My problem is if qualia are atomic, with no differentiable details, why
do some "feel" different than others -- shouldn't they all be separate
but equal? "Red" is relatively neutral, while "searing hot" is not. Part
of that is certainly lower brain function, below the level of
consciousness, but that doesn't explain to me why it "feels"
qualitatively different. If it was just something like increased
activity (franticness) in response to "searing hot," then fine, that
could just be something like adrenaline being pumped into the system,
but there is a subjective feeling that goes beyond that.
Maybe I missed it but why do you assume that because qualia are atomic that
they have no differentiable details? Evolution is, quite correctly, going
to give pain qualia higher priority and less ability to be shut down than
red qualia. In a good representation system, that means that searing hot is
going to be *very* <whatever> and very tough to ignore.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Harry Chesley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <agi@v2.listbox.com>
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 1:57 PM
Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of
consciousness
Richard Loosemore wrote:
Harry Chesley wrote:
Richard Loosemore wrote:
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness
the other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it
can be found at:
http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf
One other point: Although this is a possible explanation for our
subjective experience of qualia like "red" or "soft," I don't see
it explaining "pain" or "happy" quite so easily. You can
hypothesize a sort of mechanism-level explanation of those by
relegating them to the older or "lower" parts of the brain (i.e.,
they're atomic at the conscious level, but have more effects at the
physiological level (like releasing chemicals into the system)),
but that doesn't satisfactorily cover the subjective side for me.
I do have a quick answer to that one.
Remember that the core of the model is the *scope* of the analysis
mechanism. If there is a sharp boundary (as well there might be),
then this defines the point where the qualia kick in. Pain receptors
are fairly easy: they are primitive signal lines. Emotions are, I
believe, caused by clusters of lower brain structures, so the
interface between "lower brain" and "foreground" is the place where
the foreground sees a limit to the analysis mechanisms.
More generally, the significance of the "foreground" is that it sets
a boundary on how far the analysis mechanisms can reach.
I am not sure why that would seem less satisfactory as an explanation
of the subjectivity. It is a "raw feel", and that is the key idea,
no?
My problem is if qualia are atomic, with no differentiable details, why
do some "feel" different than others -- shouldn't they all be separate
but equal? "Red" is relatively neutral, while "searing hot" is not. Part
of that is certainly lower brain function, below the level of
consciousness, but that doesn't explain to me why it "feels"
qualitatively different. If it was just something like increased
activity (franticness) in response to "searing hot," then fine, that
could just be something like adrenaline being pumped into the system,
but there is a subjective feeling that goes beyond that.
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agi
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