Hello, In discussing opposition to 2014-9, and why audited needs-basis is still very much important, Owen laid out the following point in support of needs assessments in NRPM 8.2:
> 1. To raise the visibility when an 8.3 transfer is being attempted through > structures designed > to disguise it as an 8.2 transfer. My response: I read this as an anti-speculation argument. It has been asserted in PPML over the years that there exists the possibility of well-capitalized actors coming into the IPv4 market, buying up tracts of available space, and then artificially raising the prices for the sole purpose of making a profit. This would be a bad thing to genuine needers of IPv4. By making policy levers a certain way, ARIN policy can quash those behaviors before they develop. It's a clear and concise argument that has, so far, won out in the policy development process The counter argument over the years has been equally consistent: markets work, let the markets be markets, ARIN shouldn't impede on markets. (That's my lay understanding, anyway. I am an engineer, not an arm chair economist.) I think the quoted text is the most compelling argument against part of my 2014-9 proposal, because Owen's probably right: it would be a great way for a speculator to get around the 24-month rule that exists in NRPM 8.3. It's been a few years (I think) since the ARIN PPML community has really argued through the speculator-vs-free market argument in a substantive policy discussion, so maybe Chicago is the right venue to see where the community's feelings tend towards nowadays. /david _______________________________________________ PPML You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml Please contact [email protected] if you experience any issues.
