Zefram wrote:
Eep, here's another message with datestamps crossing midnight. (I just
CFJed about this concerning Quazie's VC spending.) Headers:
I think the "normal domain of technical control" argument should
continue to hold.
I remove "Proposal Racket" from the pool.
It was titled "Protection Racket", the same title that you used for the
new version. This probably wasn't effective in removing the old one.
Oops, things like that happen when you're in a hurry. (I caught up on a
few weeks' CotC DB backlog earlier, and have been entering subsequent
updates as soon as they come in.) The second one should still be
effective, though.
An Oligarch may refuse a CFJ by announcement. A refused CFJ
ceases to be a CFJ.
There is particular concern about this provision, so I'm disappointed to
see you retaining it in the second iteration. Swann's Mousetrap Thesis,
worth rereading at times like this, points out that the conspirators
there could have reserved judging duties for themselves, but refrained
from doing so because it would have greatly inflamed the crisis.
The theoretical threat of breaking the judiciary was what got me to
think of this scam in the first place. ("Wait a minute, if the Excess
CFJ rule can use the 'ceases to be a X' mechanism...") The similar
"ceases to be a proposal" mechanism was added as a secondary measure,
allowing the Oligarchy to shoot down repeal attempts prior to their
own "we give ourselves a token reward and then repeal the Oligarchy"
proposal. (I didn't anticipate a repeal attempt being launched before
the rule to be repealed was created.)
I would strongly encourage that the power over the judiciary not be
actually used except to set up a test case (call a trivial CFJ, refuse
it, call another CFJ on whether the refusal had its intended effect),
and that the power over proposals not be actually used except to shoot
down reward-less repeals (and preferably not even then; hopefully both
factions can agree on a suitable token instead).
