On 11-Jun-19 04:21, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> 
> On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 7:49 AM Michael Richardson <[email protected] 
> <mailto:mcr%[email protected]>> wrote:
> 
> 
>     {I've clipped the CC list}
> 
>     Eric Rescorla <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>         >> On 09-Jun-19 01:37, Eliot Lear wrote:
>         >> >
>         >> >
>         >> >> On 7 Jun 2019, at 23:17, Toerless Eckert <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>         >> >>
>         >> >> Ok, now i got you (i hope ;-).
>         >> >>
>         >> >> I really liked the c1sco example (not sure if we should mention 
> a real
>         >> >> company name in such an rfc someone not reading the draft might 
> take
>         >> >> offense, maybe examp1e.com <http://examp1e.com> insted though).
>         >> >
>         >> > This is a bit tricky with the glyph attack, but certainly the 
> base
>         >> should be
>         >> > example.com <http://example.com>.
>         >>
>         >> Can you use null.example.com <http://null.example.com> and 
> nu11.example.com <http://nu11.example.com>?
>         >>
> 
>         > That's a little unfortunate from the perspective of this attack 
> because
>         > ..com is a public suffix [0] whereas example.com 
> <http://example.com> is not.
> 
>         > -Ekr
> 
>         > [0] https://publicsuffix.org/
> 
>     okay, I'm trying to understand the relevance of this from the point of an
>     example in an RFC.
> 
>     We need to put the example under example.*, but we can't use examp1e.com 
> <http://examp1e.com>,
>     because it's not an example domain.
> 
>     Brian suggested the example null vs nu11.
>     This is not about super-cookies, etc. and it doesn't suggest any kind of
>     process involving the list of publicsuffixes.
> 
> 
> The general shape of this kind of attack is that the attacker wants to 
> impersonate A and so gets a domain with name A' that looks like A. However, 
> this depends on A' being something the attacker can register. The public 
> suffix list embodies the concept (more or less) of "anyone can register 
> here". By contrast, a.example.com <http://a.example.com> is (I assume) owned 
> by example.com <http://example.com> and so your average attacker can't do 
> anything with b.example.com <http://b.example.com>.

However, examp1e.com is 2001:470:1f07:1126::555:1212 or 64.57.183.2 so we 
*really* can't use it. examp1e.net is 133.242.206.244 and actually responds to 
HTTP.

You're right that in theory subdomains are unrealistic examples, but does that
matter for an illustrative example?

    Brian

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