On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:26 PM, bfd--- via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Several times. It's been debated if unconfirmed transactions are necessary, > methods of doing more private filtering have been suggested, along with > simply not filtering unconfirmed transactions at all. My collected data > suggests that there is very little use of BIP37 at present, based on > incoming connections to nodes I know end up in the DNS seed responses (no > "SPV" clients do their own peer management).
Sending just the output addresses of each transaction would use about 1 kilobit/s of data. Sending the entire transactions would use ~14kbit/sec data. These don't seem to be a unsustainable tremendous amount of data to use while an application is running. Doubly so for SPV wallets which are highly vulnerable to unconfirmed transactions, and many which last I heard testing reports on became pretty severely corrupted once given a fake transaction. Can someone make a case why saving no more than those figures would justify the near total loss of privacy that filtering gives? "Because they already do it" isn't a good argument when talking about a new protocol feature; things which already do BIP37 will presumably continue to already do BIP37. _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
