We can say the same thing for the human mind, right? Pei
On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:54 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Sure ... but my point is that unless the environment satisfies a certain > Occam-prior-like property, NARS will be useless... > > ben > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 11:52 AM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: >> >> Ben, >> >> You assert that Pei is forced to make an assumption about the >> regulatiry of the world to justify adaptation. Pei could also take a >> different argument. He could try to show that *if* a strategy exists >> that can be implemented given the finite resources, NARS will >> eventually find it. Thus, adaptation is justified on a sort of "we >> might as well try" basis. (The proof would involve showing that NARS >> searches the state of finite-state-machines that can be implemented >> with the resources at hand, and is more probable to stay for longer >> periods of time in configurations that give more reward, such that >> NARS would eventually settle on a configuration if that configuration >> consistently gave the highest reward.) >> >> So, some form of learning can take place with no assumptions. The >> problem is that the search space is exponential in the resources >> available, so there is some maximum point where the system would >> perform best (because the amount of resources match the problem), but >> giving the system more resources would hurt performance (because the >> system searches the unnecessarily large search space). So, in this >> sense, the system's behavior seems counterintuitive-- it does not seem >> to be taking advantage of the increased resources. >> >> I'm not claiming NARS would have that problem, of course.... just that >> a theoretical no-assumption learner would. >> >> --Abram >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 10:00 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> Ben, >> >> >> >> Thanks. So the other people now see that I'm not attacking a straw man. >> >> >> >> My solution to Hume's problem, as embedded in the experience-grounded >> >> semantics, is to assume no predictability, but to justify induction as >> >> adaptation. However, it is a separate topic which I've explained in my >> >> other publications. >> > >> > Right, but justifying induction as adaptation only works if the >> > environment >> > is assumed to have certain regularities which can be adapted to. In a >> > random environment, adaptation won't work. So, still, to justify >> > induction >> > as adaptation you have to make *some* assumptions about the world. >> > >> > The Occam prior gives one such assumption: that (to give just one form) >> > sets >> > of observations in the world tend to be producible by short computer >> > programs. >> > >> > For adaptation to successfully carry out induction, *some* vaguely >> > comparable property to this must hold, and I'm not sure if you have >> > articulated which one you assume, or if you leave this open. >> > >> > In effect, you implicitly assume something like an Occam prior, because >> > you're saying that a system with finite resources can successfully >> > adapt to >> > the world ... which means that sets of observations in the world *must* >> > be >> > approximately summarizable via subprograms that can be executed within >> > this >> > system. >> > >> > So I argue that, even though it's not your preferred way to think about >> > it, >> > your own approach to AI theory and practice implicitly assumes some >> > variant >> > of the Occam prior holds in the real world. >> >> >> >> >> >> Here I just want to point out that the original and basic meaning of >> >> Occam's Razor and those two common (mis)usages of it are not >> >> necessarily the same. I fully agree with the former, but not the >> >> latter, and I haven't seen any convincing justification of the latter. >> >> Instead, they are often taken as granted, under the name of Occam's >> >> Razor. >> > >> > I agree that the notion of an Occam prior is a significant conceptual >> > beyond >> > the original "Occam's Razor" precept enounced long ago. >> > >> > Also, I note that, for those who posit the Occam prior as a **prior >> > assumption**, there is not supposed to be any convincing justification >> > for >> > it. The idea is simply that: one must make *some* assumption >> > (explicitly or >> > implicitly) if one wants to do induction, and this is the assumption >> > that >> > some people choose to make. >> > >> > -- Ben G >> > >> > >> > >> > ________________________________ >> > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription >> >> >> ------------------------------------------- >> agi >> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; >> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > > > -- > Ben Goertzel, PhD > CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC > Director of Research, SIAI > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher > a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, > build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, > cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, > program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. > Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein > > > ________________________________ > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
