On Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:12:23 -0800 Brian Carlstrom wrote: > uid as having anything to do with a user.
It hasn't been apropriate for me to delve much into Android yet myself but your statement would be illogical as uid = userid. Maybe and I'm guessing, your confusing acl/rbac type restrictions on processes linked via path or inode with the distinct security you gain from using a seperate user for each process for priviledge seperation reasons. For example you can use setcap on /usr/bin/Xorg and remove the need to run it as root, and/or you can run it as root or any user and sculpt what it can and can't do with rbac/Rsbac/selinux. This ability is said to be what the venerable OpenBSD lacks but that is very close to complete rubbish especially in terms of trade-offs, though these acl systems can! gain a little more merit for desktop systems where exploits are rife. p.s. there's loads of security papers on Android. I've got a pile I've only read half of (as always). Have you tried e.g.: filetype:pdf Android Security uid -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Android Security Discussions" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/android-security-discuss?hl=en.
