-memory system and also from the brain’s modal systems for perception, action, and affect. Because semantic memory lies outside modal systems, its representations are viewed as different from theirs, providing a higher, amodal level of representation. The transduction principle underlies the view that amodal representations develop for categories in a modular conceptual system THE DOMINANT THEORY IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE A very different view of the conceptual system has arisen in cognitive neuroscience. According to this view, categorical knowledge is grounded in the brain’s modal systems, rather than being represented amodally in a modular semantic memory (e.g., Martin, 2001). For example, knowledge about dogs is represented in visual representations of how dogs look, in auditory representations of how dogs sound, and in motor representations of how to interact with dogs. Because the representational systems that underlie perception, action, and affect are also used to represent categorical knowledge, the conceptual system is neither modular nor amodal. Instead, perception and conception share overlapping systems. Empirical evidence has been the driving force behind this view. agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription ____________________________________________________________________________________ Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now. http://mobile.yahoo.com/;_ylt=Ahu06i62sR8HDtDypao8Wcj9tAcJ ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
