One of the purported benefits of a soft-forking change (a tightening of the consensus rule set) is the reduced risk of a blockchain split compared to a loosening of the consensus rule set. The way this works is that miners who fail to upgrade to the new tighter ruleset will have their non-compliant blocks orphaned by the hash power majority. This is a strong incentive to upgrade and has historically worked well. If a minority subset of the network didn’t want to abide by the new restricted rule set, a reasonable solution would be for them to change the proof-of-work and start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563972.0).
In the case of the coming network upgrade to larger blocks, a primary concern of both business such as Coinbase and Bitpay, and most miners, is the possibility of a blockchain split and the associated confusion, replay risk, etc. By applying techniques that are known to be successful for soft-forking changes, we can likewise benefit in a way that makes a split less likely as we move towards larger blocks. Two proposed techniques to reduce the chances of a split are: 1. That miners begin to orphan the blocks of non-upgraded miners once a super-majority of the network hash power has upgraded. This would serve as an expensive-to-ignore reminder to upgrade. 2. That, in the case where a minority branch emerges (unlikely IMO), majority miners would continually re-org that minority branch with empty blocks to prevent transactions from confirming, thereby eliminating replay risk. Just like after a soft forking change, a minority that does not want to abide by the current ruleset enforced by the majority could change the proof-of-work and start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger, as suggested by Emin. Best regards, Peter R > On Mar 25, 2017, at 9:12 AM, CANNON via bitcoin-dev > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote: >> I don't know what "Time is running short I fear" stands for and when 50% >> is supposed to be reached > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote: > I don't know what > "Time is running short I fear" stands for and when 50% > is supposed > to be reached > > According to current hashrate distribution tracking site coin.dance, > very likely within less than four weeks according to current hashrate > takeover rate. > > While a fork is very likely, that I dont really fear because worst > case scenario is that bitcoin still survives and the invalid chain > becomes an alt. My fear is the centralized mining power being used > to attack the valid chain with intentions on killing it. [1] > > Shouldn't this 50% attack they are threatening be a concern? If it > is a concern, what options are on the table. If it is not a concern > please enlightent me as to why. > > > [1] Source: > https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/6172s3/peter_rizun_tells_miners_to_force_a_hard_fork_by/ > > Text: > > The attack quoted from his article: > https://medium.com/@peter_r/on-the-emerging-consensus-regarding-bitcoins-block-size-limit-insights-from-my-visit-with-2348878a16d8 > > [Level 2] Anti-split protection Miners will orphan the > blocks of non-compliant miners prior to the first larger block > to serve as a reminder to upgrade. Simply due to the possibility > of having blocks orphaned, all miners would be motivated to > begin signalling for larger blocks once support definitively > passes 51%. If some miners hold out (e.g., they may not be > paying attention regarding the upgrade), then they will begin > to pay attention after losing approximately $15,000 of revenue > due to an orphaned block. > > [Level 3] Anti-split protection In the scenario where Levels > 1 and 2 protection fails to entice all non-compliant miners to > upgrade, a small-block minority chain may emerge. To address the > risk of coins being spent on this chain (replay risk), majority > miners will deploy hash power as needed to ensure the minority > chain includes only empty blocks after the forking point. This > can easily be accomplished if the majority miners maintain a > secret chain of empty blocks built off their last empty > block publishing only as much of this chain as necessary > to orphan any non-empty blocks produced on the minority chain. > > > > > - -- > Cannon > PGP Fingerprint: 2BB5 15CD 66E7 4E28 45DC 6494 A5A2 2879 3F06 E832 > Email: can...@cannon-ciota.info > > NOTICE: ALL EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE NOT SIGNED/ENCRYPTED WITH PGP SHOULD > BE CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY FORGED, AND NOT PRIVATE. > If this matters to you, use PGP. > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJY1pbaAAoJEAYDai9lH2mwOO0QANOWqGzPNlifWguc+Y5UQxQM > eAiztAayQBoAyLcFE7/qdtSNlUxbIAHG17fM+aNkehjYH2oN5ODJ+j7E2Yt6EoUH > h5t8MLhNRG/YGF1hJK8Io940EmdcjuNmohiZvrjIqEOYggmLU3hR6J4gsuGsQQhu > gY3sMS/TtT+gZNH8w53ePGrsVhuQR7yEMMr91/vM4+Q5abpwqLeYLnslaZDcd3XK > VB9vyyK08r34J1GQt/H4UvTvGs28MFKBkvueA/Sfyvnrih7+WSQLuSvhiFr+cW1B > TmSVYrB2DzyHN27jDCI2ty3ryNE4PMYcaeLfI2TTbsD/MuVU5lK0kM/1JajP4eRj > j+P03OipuQiy/dNU63w0Uka2PbdKhDC13hVtK/ttBbNppbjnGeB9PYSJCzOpInGw > NwAyz0rVS/llGsdctcII7Z6AUMGuJXzsosY8vjUroU+KFRDqIbDfC53sH7DaPh7u > YawwId5S5RnZsAGCUJ+qNcg0s728J1eDjofN291IS5sOKMzpI7KhaOhFxjnk1MpN > ZAlQeTlvG+sAdn61QMQK1NbFt0km+jcqyVh0+L01yB0K4VDi1YFJaSBOaYUELBXa > 8a6WhZf5nrl5UIpH7rRcPzzqchcdYczy5VRZp2UsU+HYeqLXlcN0a03yPpVQik9S > /T93MuZgmvSCry5MlccA > =R71g > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev