Do we have any evidence that 1) a significant fraction of BGP hijacking (announcement in BGP of address space registered by an RIR to another organization that has not authorized them to use it) is being performed by organizations that have other address space directly registered to them by an RIR?
Or 2) is nearly all hijacking being performed by entities that have no relationship with the RIR? If 1) is true, then ARIN could theoretically revoke an organization’s registrations if they used address space that was not registered to them. We can of course debate whether we want RIRs to serve as adjudicators of what space RIR members are allowed to announce, but there would at least be something RIRs could do (kick non-cooperators out of the club of RIR registrants) to enforce their decisions if they decided to make them. But if 1) is false and 2) is true, then it’s not clear what ARIN could do about a case of BGP hijacking by someone who doesn’t have any ARIN resources registered to them. Can you think of anything we’d actually want ARIN to do in that case? ARIN’s only authority is to over their registry of who “has” which addresses, so the only thing I can imagine they could do would be to threaten to revoke unrelated registrations from a transit provider who willfully or negligently accepted the BGP announcement of space from an entity it wasn’t registered to. But if tier 1 transit providers aren’t willing to filter, let alone depeer, each other over hijacking today, it seems unlikely they’d be willing to stop accepting formerly legitimate prefixes from a peer or customer network just because ARIN is trying to take that space away to punish the network for accepting an unrelated hijacked announcement. Scott > On May 2, 2019, at 7:18 AM, Adam Thompson <[email protected]> wrote: > > Instead of focusing on whether the current proposal is or isn’t in scope, I > suggest we re-cast the discussion as follows: > > So far, we have unanimous community agreement that BGP hijacking is bad. > So far, we have broad agreement that “something ought to be done” about BGP > hijacking, although detailed opinions vary significantly. > So what (else) can ARIN do about it? (Caveat: the answer “nothing” is > unacceptable to a significant proportion of PPML participants.) > > My suggested direction to the AC and/or the board would therefore be: Find > something ARIN can do to help combat the problem (more effectively). If this > requires expanding the scope of ARIN’s operations or policies, bring that > back to the membership (possibly via PPML?) with the accompanying financial & > legal analysis, as usual. > > Now the question becomes: what is the most appropriate mechanism, within > ARIN’s existing policies, to bring a request like that to the AC and/or > Board? It seems clear to me that the petition already underway here is not > meeting, and will not meet, the needs of the community very well. > > -Adam > > Adam Thompson > Consultant, Infrastructure Services > <image001.png> > 100 - 135 Innovation Drive > Winnipeg, MB, R3T 6A8 > (204) 977-6824 or 1-800-430-6404 (MB only) > [email protected] > www.merlin.mb.ca > > _______________________________________________ > ARIN-PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > https://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml > Please contact [email protected] if you experience any issues.
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