Ed, they used to combine ritalin with lsd for psychotherapy. It assists in absorbing insights achieved from psycholitic doses, which is a term for doses that are not fully psychedelic. Those are edifying on their own but are less organized. I don't know if you can get this in a clinical setting today. But these molecules are gradually being apprehended as tools
On 11/30/08, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ed, > > Unfortunately to reply to your message in detail would absorb a lot of > time, because there are two issues mixed up > > 1) you don't know much about computability theory, and educating you > on it would take a lot of time (and is not best done on an email list) > > 2) I may not have expressed some of my weird philosophical ideas about > computability and mind and reality clearly ... though Abram, at least, > seemed to "get" them ;) [but he has a lot of background in the area] > > Just to clarify some simple things though: Pi is a computable number, > because there's a program that would generate it if allowed to run > long enough.... Also, pi has been proved irrational; and, quantum > theory really has nothing directly to do with uncomputability... > > About > >>How can several pounds of matter that is the human brain model >> the true complexity of an infinity of infinitely complexity things? > > it is certainly thinkable that the brain is infinite not finite in its > information content, or that it's a sort of "antenna" that receives > information from some infinite-information-content source. I'm not > saying I believe this, just saying it's a logical possibility, and not > really ruled out by available data... > > Your reply seems to assume that the brain is a finite computational > system and that other alternatives don't make sense. I think this is > an OK working assumption for AGI engineers but it's not proved by any > means. > > My main point in that post was, simply, that science and language seem > intrinsically unable to distinguish computable from uncomputable > realities. That doesn't necessarily mean the latter don't "exist" but > it means they're not really scientifically useful entities. But, my > detailed argument in favor of this point requires some basic > understanding of computability math to appreciate, and I can't review > those basics in an email, it's too much... > > ben g > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 4:20 PM, Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Ben, >> >> >> >> On November 19, 2008 5:39 you wrote the following under the above titled >> thread: >> >> >> >> ---------------------- >> >> Ed, >> >> >> >> I'd be curious for your reaction to >> >> >> >> http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2008/10/are-uncomputable-entities-useless-forhtml >> >> >> >> which explores the limits of scientific and linguistic explanation, in >> >> a different but possibly related way to Richard's argument. >> >> >> >> ---------------------- >> >> >> >> In the below email I asked you some questions about your article, which >> capture my major problem in understanding it, and I don't think I ever >> receive a reply >> >> >> >> The questions were at the bottom of such a long post you may well never >> have >> even seen them. I know you are busy, but if you have time I would be >> interested in hearing your answers to the following questions about the >> following five quoted parts (shown in red if you are seeing this in rich >> text) from you article. If you are too busy to respond just say so, >> either >> on or off list. >> >> >> >> --------------------- >> >> >> >> (1) "In the simplest case, A2 may represent U directly in the language, >> using a single expression" >> >> >> >> How, can "U" be directly represented in the language if it is >> uncomputable? >> >> >> >> I assume you consider any irational number, such as pi to be uncomputable >> (although, at least pi has a forumula that with enough computation can >> approach it as a limit –I assume that for most real numbers if there is >> such >> a formula, we do not know it.) (By the way, do we know for a fact that pi >> is >> irational, and if so how do we know other than that we have caluclated it >> to >> millions of places and not yet found an exact solution?) >> >> >> >> Merely communicating the symbol pi only represents the number if the agent >> receiving the communication has a more detailed definition, but any >> definition, such as a formula for iteratively approaching pi, which >> presumably is what you mean by "R_U" would only be an approximation. >> >> >> >> So U could never by fully represented unless one had infinite time --- and >> I >> generally consider it a waste of time to think about infinate time unless >> there is something valuable about such considerations that has a use in >> much >> more human-sized chunks of time. >> >> >> >> In fact, it seems the major message of quantum mechanics is that even >> physical reality doesn't have the time or machinery to compute >> uncomputable >> things, like a space constructed of dimensions each correspond to all the >> real numbers within some astronomical range . So the real number line is >> not really real. It is at best a construct of the human mind that can at >> best only be approximated in part. >> >> >> >> (2) "complexity(U) < complexity(R_U)" >> >> >> >> Because I did not understand how U could be represented, and how R_U could >> be anything other than an approximation for any practical purposes, I >> didn't >> understand the meaning of the above line from your article? >> >> >> >> If U and R_U have the meaning I guessed in my discussion of quote (1), >> then >> U could not be meaningfully representable in the language, other than by a >> symbol that references some definition (presumably R_U), which, in order >> even be able to approximate U's uncomputable complexity, would have to be >> more complex than U itself. >> >> >> >> Thus, according to this understanding, wouldn't quote (2) always be true? >> >> >> >> >> >> (3) "complexity(real number line R) <>" >> >> >> >> I didn't understand this formula because I don't know what the "<>" symbol >> means and I don't know if some text was supposed to follow after it. >> >> >> >> (4) "If NO, then it means the mind is better off using the axioms for R >> than >> using R directly. And, I suggest, that is what we actually do when using R >> in calculus. We don't use R as an "actual entity" in any strong sense, we >> use R as an abstract set of axioms." >> >> >> >> As is stated regarding quote (3) I don't understand what you are saying >> "NO" >> to. But it seems pretty obvious that our minds, and even our computers, >> do >> not use R directly (after all the percent of R that is uncomputable would >> appear to approach 100% as a limit --- even worse it contains an infinity >> of >> infinitely complex things), but we have a set of axioms and models about >> it >> that are quite useful? >> >> >> >> >> >> (5) "What would YES mean? It would mean that somehow we, as uncomputable >> beings, used R as an internal source of intuition about continuity ... not >> thus deriving any conclusions beyond the ones obtainable using the axioms >> about R, but deriving conclusions in a way that we found subjectively >> simpler." >> >> >> >> Again, from my discussion of Quote (3), I don't know what "YES" means. But >> if by use R as an internal source of intuition about continuity, you mean >> we >> that we actually model the true complexity of R, I think that is absurd on >> its face. How can several pounds of matter that is the human brain model >> the true complexity of an infinity of infinitely complexity things? >> >> >> >> --------------------- >> >> >> >> I don't understand what your paper on uncomputability has to do with my >> questions and comments about Richard's paper, other than to highlight that >> many things are uncomputable, some in theory and many more in practice, >> and >> that instead of dealing with many things, imagined or real, in their true >> complexity our minds deal with simplifications of them. >> >> >> >> But such simplifications, particularly since they often let us apply more >> complex analysis where it is most needed, can be very valuable. >> >> >> >> Furthermore, it is not clear to me that consciousness is not computable. >> I >> think it is, in fact, computed. But I have always felt that a given >> computation can never fully model or understand itself. >> >> >> >> Perhaps you are saying that we can never communicate the true complexity >> of >> our consciousness to someone else, except, to some extent, by reference to >> their own consciousnesses --- that when we use words to describe our >> consciousness we are sending symbols, somewhat like "U" in your article, >> which is defined by reference to the actual sense of consciousness in >> someone else that functions very roughly, somewhat like R_U in your paper >> >> >> >> Ed Porter >> >> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Ed Porter [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2008 9:38 PM >> To: [email protected] >> Subject: RE: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of >> consciousness >> >> >> >> Ben, >> >> >> >> I have never assumed language is all-powerful, in fact I have always >> assumed >> at least since boarding school, if not years before, that there are severe >> limits to human understanding. >> >> >> >> I certainly agree there are limits to what we can understand about >> consciousness. A consciousness cannot completely model itself, because >> that >> would require the model created in the mind to be as complex as the >> computation that is modeling it, which seem inherently impossible. >> >> >> >> But many aspects of reality can be meaningfully represented by models that >> are substantial simplification of what they are modeling. Since any >> aspect >> of physical reality that we can see or touch without the aid of >> instruments >> involves at least 10^20 atoms, each vibrating trillions of times a second, >> and each having electrons whose Schrödinger equations vibrate something >> like >> 10^19 times a second --- we humans naturally perceive, understand, and >> navigate the world only at the level of extremely gross generalizations. >> But through the tools of science, including computers, we have been able >> to >> create and test models that operate at much finer, or much more complex >> levels >> >> >> >> I totally disagree with the notion that consciousness and its relation to >> the physical world are inexplicable. Clearly certain aspect of >> consciousness can be explained in terms of meaningful generalizations. >> Psychology and brain science have already created many such meaningful >> generalizations. Richard seems to admit as much, when he dismissed all >> the >> examples I have given in this thread of scientific knowledge about >> consciousness as merely examples of the easy problems of consciousness. >> Easy or not, they are meaningful explanations about consciousness. >> >> >> >> Our understanding of the human mind has grown tremendously in the last >> decade and the rate of of our learning on the subject is rapidly >> accelerating. This includes our understanding of the physical correlates >> of >> consciousness. >> >> >> >> So, do I think we will ever understand everything about consciousness --- >> of >> course not. But do I think that within fifty years we will know much, >> much >> more about it – of course. >> >> >> >> In fact, I think we will come to understand the sense of awareness that we >> experience in our own consciousnesses as a natural result of a certain >> type >> of computation, one which has an extremely rich, but somewhat coherently >> controlled feedback loop with its own extremely complex internal state. >> >> >> >> Why does do our bodies sense reaility? Because they are located within >> it, >> and have systems for sensing and affecting realities. >> >> >> >> Why do we experience consciousness? Because computation in our mind is >> located within the mind and has system for sensing and affecting its >> states. >> >> >> >> Its not quite that simple, but that is a central part of the puzzle. It >> is >> sort of a Zen thing. But I hope people on this list open your mind to the >> concept that a human consciousness is a special type of computation. It >> is >> a computation that includes the generation of a sense of experiencing and >> understanding a sequence of conscious concepts by simultaneous activation >> of >> prior experiences related to each such concept, being project into a mind >> previously activated by the grounding of previously selected concepts, so >> as >> to provide a sense of grounding for those concepts that is appropriate to >> the sequence of prior activations. >> >> >> >> The complexity of the brain, just in terms of neurons (10^11) is equal to >> a >> large football stadium (10^5) seats in which every single seat is itself a >> 10 large football stadiums in which each seat corresponds to a agent with >> connections to 100 to 10,000 other such agents, having memory at each of >> those connections, and there are mechanism for communicating information >> to >> the whole stadium of stadiums at once, and there are lots of local >> channels >> and screens. >> >> >> >> Image, what a complexly dynamic crowd that could be. >> >> >> >> The more you think about it the more it makes sense. I read a book called >> the "Minds of Robots" in 1964 which said that conscious news was >> computation, but it was not until after I was well into my '69-70 >> independent study on AI with comprehensive reading list from Minsky, and I >> understood roughly the numbers associated with the computation of the >> brain, >> had understood experiential computing based on Minsky K-line theory, and >> had >> thought about it in a couple on acid trips that I truly started to >> understand how straight forward such a statement is. >> >> >> >> (Please note I have not taken any acid in over three decades and I an not >> advocating its use outside of the care of a responsible psychiatrist.) >> >> >> >> ---------------- >> >> >> >> With regard to your paper, I read it, but I did not spend the time that >> probably would be required for me to understand it. >> >> >> >> Unlike you, I was only briefly bothered by the fact that most of the real >> number line was full of irrational numbers. I had very little trouble >> understanding the concept of a limit in calculus. If some solution can be >> reasonably be shown to have an error smaller than any you would ever be >> concerned with, that's good enough for me. >> >> >> >> I guess this is because I have never been one for theoretical purity. In >> fact, I tend to instinctually distrust it. In fact, I think all kids >> should >> be taught in school to distrust, at least to some degree, all theories (as >> well as their own senses and memories). I was originally in favor of >> spending one day a year in high school science to discuss intelligent >> design >> because if it would be part of an honest discussion about why, when, and >> to >> what degree we should trust scientific theory. Once I found that most of >> the intelligent design texts were total, closed minded propaganda, I >> changed >> my mind. >> >> >> >> There were some parts of your paper I particularly did not under stand. >> Let >> me quote them and then ask you about them. >> >> >> >> --------------------- >> >> >> >> (1) In the simplest case, A2 may represent U directly in the language, >> using >> a single expression" >> >> >> >> How, can U be directly represented in the language if it is uncomputable? >> >> >> >> I assume you consider any irational number, such as pi to be uncomputable >> (although, at least pi has a forumula that with enough computation can be >> approach it as a limit – as assume the for most real numbers if there is >> such a formula, we do not know it.) Merely communicating the symbol pi >> only >> represents the number if the agent receiving the communication has a more >> detailed definition, but any definition, such as a formula for iteratively >> approaching pi, which presumably is what you mean by R_U would only be an >> approximation. >> >> >> >> So U could never by fully represented unless one had infinite time --- and >> I >> generally consider it a waste of time to think about infinate time unless >> there is something valuable about such considerations that has a use in >> much >> more human-sized chunks of time. >> >> >> >> In fact, it seems the major message of quantum mechanic is that even >> physical reality doesn't have the time or machinery to compute >> uncomputable >> things. So the real number line is not really real. It is at best a >> construct of the human mind that can at best only be approximated in part. >> >> >> >> (2) complexity(U) < complexity(R_U) >> >> >> >> Because I did not understand how U could be represented, and how R_U could >> be anything other than an approximation for any practical purposes, I >> didn't >> understand the meaning of the above line from your article? >> >> >> >> If U and R_U have the meaning I guessed in my discussion of text quote >> (1), >> above, U could not be meaningfully representable in the language, other >> than >> by a symbol that reference some definition (presumably R_U), which, in >> order >> even be able to approximate U's uncomputable complexity, would have to be >> more complex than U itself. >> >> >> >> So why wouldn't this inequality always be true? >> >> >> >> (3) complexity(real number line R) <> >> >> >> >> I didn't understand this formula because I don't know what the "<>" symbol >> means and I don't know if some text was supposed to follow after it. >> >> >> >> (4) If NO, then it means the mind is better off using the axioms for R >> than >> using R directly. And, I suggest, that is what we actually do when using R >> in calculus. We don't use R as an "actual entity" in any strong sense, we >> use R as an abstract set of axioms. >> >> >> >> From quote (4) above it is clear I don't understand what you are saying >> "NO" >> to. But it seems pretty obvious that our minds, and even our computers, >> do >> not use R directly (after all the percent of it that is uncomputable would >> appear to approach 100% as a limit --- even worse it contains an infinity >> of >> infinitely complex things), but we have a set of axioms and models about >> it >> that are quite useful? >> >> >> >> >> >> (5) What would YES mean? It would mean that somehow we, as uncomputable >> beings, used R as an internal source of intuition about continuity ... not >> thus deriving any conclusions beyond the ones obtainable using the axioms >> about R, but deriving conclusions in a way that we found subjectively >> simpler. >> >> >> >> Again from Quote (4) I don't know what "YES" means. But if by use R as an >> internal source of intuition about continuity, you mean we that we >> actually >> model the true complexity of R, I think that is absurd on its face. How >> can >> several pounds of matter that is the human brain model an infinity of >> infinitely complexity things? >> >> >> >> --------------------- >> >> >> >> I don't understand what your paper on uncomputability has to do with my >> questions and comments about Richard's paper, other than to highlight >> profoundly that many things are uncomputable. But for at least since my >> 1969-1970 study of AI I have always felt the true complexity of any one >> human consciousness would be far beyond human comprehension. After all I >> am >> the one attacking Richard's paper for not discussing depth and complexity >> of >> computation as a source of our perception of consciousnesses richness. >> >> >> >> As I said above, it is clearly uncomputable to have the brain be able to >> understand itself completely, or even anything close to completely. I >> have >> never doubted that. But that does not necessarily mean that we cannot >> come >> to know the brain and mind, through the use of computers and models, with >> as >> much specificity as we can understand most aspects of physical reality >> that >> are anywhere nearly as complex. >> >> >> >> I do not think the human mind is all irreducible complexity. Remember >> that >> chaos theory is the study of systems that are a mixture of randomness and >> regularity. Despite its complexity, I think human consciousness has enough >> regularities that in fifty years we will have a surprising and >> philosophically transformative degree of understanding about it – although >> not total understanding. >> >> >> >> Remember most people in the know are predicting human-level AI in 20 >> years, >> so that would mean the level of understanding we would have of the human >> mind in 50 years, barring a major collapse of civilization, would benefit >> from a full 30 years of superhuman intelligence and immeasurably better >> brain scanning and interfacing technology. >> >> >> >> Ed Porter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Ben Goertzel [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2008 5:39 PM >> >> To: [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of >> consciousness >> >> >> >> Ed, >> >> >> >> I'd be curious for your reaction to >> >> >> >> http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2008/10/are-uncomputable-entities-useless-for.html >> >> >> >> which explores the limits of scientific and linguistic explanation, in >> >> a different but possibly related way to Richard's argument. >> >> >> >> Science and language are powerful tools for explanation but there is >> >> no reason to assume they are all-powerful. We should push them as far >> >> as we can, but no further... >> >> >> >> I agree with Richard that according to standard scientific notions of >> >> explanation, consciousness and its relation to the physical world are >> >> inexplicable. My intuition and reasoning are probably not exactly the >> >> same as his, but there seems some similarity btw our views... >> >> >> >> -- Ben G >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 5:27 PM, Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >>> Richard, >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> (the second half of this post, that starting with the all capitalized >> >>> heading, is the most important) >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> I agree with your extreme cognitive semantics discussion. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> I agree with your statement that one criterion for "realness" is the >> >>> directness and immediateness of something's phenomenology. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> I agree with your statement that, based on this criterion for "realness," >> >>> many conscious phenomena, such as qualia, which have traditionally fallen >> >>> under the hard problem of consciousness seem to be "real." >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> But I have problems with some of the conclusions you draw from these >>> things, >> >>> particularly in your "Implications" section at the top of the second >>> column >> >>> on Page 5 of your paper. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> There you state >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> "…the correct explanation for consciousness is that all of its various >> >>> phenomenological facets deserve to be called as "real" as any other >>> concept >> >>> we have, because there are no meaningful objective standards that we >>> could >> >>> apply to judge them otherwise." >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> That aspects of consciousness seem real does not provides much of an >> >>> "explanation for consciousness." It says something, but not much. It >>> adds >> >>> little to Descartes' "I think therefore I am." I don't think it provides >> >>> much of an answer to any of the multiple questions Wikipedia associates >>> with >> >>> Chalmer's hard problem of consciousness. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> You further state that some aspects of consciousness have a unique status >>> of >> >>> being beyond the reach of scientific inquiry and give a purported reason >>> why >> >>> they are beyond such a reach. Similarly you say: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> "…although we can never say exactly what the phenomena of consciousness >>> are, >> >>> in the way that we give scientific explanations for other things, we can >> >>> nevertheless say exactly why we cannot say anything: so in the end, we >>> can >> >>> explain it." >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> First, I would point out as I have in my prior papers that, given the >> >>> advances that are expected to be made in AGI, brain scanning and brain >> >>> science in the next fifty years, it is not clear that consciousness is >> >>> necessarily any less explainable than are many other aspects of physical >> >>> reality. You admit there are easy problems of consciousness that can be >> >>> explained, just as there are easy parts of physical reality that can be >> >>> explained. But it is not clear that the percent of consciousness that >>> will >> >>> remain a mystery in fifty years is any larger than the percent of basic >> >>> physical reality that will remain a mystery in that time frame. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> But even if we accept as true your statement that certain phenomena of >> >>> consciousness are beyond analysis, that does little to explain >> >>> consciousness. In fact, it does not appear to answer any of the hard >> >>> problems of consciousness. For example, just because (a) we are >>> conscious >> >>> of the distinction used in our own mind's internal representation between >> >>> sensation of the colors red and blue, (b) we allegedly cannot analyze >>> that >> >>> difference further, and (c) that distinction seems subjectively real to >>> us >> >>> --- that does not shed much light on whether or not a p-zombie would be >> >>> capable of acting just like a human without having consciousness of red >>> and >> >>> blue color qualia. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> It is not even clear to me that your paper shows consciousness is not an >> >>> "artifact, " as your abstract implies. Just because something is "real" >> >>> does not mean it is not an "artifact", in many senses of the word, such >>> as >> >>> an unintended, secondary, or unessential, aspect of something. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> THE REAL WEAKNESS OF YOUR PAPER IS THAT IS PUTS WAY TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON >>> THE >> >>> PART OF YOUR MOLECULAR FRAMEWORK THAT ALLEGEDLY BOTTOMS OUT, AND NOT >>> ENOUGH >> >>> ON THE PART OF THE FRAMEWORK YOU SAY REPORTS A SENSE OF REALNESS DESPITE >> >>> SUCH BOTTOMING OUT -- THE SENSE OF REALNESS THAT IS MOST ESSENTIAL TO >> >>> CONSCIOUSNESS. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> It is my belief that if you want to understand consciousness in the >>> context >> >>> of the types of things discussed in your paper, you should focus the part >>> of >> >>> the molecular framework, which you imply it is largely in the foreground, >> >>> that prevents the system from returning with no answer, even when trying >>> to >> >>> analyze a node such as a lowest level input node for the color red in a >> >>> given portion of the visual field. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> This is the part of your molecular framework that >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> "…because of the nature of the representations used in the foreground, >>> there >> >>> is no way for the analysis mechanism to fail to return some kind of >>> answer, >> >>> because a non-existent answer would be the same as representing the color >>> of >> >>> red as "nothing," and in that case all colors would be the same." (Page >>> 3, >> >>> Col.2, first full paragraph.) >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> It is also presumably the part of your molecular framework that >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> "…report that 'There is definitely something that it is like to be >> >>> experiencing the subjective essence of red, but that thing is ineffable >>> and >> >>> inexplicable.' " (Page 3, Col. 2, 2nd full paragraph.) >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> This is the part of your system that is providing the subjective >>> experience >> >>> that you say is providing the "realness" to your conscious experience. >>> This >> >>> is where your papers should focus. How does it provide this sense of >> >>> realness. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Unfortunately, your description of the molecular framework provides some, >> >>> but very little, insight into what might be providing this subjective >>> sense >> >>> of experience, that is so key to the conclusions of your paper. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> In multiple prior posts on this thread I have said I believe the real >>> source >> >>> of consciousness appears to lie in such a molecular framework, but that >>> to >> >>> have anything approaching a human level of such consciousness this >> >>> framework, and its computations that give rise to consciousness, have to >>> be >> >>> extremely complex. I have also emphasized that brain scientist who have >> >>> already done research on the neural correlates of consciousness, tend to >> >>> indicate humans usually only report consciousness of things associated >>> with >> >>> fairly broad spread neural activation, which would normally involve many >> >>> billions or trillions of inter-neuron messages per second. I have >>> posited >> >>> that widespread activation of the nodes directly and indirectly >>> associated >> >>> with a given "conscious" node, provides dynamic grounding for the meaning >>> of >> >>> the conscious node. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> As I have pointed out, we know of nothing about physical reality that is >> >>> anything other than computation (if you consider representation to be >>> part >> >>> of computation). Similarly there is nothing our subjective experience >>> can >> >>> tell us about our own consciousnesses that is other than computation. >>> One >> >>> of the key words we humans use to describe our consciousnesses is >> >>> "awareness." Awareness is created by computation. It is my belief that >> >>> this awareness comes from the complex, dynamically focused, and >>> meaningful >> >>> way in which our thought processes compute in interaction with >>> themselves. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Ed Porter >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> P.S. (With regard to the alleged bottoming out reported in your papert: >>> as >>> I >> >>> have pointed out in previous threads, even the lowest level nodes in any >> >>> system would normally have associations that would give them a type and >> >>> degree of grounding and, thus, further meaning So that spreading >>> activation >> >>> would normally not bottom out when it reaches the lowest level nodes. >>> But >> >>> it would be subject to circularly, or a lack of information about lowest >> >>> nodes other than what could be learned from their associations with other >> >>> nodes in the system.) >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >> >>> From: Richard Loosemore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> >>> Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2008 1:57 PM >> >>> >> >>> To: [email protected] >> >>> Subject: Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of >> >>> consciousness >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Ben Goertzel wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> Richard, >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> I re-read your paper and I'm afraid I really don't grok why you think it >> >>> >> >>>> solves Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness... >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> It really seems to me like what you're suggesting is a "cognitive >> >>> >> >>>> correlate of consciousness", to morph the common phrase "neural >> >>> >> >>>> correlate of consciousness" ... >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> You seem to be stating that when X is an unanalyzable, pure atomic >> >>> >> >>>> sensation from the perspective of cognitive system C, then C will >> >>> >> >>>> perceive X as a raw quale ... unanalyzable and not explicable by >> >>> >> >>>> ordinary methods of explication, yet, still subjectively real... >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> But, I don't see how the hypothesis >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> "Conscious experience is **identified with** unanalyzable mind-atoms" >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> could be distinguished empirically from >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> "Conscious experience is **correlated with** unanalyzable mind-atoms" >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> I think finding cognitive correlates of consciousness is interesting, >> >>> >> >>>> but I don't think it constitutes solving the hard problem in Chalmers' >> >>> >> >>>> sense... >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> I grok that you're saying "consciousness feels inexplicable because it >> >>> >> >>>> has to do with atoms that the system can't explain, due to their role as >> >>> >> >>>> its primitive atoms" ... and this is a good idea, but, I don't see how >> >>> >> >>>> it bridges the gap btw subjective experience and empirical data .. >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> What it does is explain why, even if there *were* no hard problem, >> >>> >> >>>> cognitive systems might feel like there is one, in regard to their >> >>> >> >>>> unanalyzable atoms >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> Another worry I have is: I feel like I can be conscious of my son, even >> >>> >> >>>> though he is not an unanalyzable atom. I feel like I can be conscious >> >>> >> >>>> of the unique impression he makes ... in the same way that I'm conscious >> >>> >> >>>> of redness ... and, yeah, I feel like I can't fully explain the >> >>> >> >>>> conscious impression he makes on me, even though I can explain a lot of >> >>> >> >>>> things about him... >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>>> So I'm not convinced that atomic sensor input is the only source of raw, >> >>> >> >>>> unanalyzable consciousness... >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> My first response to this is that you still don't seem to have taken >> >>> >> >>> account of what was said in the second part of the paper - and, at the >> >>> >> >>> same time, I can find many places where you make statements that are >> >>> >> >>> undermined by that second part. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> To take the most significant example: when you say: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> > But, I don't see how the hypothesis >> >>> >> >>> > >> >>> >> >>> > "Conscious experience is **identified with** unanalyzable mind-atoms" >> >>> >> >>> > >> >>> >> >>> > could be distinguished empirically from >> >>> >> >>> > >> >>> >> >>> > "Conscious experience is **correlated with** unanalyzable mind-atoms" >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> ... there are several concepts buried in there, like [identified with], >> >>> >> >>> [distinguished empirically from] and [correlated with] that are >> >>> >> >>> theory-laden. In other words, when you use those terms you are >> >>> >> >>> implictly applying some standards that have to do with semantics and >> >>> >> >>> ontology, and it is precisely those standards that I attacked in part 2 >> >>> >> >>> of the paper. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> However, there is also another thing I can say about this statement, >> >>> >> >>> based on the argument in part one of the paper. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> It looks like you are also falling victim to the argument in part 1, at >> >>> >> >>> the same time that you are questioning its validity: one of the >> >>> >> >>> consequences of that initial argument was that *because* those >> >>> >> >>> concept-atoms are unanalyzable, you can never do any such thing as talk >> >>> >> >>> about their being "only correlated with a particular cognitive event" >> >>> >> >>> versus "actually being identified with that cognitive event"! >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> So when you point out that the above distinction seems impossible to >> >>> >> >>> make, I say: "Yes, of course: the theory itself just *said* that!". >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> So far, all of the serious questions that people have placed at the door >> >>> >> >>> of this theory have proved susceptible to that argument. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> That was essentially what I did when talking to Chalmers. He came up >> >>> >> >>> with an objection very like the one you gave above, so I said: "Okay, >> >>> >> >>> the answer is that the theory itself predicts that you *must* find that >> >>> >> >>> question to be a stumbling block ..... AND, more importantly, you should >> >>> >> >>> be able to see that the strategy I am using here is a strategy that I >> >>> >> >>> can flexibly d >> >> ... >> >> [Message clipped] > > > > -- > Ben Goertzel, PhD > CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC > Director of Research, SIAI > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > "I intend to live forever, or die trying." > -- Groucho Marx > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
