Argh! Are you all making the mistake I think you are making? Searle is using a technical term in philosophy--"intentionality". It is different from the common use of intending as in aiming to do something or intention as a goal. (Here's s wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intentionality). The sense that Seale is using is roughly how things like words (but it could just be finger pointing) can refer to other things. I see the wiki uses the word "aboutness".
I have to admit I'm pretty influenced by Searle. I've listened to his lectures on philosophy of mind from the Teaching Company. He actually came to U of M and gave a lecture in the Star Wars Senate room where we had AGI-08. This was during the semester when the cognitive science seminar there was about the symbol grounding problem. I didn't go to the seminar much, so I didn't see what they came up with. The Chinese room argument is pretty simple, and it doesn't really try to do too much. It's really just all about how you can manipulate sysmbols, but you might not get any real meaning because the symbols aren't really referring to anything. Searle also says it's trivially true that machines can possibly understand things because we do and we're machines. It's just formal systems that have this problem. andi > Mark Waser wrote: >> The critical point that most people miss -- and what is really >> important for this list (and why people shouldn't blindly dismiss >> Searle) is that it is *intentionality* that defines "understanding". >> If a system has goals/intentions and it's actions are modified by the >> external world (i.e. it is grounded), then, to the extent to which >> it's actions are *effectively* modified (as judged in relation to >> it's intentions) is the extent to which it "understands". The most >> important feature of an AGI is that it has goals and that it modifies >> it's behavior (and learns) in order to reach them. The Chinese Room >> is incapable of these behaviors since it has no desires. Harry Chesley replied: > I think this is an excellent point, so long as you're careful to define > "intention" simply in terms of goals that the system is attempting to > satisfy/maximize, and not in terms of conscious desires. As you point > out, the former provides a context in which to define understanding and > to measure it. The latter leads off into further undefined terms and > concepts -- I mention this rather than just agreeing outright mainly > because of your use of the word "desire" in the last sentence, which > /could/ be interpreted anthropomorphically. ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=108809214-a0d121 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
