I have a practical concern related to the amount of activation energy required to get something like this through. We are talking about implementing something that would remove tens to hundreds of millions of dollars of mining revenue for miners who have already gambled that this income would be available to them.
That's not something they are going to let go of without a fight, and we've already seen this with the segwit resistance. Further, my understanding is that this makes a UASF a lot more difficult. Mining hardware that has unique optimizations on one chain only can resist a UASF beyond a simple economic majority, because they can do more hashes on the same amount of revenue. Threshold for success is no longer 51%, especially if you are expecting the miners to struggle (and this is a case where they have a very good reason to struggle). Any resistance from the hashrate during the early days of a UASF will inevitably cause large reorgs for older nodes, and is not much better than a hardfork. I don't know what the right answer is. But I know that we are not going to get segwit without a fight. We are not going to invalidate covert asicboost without a fight. And we are working with a system that actively (and is demonstrably very effective at doing it) resists changes which are contentious. This is definitely a contentious change, because an important part of the community (the miners) is going to be actively resisting it. I urge everybody to realize how difficult something like this is going to be to pull off. We are literally talking about invalidating hardware (or at least the optimized bits). It's only going to succeed if everybody is conclusively on board. As you consider proposals, realize that anything which is not the simplest and least contentious is already dead.
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