As a user, I would far prefer a split over any kind of mandatory change that would drastically harm the ecosystem. Many users feel the same way. Level 3 is a pure attack on users who do not conform to your beliefs. Please do not put words in people's mouths claiming they wouldn't prefer a split when many would. If you wish to fork off, please do so responsibly.
-Alphonse On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 2:05 PM, Peter R via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Hello Alex, > > Thank you for the thoughtful reply. > > Surely you are aware that what you are proposing is vastly different from > the way soft forks have historically worked. > > > Yes, it is different. It’s different because the future network upgrade > to larger blocks includes a loosening of the consensus ruleset whereas > previous upgrades have included a tightening of the rule set. (BTW—this is > not my proposal, I am describing what I have recently learned through my > work with Bitcoin Unlimited and discussions with miners and businesses). > > With a tightening of the rule set, a hash power minority that has not > upgraded will not produce a minority branch; instead they will simply have > any invalid blocks they produce orphaned, serving as a wake-up call to > upgrade. > > With a loosening of the consensus rule set, the situation is different: a > hash power minority that has not upgraded will produce a minority branch, > that will also drag along non-upgraded node operators, leading to potential > confusion. The idea behind orphaning the blocks of non-upgraded miners was > to serve as a wake-up call to upgrade, to reduce the chances of a minority > chain emerging in the first place, similar to what happens automatically > with a soft-forking change. If one's worry is a chain split, then this > seems like a reasonable way to reduce the chances of that worry > materializing. The Level 3 anti-split protection takes this idea one step > further to ensure that if a minority branch does emerge, that transactions > cannot be confirmed on that branch. > > First of all, the bar for miners being on the new chain is extremely high, > 95%. > > > I’m very confident that most people do NOT want a split, especially the > miners. The upgrade to larger blocks will not happen until miners are > confident that no minority chain will survive. > > Second of all, soft forks make rule restrictions on classes of > transactions that are already non-standard so that any non-upgraded miners > are unlikely to be including txs in their blocks which would violate the > new rules and should not have their blocks orphaned even after the fork. > > > I agree that the soft-fork mechanism usually works well. I believe this > mechanism (or perhaps a modified version of it) to increase the block size > limit will likewise work well. All transactions types that are currently > valid will be valid after the upgrade, and no new types of transactions are > being created. The “block-size-limit gene" of network nodes is simply > evolving to allow the network to continue to grow in the way it has always > grown. (If you’re interested, here is my talk at Coinbase where I discuss > this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWnFDocAmfg) > > Finally, soft forks are designed to only be used when there is a very wide > community consensus and the intention is not to overrule anyone's choice to > remain on the old rules but to ensure the security of nodes that may have > neglected to upgrade. Obviously it is impossible to draw a bright line > between users who intentionally are not upgrading due to opposition and > users that are just being lazy. But in the case of a proposed BU hard fork > it is abundantly clear that there is a very significant fraction, in fact > likely a majority of users who intentionally want to remain on the old > rules. > > > My read is completely different. I still have never talked with a person > in real life who doesn’t want the block size limit to increase. Indeed, I > have met people who worry that Bitcoin Unlimited is “trying to take > over”—and thus they are worried for other reasons—but this couldn’t be > further from the truth. For example, what most people within BU would love > to see is a simple patch to Bitcoin Core 0.14 that allows node operators to > adjust the size of blocks their nodes will accept, so that these node > operators can follow consensus through the upgrade if they choose to. > > This is not a fight about “Core vs. BU”; Bitcoin’s future is one of > “genetic diversity” with multiple implementations, so that a bug in one > doesn’t threaten the network as a whole. To me it seems this is largely a > fight about whether node operators should be easily able to adjust the size > of blocks their nodes accept. BU makes it easy for node operators to > accept larger blocks; Core doesn’t believe users should have this power > (outside of recompiling from source, which few users can do). > > As a Bitcoin user I find it abhorrent the way you are proposing to > intentionally cripple the chain and rules I want to use instead of just > peacefully splitting. > > > Once again, this is not my proposal. I am writing about what I have come > to learn over the past several weeks. When I first heard about these > ideas, I was initially against them too. They seemed harsh and merciless. > It wasn’t until I got out their and started talking to more people in the > community that the rationale started to make sense to me: the biggest > concern people had was a chain split! > > So I guess the “ethics” here depend on the lens through which one is > looking. People who believe that an important outcome of the upgrade to > larger blocks is to avoid a blockchain split may be more favourable to > these ideas than people who want the upgrade to result in a split (or are > OK with a split), as it sounds like you do (is this true that you’d rather > split than accept blocks with more than 1,000,000 bytes of transaction > information in them? Sorry if I misunderstood). > > But if one's intention is to split and not follow the majority hash power > when blocks become larger, then why not change the proof-of-work? This > would certainly result in a peaceful splitting, as you said you desire. > > Best regards, > Peter R > > > > > On Sat, Mar 25, 2017 at 3:28 PM, Peter R via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> One of the purported benefits of a soft-forking change (a tightening of >> the consensus rule set) is the reduced risk of a blockchain split compared >> to a loosening of the consensus rule set. The way this works is that >> miners who fail to upgrade to the new tighter ruleset will have their >> non-compliant blocks orphaned by the hash power majority. This is a strong >> incentive to upgrade and has historically worked well. If a minority >> subset of the network didn’t want to abide by the new restricted rule set, >> a reasonable solution would be for them to change the proof-of-work and >> start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger ( >> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563972.0). >> >> In the case of the coming network upgrade to larger blocks, a primary >> concern of both business such as Coinbase and Bitpay, and most miners, is >> the possibility of a blockchain split and the associated confusion, replay >> risk, etc. By applying techniques that are known to be successful for >> soft-forking changes, we can likewise benefit in a way that makes a split >> less likely as we move towards larger blocks. Two proposed techniques to >> reduce the chances of a split are: >> >> 1. That miners begin to orphan the blocks of non-upgraded miners once a >> super-majority of the network hash power has upgraded. This would serve as >> an expensive-to-ignore reminder to upgrade. >> >> 2. That, in the case where a minority branch emerges (unlikely IMO), >> majority miners would continually re-org that minority branch with empty >> blocks to prevent transactions from confirming, thereby eliminating replay >> risk. >> >> Just like after a soft forking change, a minority that does not want to >> abide by the current ruleset enforced by the majority could change the >> proof-of-work and start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger, as >> suggested by Emin. >> >> Best regards, >> Peter R >> >> >> > On Mar 25, 2017, at 9:12 AM, CANNON via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> > >> > On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote: >> >> I don't know what "Time is running short I fear" stands for and when >> 50% >> >> is supposed to be reached >> > >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> > Hash: SHA512 >> > >> > On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote: > I don't know what >> > "Time is running short I fear" stands for and when 50% > is supposed >> > to be reached >> > >> > According to current hashrate distribution tracking site coin.dance, >> > very likely within less than four weeks according to current hashrate >> > takeover rate. >> > >> > While a fork is very likely, that I dont really fear because worst >> > case scenario is that bitcoin still survives and the invalid chain >> > becomes an alt. My fear is the centralized mining power being used >> > to attack the valid chain with intentions on killing it. [1] >> > >> > Shouldn't this 50% attack they are threatening be a concern? If it >> > is a concern, what options are on the table. If it is not a concern >> > please enlightent me as to why. >> > >> > >> > [1] Source: >> > https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/6172s3/peter_rizun >> _tells_miners_to_force_a_hard_fork_by/ >> > >> > Text: >> > >> > The attack quoted from his article: >> > https://medium.com/@peter_r/on-the-emerging-consensus-regard >> ing-bitcoins-block-size-limit-insights-from-my-visit-with-2348878a16d8 >> > >> > [Level 2] Anti-split protection Miners will orphan the >> > blocks of non-compliant miners prior to the first larger block >> > to serve as a reminder to upgrade. Simply due to the possibility >> > of having blocks orphaned, all miners would be motivated to >> > begin signalling for larger blocks once support definitively >> > passes 51%. If some miners hold out (e.g., they may not be >> > paying attention regarding the upgrade), then they will begin >> > to pay attention after losing approximately $15,000 of revenue >> > due to an orphaned block. >> > >> > [Level 3] Anti-split protection In the scenario where Levels >> > 1 and 2 protection fails to entice all non-compliant miners to >> > upgrade, a small-block minority chain may emerge. To address the >> > risk of coins being spent on this chain (replay risk), majority >> > miners will deploy hash power as needed to ensure the minority >> > chain includes only empty blocks after the forking point. This >> > can easily be accomplished if the majority miners maintain a >> > secret chain of empty blocks built off their last empty >> > block publishing only as much of this chain as necessary >> > to orphan any non-empty blocks produced on the minority chain. >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > - -- >> > Cannon >> > PGP Fingerprint: 2BB5 15CD 66E7 4E28 45DC 6494 A5A2 2879 3F06 E832 >> > Email: can...@cannon-ciota.info >> > >> > NOTICE: ALL EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE NOT SIGNED/ENCRYPTED WITH PGP SHOULD >> > BE CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY FORGED, AND NOT PRIVATE. >> > If this matters to you, use PGP. >> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> > >> > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJY1pbaAAoJEAYDai9lH2mwOO0QANOWqGzPNlifWguc+Y5UQxQM >> > eAiztAayQBoAyLcFE7/qdtSNlUxbIAHG17fM+aNkehjYH2oN5ODJ+j7E2Yt6EoUH >> > h5t8MLhNRG/YGF1hJK8Io940EmdcjuNmohiZvrjIqEOYggmLU3hR6J4gsuGsQQhu >> > gY3sMS/TtT+gZNH8w53ePGrsVhuQR7yEMMr91/vM4+Q5abpwqLeYLnslaZDcd3XK >> > VB9vyyK08r34J1GQt/H4UvTvGs28MFKBkvueA/Sfyvnrih7+WSQLuSvhiFr+cW1B >> > TmSVYrB2DzyHN27jDCI2ty3ryNE4PMYcaeLfI2TTbsD/MuVU5lK0kM/1JajP4eRj >> > j+P03OipuQiy/dNU63w0Uka2PbdKhDC13hVtK/ttBbNppbjnGeB9PYSJCzOpInGw >> > NwAyz0rVS/llGsdctcII7Z6AUMGuJXzsosY8vjUroU+KFRDqIbDfC53sH7DaPh7u >> > YawwId5S5RnZsAGCUJ+qNcg0s728J1eDjofN291IS5sOKMzpI7KhaOhFxjnk1MpN >> > ZAlQeTlvG+sAdn61QMQK1NbFt0km+jcqyVh0+L01yB0K4VDi1YFJaSBOaYUELBXa >> > 8a6WhZf5nrl5UIpH7rRcPzzqchcdYczy5VRZp2UsU+HYeqLXlcN0a03yPpVQik9S >> > /T93MuZgmvSCry5MlccA >> > =R71g >> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > bitcoin-dev mailing list >> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > >
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