Brian E Carpenter <[email protected]> wrote: mcr> Brian suggested the example null vs nu11. mcr> This is not about super-cookies, etc. and it doesn't suggest any kind of mcr> process involving the list of publicsuffixes.
ekr> The general shape of this kind of attack is that the attacker wants
ekr> to impersonate A and so gets a domain with name A' that looks like
ekr> A. However, this depends on A' being something the attacker can
ekr> register. The public suffix list embodies the concept (more or less)
ekr> of "anyone can register here". By contrast, a.example.com
ekr> <http://a.example.com> is (I assume) owned by example.com
ekr> <http://example.com> and so your average attacker can't do anything
ekr> with b.example.com <http://b.example.com>.
bc> However, examp1e.com is 2001:470:1f07:1126::555:1212 or 64.57.183.2 so
bc> we *really* can't use it. examp1e.net is 133.242.206.244 and actually
bc> responds to HTTP.
yes, some nice people have been sending example.* traffic to /dev/null.
> You're right that in theory subdomains are unrealistic examples, but does
that
> matter for an illustrative example?
Exactly.
We are just trying to avoid c1sco.com / cisco.com as the example.
--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]>, Sandelman Software Works
-= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ Anima mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
