Jerry:

On Wed, May 8, 2013 at 9:19 PM, Jerry Shepherd <[email protected]>wrote:

> Hi Karl,
>
> I'm afraid there's a bit of "around and around"-ness in our emails back
> and forth, so I guess, to use the old cliché, on some things, we'll just
> have to agree to disagree.  But there are a couple of things I'd like to
> clarify.
>
> (1) There's a bit of inconsistency in your posts, in that, on the one
> hand, you say that you reject the methodology of defining by semantic
> domains; yet, on the other hand, you say that your dictionary, unlike other
> lexicons, has an "extensive cross-referencing of synonyms."  But this is
> one of the very things that semantic domain lexicons try to do.  They try
> to understand words by looking at how they fit in with other words that are
> in the semantic field.  In fact, your attempt to refer to refer to a
> "commonality of action" has much more to do with a semantic domain than it
> does to "meaning."  So by criticizing semantic domain work, you're really
> undercutting and undermining what, in at least some respect, you are trying
> to do yourself.
>

Personally, I don’t see any inconsistency in my methodology, nor my
attempts to communicate, but I see difficulties to have people understand
when the thinking processes are so different.

Don’t you see, that when you look at semantic fields, that you are looking
at forms? That it is the forms of the semantic fields that give the widely
varying understandings?

To go back to an example that I mentioned before, “to swing”, when
referring to a conductor in front of an orchestra, in semantic domains,
what is the focus? Is it not the formal structure of the conductor
positioned in front of the orchestra? That the swinging of the baton in
that formal structure is subject to the formal structure, for the purpose
of leading the orchestra?

But I looked at the actions taken by the baton itself, and that action is
consistent with all other physical objects that have the motion of swing
(not counting the idiomatic uses of the word “swing”, idiomatic uses that
get their understanding from referring to the physical action), namely
limited circular motion around an arc.

Looking for synonyms doesn’t undercut what I do, in that synonyms refer to
similar actions, often where there is overlap; e.g. “to revolve” can be a
limited circular motion around an arc, but it also contains the idea of
unlimited circular motion, so the action is slightly different from “to
swing”.

To bring in a Hebrew example, בקר to look after, הבר to observe, חזה to
vision, view, נבט to stare, i.e. look closely at or with expectation,
עיןto have one’s eye on (somebody),
שגח to look steadily, to gaze, שזף to glimpse for a moment, שקף to look out
(e.g. from a window), draw one’s attention to (for purposes of looking,
acting), תאה to sight  (surveying) are some of the synonyms for ראה, all
referring to different aspects of the action of looking.

>
> (2) Also, please recognize that you are using the word "meaning" very
> idiosyncratically.  Meaning is simply not the same thing as "commonality of
> action" or similarity of concept.  When a batter can stand at a plate, not
> even swing at the ball, and yet that be called a strike, that is simply an
> entirely different meaning of the word "strike" versus those contexts where
> the word actually refers to the action of hitting something.  Sure, the two
> usages are united in that the one usage, by a series of developments, is
> derived from the other.  But the word "strike" in those two usages, simply
> do no mean the same thing.  "Strike," referring to hitting the ball, and
> "strike" referring to missing the ball, simply are not the same thing, and
> they are not the same meaning.
>

My understanding of this paragraph is that you didn’t understand what I
wrote. To try to reword it, even in the idiosyncratic use of “strike”
within baseball gets its meaning from the action of hitting the ball:
either in hitting the ball but the ball goes in a direction that doesn’t
count (called a “foul ball”), attempting to hit the ball but missing, or
the ball is thrown in an area where the batter could have hit the ball, but
didn’t try. Even though in the latter two instances the ball is not hit,
hitting the ball is still the goal and reference to the use of the term.

You look at the form, that the ball was not hit. I look at the action that
there was an attempt, or should have been an attempt, to hit the ball,
hence is counted in the idiosyncratic use within baseball as a hit that
counts against the batter. (For those who don’t know baseball, if this
discussion doesn’t make sense, well neither does the vocabulary used in the
game of baseball.)

There are other terms that are used in idiosyncratic ways within the game
of baseball, indicating that how these terms are used in baseball should
not be referenced for normative uses of those terms. If I were to write an
English dictionary (not likely), I probably would have a half-page to page
description of the game of baseball, the terms used, how they are
idiosyncratic and should not be considered for normative use of the terms.

>
> (3) Another problem in your posts is a rather idiosyncratic usage of the
> terms "form" and function."  You say that you are concerned with function,
> while the other lexicons and dictionaries are concerned with forms.  But I
> don't think you could ever get any of these lexicographers to agree with
> your mischaracterizations of their work.  They are not at all fixated on
> form; rather, their concern is the function that words perform in their
> different contexts, recognizing, of course, that these functions are not
> can be very different in different contexts.  These function, these usages,
> are the meanings of the words.
>

Don’t you see, that context is form? That in emphasizing the form, that you
denigrate or even ignore the action involved?

>
> (4) Finally, one of your complaints has been, "why bring up idiomatic uses
> as an argument, as has been done in this discussion?"  This very question,
> in my opinion, betrays a profound linguistic misunderstanding.  When an,
> admittedly, original idiomatic usage, becomes a commonality in a language,
> it is no longer tenable to dismiss it as idiomatic.  "Strike," referring to
> the action of missing the ball, is no longer idiomatic.  Rather, it is one
> of the meanings, one of the usages, one of the functions, of the lexeme
> "strike."
>

Do you not confuse idiomatic with idiosyncratic? The idiosyncratic use of
“strike” is not idiomatic, rather something that makes no sense outside the
narrow confines of the baseball (can you imagine a person being brought to
court because “he struck someone else” meaning that he didn’t even try to
hit him?). Idiomatic use, on the other hand, doesn’t contradict normal use;
in fact can often be understood through normal use. For example, “He is no
longer with us” doesn’t add new or different meanings to the words used,
but is recognized as an idiom meaning that the person referenced has died
without saying the harsher term “died”. Native speakers of a language don’t
claim that idiomatic use of language adds new and unique definitions to the
words used, in contrast to idiosyncratic use. One of the reasons that
lawyers are often held in contempt is their often idiosyncratic use of
terminology.

One of my criticisms is that some lexicographers use idioms or euphemisms
to change the definitions of words instead of recognizing them as idioms
and euphemisms.


>   What is important about a word is not its underlying commonality of
> references, but its usage in its different contexts.  This is the very
> reason so many dictionaries now name themselves as, e.g., "Dictionary of
> American English Usage."  Meaning is found in usage, not in some long lost
> underlying concept.
>

This is usage, but looking at the actions. Getting back at the example of
the conductor in front of the orchestra, would you define “to swing” as “to
lead”? Or would you recognize that “to swing” is the limited circular
motion of the baton which is used in this context as the method by which
the conductor leads the orchestra? Do you look at the form of the conductor
in front of the orchestra, or the action of the baton itself?


> Blessings,
>
> Jerry
>
> Jerry Shepherd
> Taylor Seminary
> Edmonton, Alberta
> [email protected]
>
>
> I still don’t buy the argument that just because “strike” is used in a
highly idiosyncratic way within baseball, therefore it is common for
Biblical Hebrew terms to have multiple meanings that have no relation to
each other, which can include more definitions than times a term is used in
Tanakh.

Karl W. Randolph.
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