Sure ... but my point is that unless the environment satisfies a certain Occam-prior-like property, NARS will be useless...
ben On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 11:52 AM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > Ben, > > You assert that Pei is forced to make an assumption about the > regulatiry of the world to justify adaptation. Pei could also take a > different argument. He could try to show that *if* a strategy exists > that can be implemented given the finite resources, NARS will > eventually find it. Thus, adaptation is justified on a sort of "we > might as well try" basis. (The proof would involve showing that NARS > searches the state of finite-state-machines that can be implemented > with the resources at hand, and is more probable to stay for longer > periods of time in configurations that give more reward, such that > NARS would eventually settle on a configuration if that configuration > consistently gave the highest reward.) > > So, some form of learning can take place with no assumptions. The > problem is that the search space is exponential in the resources > available, so there is some maximum point where the system would > perform best (because the amount of resources match the problem), but > giving the system more resources would hurt performance (because the > system searches the unnecessarily large search space). So, in this > sense, the system's behavior seems counterintuitive-- it does not seem > to be taking advantage of the increased resources. > > I'm not claiming NARS would have that problem, of course.... just that > a theoretical no-assumption learner would. > > --Abram > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 10:00 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > >> > >> Ben, > >> > >> Thanks. So the other people now see that I'm not attacking a straw man. > >> > >> My solution to Hume's problem, as embedded in the experience-grounded > >> semantics, is to assume no predictability, but to justify induction as > >> adaptation. However, it is a separate topic which I've explained in my > >> other publications. > > > > Right, but justifying induction as adaptation only works if the > environment > > is assumed to have certain regularities which can be adapted to. In a > > random environment, adaptation won't work. So, still, to justify > induction > > as adaptation you have to make *some* assumptions about the world. > > > > The Occam prior gives one such assumption: that (to give just one form) > sets > > of observations in the world tend to be producible by short computer > > programs. > > > > For adaptation to successfully carry out induction, *some* vaguely > > comparable property to this must hold, and I'm not sure if you have > > articulated which one you assume, or if you leave this open. > > > > In effect, you implicitly assume something like an Occam prior, because > > you're saying that a system with finite resources can successfully adapt > to > > the world ... which means that sets of observations in the world *must* > be > > approximately summarizable via subprograms that can be executed within > this > > system. > > > > So I argue that, even though it's not your preferred way to think about > it, > > your own approach to AI theory and practice implicitly assumes some > variant > > of the Occam prior holds in the real world. > >> > >> > >> Here I just want to point out that the original and basic meaning of > >> Occam's Razor and those two common (mis)usages of it are not > >> necessarily the same. I fully agree with the former, but not the > >> latter, and I haven't seen any convincing justification of the latter. > >> Instead, they are often taken as granted, under the name of Occam's > >> Razor. > > > > I agree that the notion of an Occam prior is a significant conceptual > beyond > > the original "Occam's Razor" precept enounced long ago. > > > > Also, I note that, for those who posit the Occam prior as a **prior > > assumption**, there is not supposed to be any convincing justification > for > > it. The idea is simply that: one must make *some* assumption (explicitly > or > > implicitly) if one wants to do induction, and this is the assumption that > > some people choose to make. > > > > -- Ben G > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
