Colin Hales wrote:
Dear Richard,
I have an issue with the 'falsifiable predictions' being used as
evidence of your theory.
The problem is that right or wrong...I have a working physical model for
consciousness. Predictions 1-3 are something that my hardware can do
easily. In fact that kind of experimentation is in my downstream
implementation plan. These predictions have nothing whatsoever to do
with your theory or mine or anyones. I'm not sure about prediction 4.
It's not something I have thought about, so I'll leave it aside for now.
In my case, in the second stage of testing of my chips, one of the
things I want to do is literally 'Mind Meld', forming a bridge of 4 sets
of compared, independently generated qualia. Ultimately the chips may be
implantable, which means a human could experience what they generate in
the first person...but I digress....
Your statement "This theory of consciousness can be used to make some
falsifiable predictions" could be replaced by "ANY theory of
consciousness can be used to make falsifiable predictions 1..4 as
follows.". Which basically says they are not predictions that falsify
anything at all. In which case the predictions cannot be claimed to
support your theory. The problem is that the evidence of predictions 1-4
acts merely as a correlate. It does not test any particular critical
dependency (causality origins). The predictions are merely correlates of
any theory of consciousness. They do not test the causal necessities. In
any empirical science paper the evidence could not be held in support of
the claim and they would be would be discounted as evidence of your
mechanism. I could cite 10 different computationalist AGI knowledge
metaphors in the sections preceding the 'predictions' and the result
would be the same.
So....If I was a reviewer I'd be unable to accept the claim that your
'predictions' actually said anything about the theory preceding them.
This would seem to be the problematic issue of the paper. You might want
to take a deeper look at this issue and try to isolate something unique
to your particular solution - which has a real critical dependency in
it. Then you'll have an evidence base of your own that people can use
independently. In this way your proposal could be seen to be scientific
in the dry empirical sense.
By way of example... a computer program is not scientific evidence of
anything. The computer materials, as configured by the program, actually
causally necessitate the behaviour. The program is a correlate. A
correlate has the formal evidentiary status of 'hearsay'. This is the
sense in which I invoke the term 'correlate' above.
BTW I have fallen foul of this problem myself...I had to look elsewhere
for real critical dependency, like I suggested above. You never know,
you might find one in there someplace! I found one after a lot of
investigation. You might, too.
Regards,
Colin Hales
Okay, let me phrase it like this: I specifically say (or rather I
should have done... this is another thing I need to make more explicit!)
that the predictions are about making alterations at EXACTLY the
boundary of the "analysis mechanisms".
So, when we test the predictions, we must first understand the mechanics
of human (or AGI) cognition well enough to be able to locate the exact
scope of the analysis mechanisms.
Then, we make the tests by changing things around just outside the reach
of those mechanisms.
Then we ask subjects (human or AGI) what happened to their subjective
experiences. If the subjects are ourselves - which I strongly suggest
must be the case - then we can ask ourselves what happened to our
subjective experiences.
My prediction is that if the swaps are made at that boundary, then
things will be as I state. But if changes are made within the scope of
the analysis mechanisms, then we will not see those changes in the qualia.
So the theory could be falsified if changes in the qualia are NOT
consistent with the theory, when changes are made at different points in
the system. The theory is all about the analysis mechanisms being the
culprit, so in that sense it is extremely falsifiable.
Now, correct me if I am wrong, but is there anywhere else in the
literature where you have you seen anyone make a prediction that the
qualia will be changed by the alteration of a specific mechanism, but
not by other, fairly similar alterations?
Richard Loosemore
-------------------------------------------
agi
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