Miners could include their fee tiers in the coinbase, but this is obviously open to manipulation, with little recourse (unless they are a pool and miners move away because of it).
In any event, I think that trying out a solution that is both simple and involves the least number of parties necessary is preferable. Have miners set their tiers, have users select the level of quality they want, ignore the block size. Miners will adapt their tiers depending on how many transactions actually end up in them. If for example they set the first tier to be $1 to be included in the current block and no user chooses that level of service, they've obviously priced themselves out of the market. The opposite is also true; if a tier is popular they can choose to increase the cost of that tier. jp > On Jul 24, 2015, at 9:28 AM, Eric Lombrozo <elombr...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I suppose you can use a timelocked output that is spendable by anyone you > could go somewhat in this direction…the thing is it still means the wallet > must make fee estimations rather than being able to get a quick quote. > >> On Jul 23, 2015, at 6:25 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman <jeanpaulkogel...@me.com> >> wrote: >> >> I think implicit QoS is far simpler to implement, requires less parties and >> is closer to what Bitcoin started out as: a peer-to-peer digital cash >> system, not a peer-to-let-me-handle-that-for-you-to-peer system. >> >> jp >> >>> On Jul 24, 2015, at 9:08 AM, Eric Lombrozo <elombr...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> By using third parties separate from individual miners that do bidding on >>> your behalf you get a mechanism that allows QoS guarantees and shifting the >>> complexity and risk from the wallet with little computational resources to >>> a service with abundance of them. Using timelocked contracts it’s possible >>> to enforce the guarantees. >>> >>> Negotiating directly with miners via smart contracts seems difficult at >>> best. >>> >>> >>>> On Jul 23, 2015, at 6:03 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman via bitcoin-dev >>>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>>> >>>> Doesn't matter. >>>> >>>> It's not going to be perfect given the block time variance among other >>>> factors but it's far more workable than guessing whether or not your >>>> transaction is going to end up in a block at all. >>>> >>>> jp >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jul 24, 2015, at 8:53 AM, Peter Todd <p...@petertodd.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>>>> Hash: SHA256 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On 23 July 2015 20:49:20 GMT-04:00, Jean-Paul Kogelman via bitcoin-dev >>>>>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> And it's obvious how a size cap would interfere with such a QoS scheme. >>>>>> Miners wouldn't be able to deliver the below guarantees if they have to >>>>>> start excluding transactions. >>>>> >>>>> As mining is a random, poisson process, obviously giving guarantees >>>>> without a majority of hashing power isn't possible. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >>>>> >>>>> iQE9BAEBCAAnIBxQZXRlciBUb2RkIDxwZXRlQHBldGVydG9kZC5vcmc+BQJVsYyK >>>>> AAoJEMCF8hzn9Lnc47AH/28WlecQLb37CiJpcvXO9tC4zqYEodurtB9nBHTSJrug >>>>> VIEXZW53pSTdd3vv2qpGIlHxuYP8QmDSATztwQLuN6XWEszz7TO8MXBfLxKqZyGu >>>>> i83WqSGjMAfwqjl0xR1G7PJgt4+E+0vaAFZc98vLCgZnedbiXRVtTGjhofG1jjTc >>>>> DFMwMZHP0eqWTwtWwqUvnA7PTFHxdqoJruY/t1KceN+JDbBCJWMxBDswU64FXcVH >>>>> 0ecsk9nhLMyylBX/2v4HjCXyayocH8jQ+FpLSP0xxERyS+f1npFX9cxFMq24uXqn >>>>> PcnZfLfaSJ6gMbmhbYG5wYDKN3u732j7dLzSJnMW6jk= >>>>> =LY1+ >>>>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
