Mike Tintner wrote:
Richard:The precise definition of "qualia", which everyone agrees on,
and which
you are flatly contradicting here, is that these things do not involve
anything that can be compared across individuals.
Actually, we don't do a bad job of comparing our emotions/sensations -
not remotely perfect, but not remotely as bad as the above philosophy
would suggest. We do share each other's pains and joys to a remarkable
extent. That's because our emotions are very much materially based and
we share basically the same bodies and nervous systems.
The hard problem of consciousness is primarily about *not*
qualia/emotions/sensations but *sentience* - not about what a red bus
or a warm hand stroking your face feel like to you, but about your
capacity to feel anything at all - about your capacity not for
particular types of emotions/sensations, but for emotion generally.
Sentience resides to a great extent in the nervous system, and whatever
proto-nervous system preceded it in evolution. When we solve how that
works we may solve the hard problem. Unless you believe that every thing
including inanimate objects, feels, then the capacity of sentience
clearly evolved and has an explanation.
(Bear in mind that AGI-ers' approaches to the problem of consciousness
are bound to be limited by their disembodied and anti-evolutionary
prejudices).
Mike
"Hard Problem" is a technical term.
It was invented by David Chalmers, and it has a very specific meaning.
See the Chalmers reference in my paper.
Richard Loosemore
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agi
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