I wished I could be too. But Bhootor mukhor raam-naam ?
At 2:54 PM -0500 10/13/07, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
Hehehe!
And I thought you would be more open! :)
On 10/13/07, Chan Mahanta
<<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> a scholar from the Indian army,
**** Need we know more?
At 1:19 PM -0600 10/13/07, Ram Sarangapani wrote:
This from today's Asia Times. Whether one agrees or not with the
author, the book promises to be good. There seems to be something
for everyone. The 1st & last paragraphs of the review are
captivating.
--Ram
_____________________
Embattled frontier
Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and
India's Response by S P Sinha
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
A good 60 years after independence, India's politicians have failed
to satisfy the aspirations of its ethnically distinct northeastern
region. Policymakers in Delhi agonize over the incessant
insurgencies on this embattled frontier, where 99% of the external
boundary synchronizes with India's international border.
Counter-productively, alienation and rebellion in this strategic
area are exacerbated by bias and insensitivity by agents of the
Indian government. Divisive strategies of political parties and an
entrenched nexus among politicians, bureaucrats and contractors
contribute to the mess.
In Lost Opportunities, S P Sinha, a scholar from the Indian army,
presents a one-stop compilation of the insurrections in all the
northeast "Seven Sister" states. His core argument is that events
beyond India's borders, rather than ethnic impulses, are more potent
influences on the area's fate. He highlights the multiple linkages
between insurgencies on both sides of the India- Myanmar border,
where a "Christian cordon" exists among the Nagas, Mizos, Kachins
and Chins. However, overlooking the pernicious involvement of the
Myanmar military junta in drug trafficking and guerrilla-fanning,
the author clings to the illusion that it is "practical" for Delhi
to cooperate with Myanmar.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan and
current-day Bangladesh have hosted nearly all the insurgent groups
of India's northeast. The rise of Islamist terrorism in Assam and
Tripura is a direct consequence of massive illegal immigration from
Bangladesh into these states. As of 1996, some 15 million illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants had infiltrated into India, with upwards of 4
million settling in Assam and 1 million in Tripura.
Sinha pinpoints the changing demographic profile of the area as the
"heart of the problem". (p 27) Since 1937, the Muslim League
ministry of Mohammad Saadulla encouraged migration of Bengali
Muslims into Assam with the aim of claiming it as a part of the
hoped-for Pakistan. After India's independence, the malaise was
allowed to fester due to "misplaced ideas of secularism and vote
bank politics". (p 31) The prophecy of former US secretary of state
Henry Kissinger that "Bangladesh would over the years accentuate
India's centrifugal tendencies and carve out new Muslim states" is
an ever-creeping reality.
When the British quit India in 1947, extremist Naga leader A Z Phizo
voiced demands for separation. As secessionists went on the rampage
in the 1950s, pro-India moderates like A K Sakhrie were tortured and
murdered by the militants. Coerced taxation, forcible recruitment of
cadres, and arms procurement from East Pakistan were part of the
mix. The hostile conduct of Michael Scott, a British missionary
close to the rebels, undid chances of any negotiated settlement. The
spread of Christianity accentuated the Nagas' sense of separateness.
Across the northeast, missionaries "widened the barrier and conflict
between the hills and the plains". (p 229)
From 1967 to 1974, Naga youths picked for guerrilla training
trekked to China, which even opened a school for northeastern
insurgents in East Pakistan. The 1975 Shillong Accord, which
promised peace, was rejected by some rebel factions under Chinese
sway. Splits and internecine feuds between the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Naga National Council played
havoc with the lives of innocent civilians. A ceasefire has held
since 1997, but killings and extortion by the underground go on.
NSCN's revival of the Chinese connection and the visit of its top
guns to Pakistan in 2000 raise doubts about any final settlement.
Most Mizos did not press for separation from India in 1947. Unlike
Nagaland, the Church in Mizo opposed cecession and violence from the
beginning. Perceived discrimination by the central government during
the 1959 famine triggered militancy by the Mizo National Front
(MNF), which was welcomed in East Pakistan. Pakistan's defeat in the
1971 war with India deprived MNF of a reliable ally, but it
regrouped with Chinese aid and Burmese havens. Factionalism in the
MNF weaned away splinters to join the Indian "mainstream". The MNF
supremo threw in the towel on being co-opted as Chief Minister of
Mizoram in 1987. Peace lasts in this state owing to the presence of
"an influential political class favoring autonomy within India". (p
101)
In Manipur, the genesis of insurgency lay in discontent that the
majority Meiteis and their language were neglected by Delhi in its
bid to woo Naga militants. Once Pakistan's assistance dried up after
1971, a China-trained People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit was formed
to perform urban terrorist acts. In the 1990s, the PLA forged links
with the armies of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In this decade, the
distinction between above ground and underground politics blurred.
Clashes between Nagas and Kukis, the two minority tribes of Manipur,
were possibly instigated by Indian intelligence agencies and
bankrolled by Manipuri politicians. Violent demonstrations by
Meiteis against bifurcating Manipur to meet the NSCN's demands are
now adding to the fracas.
In Tripura, the large influx of refugees from East Pakistan and the
unlawful transfer of tribal lands incited anti-Bengali militancy.
Sporadic riots against Bengalis resuscitated insurgency from time
to time. Bangladesh succored the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)
through the MNF, but it later backed off, fearing Indian reprisals
in the form of support for Chakma militants. Breakaway cliques of
TNV rebels that enjoyed the patronage of Tripura's political parties
and operated through the porous border with Bangladesh robbed the
1988 accord of its peace dividend.
In Assam, feelings of the evil step-mother-like treatment by the
central government in economic development, along with the
dismemberment of the state in 1972, built up a reservoir of
resentment. Capitalizing on anti-immigrant sentiment, the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) arose in the mid-1980s with the
support of the then-Assam state government. Bodo tribals seeking a
new state out of Assam (within the Indian republic) took to
insurgency in 1988, allegedly with the blessings of Indian
intelligence, to counter ULFA. Sinha considers training camps in
Bangladesh and espionage work for Pakistan to be the two lifelines
of ULFA. Myopically, he avoids mentioning the complicity of the
Myanmar junta as the third buoy.
Riding piggyback on the flood of Bangladeshi immigrants, numerous
jihadi outfits have cropped up in Assam with the goal of creating
"Greater Bangladesh". They might replace ethnic militant movements
like those of Kamtapur and Karbi-Dimasa as the locus of future
insurgency. Sinha believes that ULFA's ongoing purge of non-Assamese
Indians is a stratagem to dig out "working space for Bangladeshi
Muslims". (p 308)
Taking the cue from Assam, Meghalaya underwent a number of violent
riots since 1979 against non-tribal Indians, Bangladeshis and
Nepalese. Leveraging the high rates of unemployment and drug
addiction in the state, ULFA has spawned front organizations such as
the Achik National Volunteer Council to facilitate safe passage for
its cadres to and from Bangladesh.
Thanks to the foresight of consultants like Verrier Elwin, Arunachal
Pradesh avoided the trademark violence. However, the settlement of
Chakma refugees from East Pakistan sparked worries and spawned
fledgling militant groups like United Liberation Army of Arunachal.
Trade in illicit narcotics keeps many northeast insurgencies going.
Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, which share a common border with
Burma, together account for the smuggling of an estimated 20
kilograms of heroin daily. Naga and Manipuri underground
organizations derive a major portion of their revenues from drug
trafficking. The NSCN is known to collect 20% tariffs on the value
of drugs passing through its territory. It is also the lynchpin of
gunrunning in the northeast to Southeast Asia's clandestine arms
market.
India's counter-insurgency strategy in the troubled region graduated
from military solutions to "winning the hearts and minds" of
disaffected tribes. To isolate rebels in Nagaland and Mizoram, the
Indian army grouped villages that caused hardship for civilians.
Policies like "area domination", cordon-and-search and curfew along
the international border could not be avoided even though they
restricted the freedom of communities.
To the Indian army's credit, '"civic action" (social welfare) that
touched people's lives at the grassroots was implemented in letter
and spirit. The spoilers are politicians and bureaucrats who are
suspicious of any enhancement of the army's public image as an
instrument of social and economic change. Poor relations between the
army and local police also hamper intelligence gathering.
As part of psychological operations, the Indian army disseminates
pamphlets detailing the amoral life and debauchery of rebel leaders.
Wherever possible, it erects armed militia units called "village
guards" to take on the despised rebels. In Sinha's opinion, the
security forces still lack tactical doctrines to confront insurgents
in crowded urban centers.
To breathe easier in the northeast, India has had to ensure more
efficient administrators, infuse employment-generating investment,
and curb illegal immigration. Sinha advocates improved relations
with Bangladesh and Myanmar, but omits a deeper examination of
regime shenanigans of these two countries. To save the northeast,
India needs to be sterner with fundamentalist regimes in Dhaka and
militarist regimes in Myanmar.
Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and
India's Responseby SP Sinha. Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2007.
ISBN: 81-7062-162-3. Price: US$ 24. 357 pages
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
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