El 2/5/19 17:16, "ARIN-PPML en nombre de Scott Leibrand" <[email protected] en nombre de [email protected]> escribió:
Do we have any evidence that 1) a significant fraction of BGP hijacking I will say that even if it solves a single case (going to the extreme), is good to have it. We often do policies that have a single case. We try to cover everything, with small wording changes. (announcement in BGP of address space registered by an RIR to another organization that has not authorized them to use it) is being performed by organizations that have other address space directly registered to them by an RIR? Or 2) is nearly all hijacking being performed by entities that have no relationship with the RIR? If 1) is true, then ARIN could theoretically revoke an organization’s registrations if they used address space that was not registered to them. We can of course debate whether we want RIRs to serve as adjudicators of what space RIR members are allowed to announce, but there would at least be something RIRs could do (kick non-cooperators out of the club of RIR registrants) to enforce their decisions if they decided to make them. But if 1) is false and 2) is true, then it’s not clear what ARIN could do about a case of BGP hijacking by someone who doesn’t have any ARIN resources registered to them. Can you think of anything we’d actually want ARIN to do in that case? ARIN’s only authority is to over their registry of who “has” which addresses, so the only thing I can imagine they could do would be to threaten to revoke unrelated registrations from a transit provider who willfully or negligently accepted the BGP announcement of space from an entity it wasn’t registered to. But if tier 1 transit providers aren’t willing to filter, let alone depeer, each other over hijacking today, it seems unlikely they’d be willing to stop accepting formerly legitimate prefixes from a peer or customer network just because ARIN is trying to take that space away to punish the network for accepting an unrelated hijacked announcement. Scott On May 2, 2019, at 7:18 AM, Adam Thompson <[email protected]> wrote: Instead of focusing on whether the current proposal is or isn’t in scope, I suggest we re-cast the discussion as follows: 1. So far, we have unanimous community agreement that BGP hijacking is bad. 2. So far, we have broad agreement that “something ought to be done” about BGP hijacking, although detailed opinions vary significantly. 3. So what (else) can ARIN do about it? (Caveat: the answer “nothing” is unacceptable to a significant proportion of PPML participants.) My suggested direction to the AC and/or the board would therefore be: Find something ARIN can do to help combat the problem (more effectively). If this requires expanding the scope of ARIN’s operations or policies, bring that back to the membership (possibly via PPML?) with the accompanying financial & legal analysis, as usual. Now the question becomes: what is the most appropriate mechanism, within ARIN’s existing policies, to bring a request like that to the AC and/or Board? It seems clear to me that the petition already underway here is not meeting, and will not meet, the needs of the community very well. -Adam Adam Thompson Consultant, Infrastructure Services <image001.png> 100 - 135 Innovation Drive Winnipeg, MB, R3T 6A8 (204) 977-6824 or 1-800-430-6404 (MB only) [email protected] www.merlin.mb.ca _______________________________________________ ARIN-PPML You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: https://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml Please contact [email protected] if you experience any issues. _______________________________________________ ARIN-PPML You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: https://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml Please contact [email protected] if you experience any issues. ********************************************** IPv4 is over Are you ready for the new Internet ? http://www.theipv6company.com The IPv6 Company This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.
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