This from today's Asia Times. Whether one agrees or not with the author, the
book promises to be good. There seems to be something for everyone. The 1st
& last paragraphs of the review are captivating.
--Ram
_____________________
*Embattled frontier
Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's
Response* by *S P Sinha*
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
A good 60 years after independence, India's politicians have failed to
satisfy the aspirations of its ethnically distinct northeastern region.
Policymakers in Delhi agonize over the incessant insurgencies on this
embattled frontier, where 99% of the external boundary synchronizes with
India's international border. Counter-productively, alienation and rebellion
in this strategic area are exacerbated by bias and insensitivity by agents
of the Indian government. Divisive strategies of political parties and an
entrenched nexus among politicians, bureaucrats and contractors contribute
to the mess.
In *Lost Opportunities*, S P Sinha, a scholar from the Indian army, presents
a one-stop compilation of the insurrections in all the northeast "Seven
Sister" states. His core argument is that events beyond India's borders,
rather than ethnic impulses, are more potent influences on the area's fate.
He highlights the multiple linkages between insurgencies on both sides of
the India-Myanmar border, where a "Christian cordon" exists among the Nagas,
Mizos, Kachins and Chins. However, overlooking the pernicious involvement of
the Myanmar military junta in drug trafficking and guerrilla-fanning, the
author clings to the illusion that it is "practical" for Delhi to cooperate
with Myanmar.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan and current-day
Bangladesh have hosted nearly all the insurgent groups of India's northeast.
The rise of Islamist terrorism in Assam and Tripura is a direct consequence
of massive illegal immigration from Bangladesh into these states. As of
1996, some 15 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants had infiltrated into
India, with upwards of 4 million settling in Assam and 1 million in Tripura.
Sinha pinpoints the changing demographic profile of the area as the "heart
of the problem". (p 27) Since 1937, the Muslim League ministry of Mohammad
Saadulla encouraged migration of Bengali Muslims into Assam with the aim of
claiming it as a part of the hoped-for Pakistan. After India's independence,
the malaise was allowed to fester due to "misplaced ideas of secularism and
vote bank politics". (p 31) The prophecy of former US secretary of state
Henry Kissinger that "Bangladesh would over the years accentuate India's
centrifugal tendencies and carve out new Muslim states" is an ever-creeping
reality.
When the British quit India in 1947, extremist Naga leader A Z Phizo voiced
demands for separation. As secessionists went on the rampage in the 1950s,
pro-India moderates like A K Sakhrie were tortured and murdered by the
militants. Coerced taxation, forcible recruitment of cadres, and arms
procurement from East Pakistan were part of the mix. The hostile conduct of
Michael Scott, a British missionary close to the rebels, undid chances of
any negotiated settlement. The spread of Christianity accentuated the Nagas'
sense of separateness. Across the northeast, missionaries "widened the
barrier and conflict between the hills and the plains". (p 229)
>From 1967 to 1974, Naga youths picked for guerrilla training trekked to
China, which even opened a school for northeastern insurgents in East
Pakistan. The 1975 Shillong Accord, which promised peace, was rejected by
some rebel factions under Chinese sway. Splits and internecine feuds between
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Naga National
Council played havoc with the lives of innocent civilians. A ceasefire has
held since 1997, but killings and extortion by the underground go on. NSCN's
revival of the Chinese connection and the visit of its top guns to Pakistan
in 2000 raise doubts about any final settlement.
Most Mizos did not press for separation from India in 1947. Unlike Nagaland,
the Church in Mizo opposed cecession and violence from the beginning.
Perceived discrimination by the central government during the 1959 famine
triggered militancy by the Mizo National Front (MNF), which was welcomed in
East Pakistan. Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India deprived MNF of
a reliable ally, but it regrouped with Chinese aid and Burmese havens.
Factionalism in the MNF weaned away splinters to join the Indian
"mainstream". The MNF supremo threw in the towel on being co-opted as Chief
Minister of Mizoram in 1987. Peace lasts in this state owing to the presence
of "an influential political class favoring autonomy within India". (p 101)
In Manipur, the genesis of insurgency lay in discontent that the majority
Meiteis and their language were neglected by Delhi in its bid to woo Naga
militants. Once Pakistan's assistance dried up after 1971, a China-trained
People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit was formed to perform urban terrorist
acts. In the 1990s, the PLA forged links with the armies of Pakistan and
Bangladesh. In this decade, the distinction between above ground and
underground politics blurred. Clashes between Nagas and Kukis, the two
minority tribes of Manipur, were possibly instigated by Indian intelligence
agencies and bankrolled by Manipuri politicians. Violent demonstrations by
Meiteis against bifurcating Manipur to meet the NSCN's demands are now
adding to the fracas.
In Tripura, the large influx of refugees from East Pakistan and the unlawful
transfer of tribal lands incited anti-Bengali militancy. Sporadic riots
against Bengalis resuscitated insurgency from time
to time. Bangladesh succored the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) through
the MNF, but it later backed off, fearing Indian reprisals in the form of
support for Chakma militants. Breakaway cliques of TNV rebels that enjoyed
the patronage of Tripura's political parties and operated through the porous
border with Bangladesh robbed the 1988 accord of its peace dividend.
In Assam, feelings of the evil step-mother-like treatment by the central
government in economic development, along with the dismemberment of the
state in 1972, built up a reservoir of resentment. Capitalizing on
anti-immigrant sentiment, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) arose
in the mid-1980s with the support of the then-Assam state government. Bodo
tribals seeking a new state out of Assam (within the Indian republic) took
to insurgency in 1988, allegedly with the blessings of Indian intelligence,
to counter ULFA. Sinha considers training camps in Bangladesh and espionage
work for Pakistan to be the two lifelines of ULFA. Myopically, he avoids
mentioning the complicity of the Myanmar junta as the third buoy.
Riding piggyback on the flood of Bangladeshi immigrants, numerous jihadi
outfits have cropped up in Assam with the goal of creating "Greater
Bangladesh". They might replace ethnic militant movements like those of
Kamtapur and Karbi-Dimasa as the locus of future insurgency. Sinha believes
that ULFA's ongoing purge of non-Assamese Indians is a stratagem to dig out
"working space for Bangladeshi Muslims". (p 308)
Taking the cue from Assam, Meghalaya underwent a number of violent riots
since 1979 against non-tribal Indians, Bangladeshis and Nepalese. Leveraging
the high rates of unemployment and drug addiction in the state, ULFA has
spawned front organizations such as the Achik National Volunteer Council to
facilitate safe passage for its cadres to and from Bangladesh.
Thanks to the foresight of consultants like Verrier Elwin, Arunachal Pradesh
avoided the trademark violence. However, the settlement of Chakma refugees
from East Pakistan sparked worries and spawned fledgling militant groups
like United Liberation Army of Arunachal.
Trade in illicit narcotics keeps many northeast insurgencies going.
Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, which share a common border with Burma,
together account for the smuggling of an estimated 20 kilograms of heroin
daily. Naga and Manipuri underground organizations derive a major portion of
their revenues from drug trafficking. The NSCN is known to collect 20%
tariffs on the value of drugs passing through its territory. It is also the
lynchpin of gunrunning in the northeast to Southeast Asia's clandestine arms
market.
India's counter-insurgency strategy in the troubled region graduated from
military solutions to "winning the hearts and minds" of disaffected tribes.
To isolate rebels in Nagaland and Mizoram, the Indian army grouped villages
that caused hardship for civilians. Policies like "area domination",
cordon-and-search and curfew along the international border could not be
avoided even though they restricted the freedom of communities.
To the Indian army's credit, '"civic action" (social welfare) that touched
people's lives at the grassroots was implemented in letter and spirit. The
spoilers are politicians and bureaucrats who are suspicious of any
enhancement of the army's public image as an instrument of social and
economic change. Poor relations between the army and local police also
hamper intelligence gathering.
As part of psychological operations, the Indian army disseminates pamphlets
detailing the amoral life and debauchery of rebel leaders. Wherever
possible, it erects armed militia units called "village guards" to take on
the despised rebels. In Sinha's opinion, the security forces still lack
tactical doctrines to confront insurgents in crowded urban centers.
To breathe easier in the northeast, India has had to ensure more efficient
administrators, infuse employment-generating investment, and curb illegal
immigration. Sinha advocates improved relations with Bangladesh and Myanmar,
but omits a deeper examination of regime shenanigans of these two countries.
To save the northeast, India needs to be sterner with fundamentalist regimes
in Dhaka and militarist regimes in Myanmar.
*Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's
Response*by SP Sinha. Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2007. ISBN:
81-7062-162-3. Price: US$ 24. 357 pages
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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