Hi,
Late feedback, but its ambiguous in the draft how vendor default Cloud 
Registrar 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20#section-2.7
 and redirects as described in 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20#section-5.6
 should interact.

Should the cloud registrar redirect immediately in response to the voucher 
request, so that the pledge then sends the voucher request via a local domain 
RA?
Should the cloud registrar issue a voucher, and then the redirect happens 
during the EST enrol flow?
When redirected, what trust anchor database should the pledge use?

It seems like:
- the cloud registrar should redirect to the local Registrar immediately and 
not issue a voucher (and this assumes a level of sales channel integration / 
ownership tracking so that the cloud registrar knows which registrar owns the 
pledge)
- the pledge should use the implicit trust anchor database for the initial 
connection to the cloud registrar, but then revert to standard provisional TLS 
connection for the initial connection to the local Registrar
- the pledge may include a proximity-registrar-cert in the new voucher request 
to the local Registrar

Doing the redirect immediately facilitates proximity assertions in the voucher 
request and associated audit logs in the MASA, and allows the MASA to discover 
the local domain CA from the voucher request signature. Maybe a clarifying 
sentence in section 2.7 would help?
Regards,
Owen

-----Original Message-----
From: Anima <[email protected]> On Behalf Of The IESG
Sent: 21 May 2019 22:21
To: IETF-Announce <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; 
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: [Anima] Last Call: <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> 
(Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Autonomic Networking Integrated Model 
and Approach WG (anima) to consider the following document: - 'Bootstrapping 
Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)'
  <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> as Proposed Standard

This is a second Last Call. IoT Directorate review was done after the ANIMA WG 
Last Call and consensus to request the publication, and that review resulted in 
substantial changes to the document.  

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final 
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the [email protected] 
mailing lists by 2019-06-04. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to 
[email protected] instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the 
Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
   Control Plane.  To do this a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI)
   is created using manufacturer installed X.509 certificate, in
   combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online
   and offline.  Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable
   address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity,
   or on limited/disconnected networks.  Support for lower security
   models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for
   legacy reasons but not encouraged.  Bootstrapping is complete when
   the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is
   successfully deployed to the device but the established secure
   connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the
   device as well.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/ballot/

The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2816/
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3233/
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2463/



The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information: 
    rfc8368: Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of 
Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) (Informational - IETF 
stream)



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