Abram, I agree with your basic idea in the following, though I usually put it in different form.
Pei On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:52 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ben, > > You assert that Pei is forced to make an assumption about the > regulatiry of the world to justify adaptation. Pei could also take a > different argument. He could try to show that *if* a strategy exists > that can be implemented given the finite resources, NARS will > eventually find it. Thus, adaptation is justified on a sort of "we > might as well try" basis. (The proof would involve showing that NARS > searches the state of finite-state-machines that can be implemented > with the resources at hand, and is more probable to stay for longer > periods of time in configurations that give more reward, such that > NARS would eventually settle on a configuration if that configuration > consistently gave the highest reward.) > > So, some form of learning can take place with no assumptions. The > problem is that the search space is exponential in the resources > available, so there is some maximum point where the system would > perform best (because the amount of resources match the problem), but > giving the system more resources would hurt performance (because the > system searches the unnecessarily large search space). So, in this > sense, the system's behavior seems counterintuitive-- it does not seem > to be taking advantage of the increased resources. > > I'm not claiming NARS would have that problem, of course.... just that > a theoretical no-assumption learner would. > > --Abram > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 10:00 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> >>> Ben, >>> >>> Thanks. So the other people now see that I'm not attacking a straw man. >>> >>> My solution to Hume's problem, as embedded in the experience-grounded >>> semantics, is to assume no predictability, but to justify induction as >>> adaptation. However, it is a separate topic which I've explained in my >>> other publications. >> >> Right, but justifying induction as adaptation only works if the environment >> is assumed to have certain regularities which can be adapted to. In a >> random environment, adaptation won't work. So, still, to justify induction >> as adaptation you have to make *some* assumptions about the world. >> >> The Occam prior gives one such assumption: that (to give just one form) sets >> of observations in the world tend to be producible by short computer >> programs. >> >> For adaptation to successfully carry out induction, *some* vaguely >> comparable property to this must hold, and I'm not sure if you have >> articulated which one you assume, or if you leave this open. >> >> In effect, you implicitly assume something like an Occam prior, because >> you're saying that a system with finite resources can successfully adapt to >> the world ... which means that sets of observations in the world *must* be >> approximately summarizable via subprograms that can be executed within this >> system. >> >> So I argue that, even though it's not your preferred way to think about it, >> your own approach to AI theory and practice implicitly assumes some variant >> of the Occam prior holds in the real world. >>> >>> >>> Here I just want to point out that the original and basic meaning of >>> Occam's Razor and those two common (mis)usages of it are not >>> necessarily the same. I fully agree with the former, but not the >>> latter, and I haven't seen any convincing justification of the latter. >>> Instead, they are often taken as granted, under the name of Occam's >>> Razor. >> >> I agree that the notion of an Occam prior is a significant conceptual beyond >> the original "Occam's Razor" precept enounced long ago. >> >> Also, I note that, for those who posit the Occam prior as a **prior >> assumption**, there is not supposed to be any convincing justification for >> it. The idea is simply that: one must make *some* assumption (explicitly or >> implicitly) if one wants to do induction, and this is the assumption that >> some people choose to make. >> >> -- Ben G >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
