Hehehe! And I thought you would be more open! :)
On 10/13/07, Chan Mahanta <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > a scholar from the Indian army, > > > > > **** Need we know more? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At 1:19 PM -0600 10/13/07, Ram Sarangapani wrote: > > This from today's Asia Times. Whether one agrees or not with the > author, the book promises to be good. There seems to be something for > everyone. The 1st & last paragraphs of the review are captivating. > > --Ram > > _____________________ > > > > *Embattled frontier > Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's > Response* by* S P Sinha* > > Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia > > A good 60 years after independence, India's politicians have failed to > satisfy the aspirations of its ethnically distinct northeastern region. > Policymakers in Delhi agonize over the incessant insurgencies on this > embattled frontier, where 99% of the external boundary synchronizes with > India's international border. Counter-productively, alienation and rebellion > in this strategic area are exacerbated by bias and insensitivity by agents > of the Indian government. Divisive strategies of political parties and an > entrenched nexus among politicians, bureaucrats and contractors contribute > to the mess. > > In* Lost Opportunities*, S P Sinha, a scholar from the Indian army, > presents a one-stop compilation of the insurrections in all the northeast > "Seven Sister" states. His core argument is that events beyond India's > borders, rather than ethnic impulses, are more potent influences on the > area's fate. He highlights the multiple linkages between insurgencies on > both sides of the India- Myanmar border, where a "Christian cordon" exists > among the Nagas, Mizos, Kachins and Chins. However, overlooking the > pernicious involvement of the Myanmar military junta in drug trafficking and > guerrilla-fanning, the author clings to the illusion that it is "practical" > for Delhi to cooperate with Myanmar. > > The Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan and current-day > Bangladesh have hosted nearly all the insurgent groups of India's northeast. > The rise of Islamist terrorism in Assam and Tripura is a direct consequence > of massive illegal immigration from Bangladesh into these states. As of > 1996, some 15 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants had infiltrated into > India, with upwards of 4 million settling in Assam and 1 million in Tripura. > > Sinha pinpoints the changing demographic profile of the area as the "heart > of the problem". (p 27) Since 1937, the Muslim League ministry of Mohammad > Saadulla encouraged migration of Bengali Muslims into Assam with the aim of > claiming it as a part of the hoped-for Pakistan. After India's independence, > the malaise was allowed to fester due to "misplaced ideas of secularism and > vote bank politics". (p 31) The prophecy of former US secretary of state > Henry Kissinger that "Bangladesh would over the years accentuate India's > centrifugal tendencies and carve out new Muslim states" is an ever-creeping > reality. > > When the British quit India in 1947, extremist Naga leader A Z Phizo > voiced demands for separation. As secessionists went on the rampage in the > 1950s, pro-India moderates like A K Sakhrie were tortured and murdered by > the militants. Coerced taxation, forcible recruitment of cadres, and arms > procurement from East Pakistan were part of the mix. The hostile conduct of > Michael Scott, a British missionary close to the rebels, undid chances of > any negotiated settlement. The spread of Christianity accentuated the Nagas' > sense of separateness. Across the northeast, missionaries "widened the > barrier and conflict between the hills and the plains". (p 229) > > >From 1967 to 1974, Naga youths picked for guerrilla training trekked to > China, which even opened a school for northeastern insurgents in East > Pakistan. The 1975 Shillong Accord, which promised peace, was rejected by > some rebel factions under Chinese sway. Splits and internecine feuds between > the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Naga National > Council played havoc with the lives of innocent civilians. A ceasefire has > held since 1997, but killings and extortion by the underground go on. NSCN's > revival of the Chinese connection and the visit of its top guns to Pakistan > in 2000 raise doubts about any final settlement. > > > Most Mizos did not press for separation from India in 1947. Unlike > Nagaland, the Church in Mizo opposed cecession and violence from the > beginning. Perceived discrimination by the central government during the > 1959 famine triggered militancy by the Mizo National Front (MNF), which was > welcomed in East Pakistan. Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India > deprived MNF of a reliable ally, but it regrouped with Chinese aid and > Burmese havens. Factionalism in the MNF weaned away splinters to join the > Indian "mainstream". The MNF supremo threw in the towel on being co-opted as > Chief Minister of Mizoram in 1987. Peace lasts in this state owing to the > presence of "an influential political class favoring autonomy within India". > (p 101) > > In Manipur, the genesis of insurgency lay in discontent that the majority > Meiteis and their language were neglected by Delhi in its bid to woo Naga > militants. Once Pakistan's assistance dried up after 1971, a China-trained > People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit was formed to perform urban terrorist > acts. In the 1990s, the PLA forged links with the armies of Pakistan and > Bangladesh. In this decade, the distinction between above ground and > underground politics blurred. Clashes between Nagas and Kukis, the two > minority tribes of Manipur, were possibly instigated by Indian intelligence > agencies and bankrolled by Manipuri politicians. Violent demonstrations by > Meiteis against bifurcating Manipur to meet the NSCN's demands are now > adding to the fracas. > > In Tripura, the large influx of refugees from East Pakistan and the > unlawful transfer of tribal lands incited anti-Bengali militancy. Sporadic > riots against Bengalis resuscitated insurgency from time > > > > to time. Bangladesh succored the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) through > the MNF, but it later backed off, fearing Indian reprisals in the form of > support for Chakma militants. Breakaway cliques of TNV rebels that enjoyed > the patronage of Tripura's political parties and operated through the porous > border with Bangladesh robbed the 1988 accord of its peace dividend. > > In Assam, feelings of the evil step-mother-like treatment by the central > government in economic development, along with the dismemberment of the > state in 1972, built up a reservoir of resentment. Capitalizing on > anti-immigrant sentiment, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) arose > in the mid-1980s with the support of the then-Assam state government. Bodo > tribals seeking a new state out of Assam (within the Indian republic) took > to insurgency in 1988, allegedly with the blessings of Indian intelligence, > to counter ULFA. Sinha considers training camps in Bangladesh and espionage > work for Pakistan to be the two lifelines of ULFA. Myopically, he avoids > mentioning the complicity of the Myanmar junta as the third buoy. > > Riding piggyback on the flood of Bangladeshi immigrants, numerous jihadi > outfits have cropped up in Assam with the goal of creating "Greater > Bangladesh". They might replace ethnic militant movements like those of > Kamtapur and Karbi-Dimasa as the locus of future insurgency. Sinha believes > that ULFA's ongoing purge of non-Assamese Indians is a stratagem to dig out > "working space for Bangladeshi Muslims". (p 308) > > Taking the cue from Assam, Meghalaya underwent a number of violent riots > since 1979 against non-tribal Indians, Bangladeshis and Nepalese. Leveraging > the high rates of unemployment and drug addiction in the state, ULFA has > spawned front organizations such as the Achik National Volunteer Council to > facilitate safe passage for its cadres to and from Bangladesh. > > Thanks to the foresight of consultants like Verrier Elwin, Arunachal > Pradesh avoided the trademark violence. However, the settlement of Chakma > refugees from East Pakistan sparked worries and spawned fledgling militant > groups like United Liberation Army of Arunachal. > > Trade in illicit narcotics keeps many northeast insurgencies going. > Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, which share a common border with Burma, > together account for the smuggling of an estimated 20 kilograms of heroin > daily. Naga and Manipuri underground organizations derive a major portion of > their revenues from drug trafficking. The NSCN is known to collect 20% > tariffs on the value of drugs passing through its territory. It is also the > lynchpin of gunrunning in the northeast to Southeast Asia's clandestine arms > market. > > > India's counter-insurgency strategy in the troubled region graduated from > military solutions to "winning the hearts and minds" of disaffected tribes. > To isolate rebels in Nagaland and Mizoram, the Indian army grouped villages > that caused hardship for civilians. Policies like "area domination", > cordon-and-search and curfew along the international border could not be > avoided even though they restricted the freedom of communities. > > To the Indian army's credit, '"civic action" (social welfare) that touched > people's lives at the grassroots was implemented in letter and spirit. The > spoilers are politicians and bureaucrats who are suspicious of any > enhancement of the army's public image as an instrument of social and > economic change. Poor relations between the army and local police also > hamper intelligence gathering. > > As part of psychological operations, the Indian army disseminates > pamphlets detailing the amoral life and debauchery of rebel leaders. > Wherever possible, it erects armed militia units called "village guards" to > take on the despised rebels. In Sinha's opinion, the security forces still > lack tactical doctrines to confront insurgents in crowded urban centers. > > To breathe easier in the northeast, India has had to ensure more efficient > administrators, infuse employment-generating investment, and curb illegal > immigration. Sinha advocates improved relations with Bangladesh and Myanmar, > but omits a deeper examination of regime shenanigans of these two countries. > To save the northeast, India needs to be sterner with fundamentalist regimes > in Dhaka and militarist regimes in Myanmar. > > *Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's > Response*by SP Sinha. Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2007. ISBN: > 81-7062-162-3. Price: US$ 24. 357 pages > > (Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact > us about sales, syndication and republishing.) > > > > > _______________________________________________ > assam mailing list > [email protected] > http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org > > > > > _______________________________________________ > assam mailing list > [email protected] > http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org > >
_______________________________________________ assam mailing list [email protected] http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
