Hi Robin.
While your motivation seems reasonable, your solution is not. It is not enough
that a problem exists. Although the solution must be technically sound for the
proposal to be interesting. So I agree it makes sense to consider Bitcoin
sidechains, not sure if with PoS consensus or other, but no one yet proposed a
viable solution, other than Federation based sidechains. Your proposal explored
a single specific PoS sidechain, which to me does not sound interesting. Maybe
you can improve it, maybe not.
I also disagree that it is okay if anyone can halt operation of a sidechain
with just tiny investment. For me that is critical security flaw of your
proposal. By enforcing stakers having to stake per chain you have actually
lowered the cost for the attacker to attack each specific chain.
Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Monday, January 13, 2020 10:22 PM, Robin Linus <robinli...@protonmail.com>
wrote:
> Hi Joachim,
>
>>> Regarding Reason #1:
>>> This proposal is less like Bitcoin vs. Altcoins and much more like Ethereum
>>> vs. ERC20 tokens, because the derivatives are not in competition with BTC,
>>> but depend on it heavily. You support Bitcoin's growth by supporting such a
>>> sidechain.
>>> Also, they won't work as separate currencies. For endusers you can abstract
>>> away all underlying complexities such that they have to think only in BTC.
>>> Exchanges rates can be hidden in TX fees. The sidechain derivatives would
>>> be nothing but a means of transfer. The unit of account is still BTC.
>>
>> I can't see any difference and advantage over doing the same with say
>> Litecoin. All you need is to create a special wallet which offers atomic
>> swaps LTC-BTC and its unit of account displayed to user is going to be BTC.
>> All you say will work perfectly with this special LTC wallet. Therefore your
>> idea is as good as any other altcoin. In your case, someone else should
>> indeed be able to create such a wallet in which the unit of account will be
>> the new token, thus emulating the current LTC wallets. So the only
>> difference in Litecoin is that the special wallet with BTC as unit is going
>> to be created after the native one, while in your case it is vice versa.
>>
>> I simply can't see why I'd call this construction of yours a Bitcoin
>> sidechain and any other altcoin not. So I'd call both altcoins.
>
> Let me try to explain where I am coming from: Whenever I want to onboard a
> not-so-techy friend to Bitcoin by sending him $5 worth of BTC, I don't have
> many good options. Usually we end up using BlueWallet. It works great. Though
> it only works so well because it is fully custodial. That is how they solve
> all the tough LN problems like inbound-capacity of new users, watchtowers and
> channel backends. Their service is just an Excel table connect to the LN.
> Unfortunately, that is the best UX we can currently offer to endusers. To me
> that's unsatisfying. Is that how we want to enter the emerging markets and
> on-board the next Billion users? I like that BlueWallet gives me the option
> to run my own LndHub for my friends. Still, does that scale globally? More
> importantly, do we want that?
>
> Now let's think about the altcoins argument. We want to serve a billion
> users. Blockchains do scale well to about a couple Million UTXOs, so we
> require a network of a couple thousand altcoins to serve our users.
> We know how to build a nice LN for all of our altcoins with a star-shaped
> topology around Bitcoin as the central settlement layer. Atomic swaps FTW. We
> can abstract away their native currencies. We display to our users only BTC,
> hide the exchange rates in the TX fees and we're done. That is actually a
> scalability solution. So why don't we do that?
> The problem here is, that In the long term, the market of PoW blockchains
> should be a winner-takes-all market, right? So all PoW chains but Bitcoin
> will eventually die because they're wasting lots of value on their energy. So
> actually we don't want a couple thousand altcoins wasting resources on
> pointlessly weak PoW chains. We want a single PoW chain which is as strong as
> possible.
>
> That's why I'd argue it makes sense to consider a bitcoin-backed PoS and
> build a LN of thousands of nameless altcoins.
>
> Regarding sidechain security: Burning BTC is almost equivalent to burning
> energy. You might argue that people won't burn BTC, but it is hard to argue
> against the strong theoretical security properties of proof-of-burn.
>
> Furthermore, even without burning BTC, using only proof-of-stake I can
> guarantee doublespending is impossible. There is a very low incentive to risk
> your BTC's time value. You can only halt a sidechain. And you can halt the
> sidechain only for as long as you maintain the staking majority. Once you
> start an attack, you increase the incentive for others to increase their
> stake. Staking happens in bitcoin's blockchain, which you can't halt. Once
> the rational stakers regain 51% you've lost a year of time value of your BTC.
> Note that you can easily enforce stakers having to stake per chain. This
> guarantees attackers can use their BTC only to attack one chain per year.
> Thus, the security of such a bitcoin-based PoS is stronger then one might
> suspect.
>
> Thanks again,
> - Robin
>
>>> Regarding Reason #2:
>>> In the "Limitations" section I discuss the cost of halting the chain:
>>>
>>> Time value of locked bitcoins might be too cheap to protect the chain. We
>>> can introduce an additional cost and let validators burn bitcoins for every
>>> on-chain vote. This is much more robust because there is an ongoing cost
>>> for halting the system. Proof-of-burn has recently been formally analysed
>>> [16]. The economic implications of burning significant amounts of Bitcoin
>>> are questionable. A level of security comparable to Bitcoin requires the
>>> system’s BTC burn rate to be equal to Bitcoin’s infaltion rate.
>>>
>>> Also remember, time value of Bitcoins is indeed a value. Even without a
>>> proof of burn, I'd consider such sidechains much more secure than those
>>> custodial lightning wallets which become more and more popular to
>>> circumvent the usability hurdles of the LN.
>>
>> Comparison to other models is not relevant to my claim that such
>> construction is insecure for small sidechains. And for big sidechains the
>> reason #1 prefers any other altcoin. Even if you introduce proof of burn,
>> the final attack cost is small for an attacker in absolute numbers, despite
>> the fact that in the relative numbers the cost is huge.
>>
>>> Thanks again,
>>> - Robin
>>>
>>> Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.
>>>
>>> ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
>>> On Monday, January 13, 2020 7:06 PM, Joachim Strömbergson
>>> <joachim...@protonmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> While I haven't rejected sidechains entirely yet, this particular proposal
>>>> seems uninteresting, especially for two reasons.
>>>>
>>>> One – it introduces a new token for each sidechain and suggests atomic
>>>> swaps to be used for the exchange of the mainchain token with the
>>>> sidechain token. Such a model seems nonsensical to me because there seems
>>>> to be excessive number of blockchain projects that can be used similarly
>>>> just as the sidechain in this proposal. Pick almost any altcoin out there
>>>> and you can atomic swap it with Bitcoin. The fact that your sidechain is
>>>> somehow mathematically bound to Bitcoin seems arbitrary because at the end
>>>> you have a new token and a new issuance model. Therefore this is not
>>>> extending Bitcoin economy, which is strictly limited by its convergence to
>>>> zero inflation. This proposal is inflating the supply with a new token,
>>>> which goes against what many people consider as a pillar of Bitcoin's
>>>> value proposal. I think if you implement this proposal, you are going not
>>>> to be considered as a Bitcoin sidechain, but you will be, from certain
>>>> point of view, indistinguishable from any other altcoin. At the level of
>>>> my current understanding, the only interesting sidechain model is the
>>>> [theoretical] one with a two way peg with Bitcoin, preserving the issuance
>>>> policy of Bitcoin.
>>>>
>>>> Two – the security of the proposed system seems to be very fragile, unless
>>>> I have missed something. When I think about sidechains, I expect that it
>>>> should be possible to create a niche chain which is used by few
>>>> participants while the security of the chain is somehow guaranteed from
>>>> its bind to the mainchain. If this was not the case, such a niche
>>>> sidechain could easily be attacked, even if just stalled/censored for a
>>>> long period time, with just a small [absolute] investment from an
>>>> attacker, although this investment might be large if taken relatively to
>>>> the utility of this niche sidechain. So if we speak concretely about your
>>>> proposal, you assume honest majority of validators. But in your system the
>>>> validators come from locking of stake on Bitcoin chain by nodes that are
>>>> interested in a particular sidechain. If you put this model on a niche
>>>> chain where only few participants are interested in it, it's trivial for
>>>> an attacker to be stronger [have more Bitcoin to lock] than all legitimate
>>>> users together. You should only use honest majority assumption where the
>>>> scope is global, where it is very hard and very expensive to obtain
>>>> majority.
>>>>
>>>> Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.
>>>>
>>>> ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
>>>> On Sunday, January 12, 2020 6:54 PM, Robin Linus via bitcoin-dev
>>>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>
>>>>> I've been working on a sidechain protocol with no trusted third party.
>>>>> You can find the [whitepaper here](http://coins.github.io/coins.pdf).
>>>>>
>>>>> Abstract. Coins is a Bitcoin extension designed for payments at scale. We
>>>>> propose an efficient solution to the double-spending problem using a
>>>>> bitcoin-backed proof-of-stake. Validators vote on sidechain blocks with
>>>>> one-time signatures, forming a record that cannot be changed without
>>>>> destroying their collateral. Every user can become a validator by locking
>>>>> bitcoins. One-time signatures guarantee that validators loose their stake
>>>>> for publishing conflicting histories. Checkpoints can be additionally
>>>>> secured with a bitcoin-backed proof-of-burn. Assuming a rational majority
>>>>> of validators, the sidechain provides safety and liveness. The
>>>>> sidechain’s footprint within bitcoin’s blockchain is minimal. The
>>>>> protocol is a generic consensus mechanism allowing for arbitrary
>>>>> sidechain assets. Spawning multiple, independent instances scales
>>>>> horizontally.
>>>>>
>>>>> Feedback is highly appreciated!
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you
>>>>>
>>>>> - Robin
>>>>>
>>>>> PS: [Here on Github you can find further research on scalability and
>>>>> usability](https://github.com/coins/coins.github.io).
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