=== Abstract ===

Imagine a future where a user Alice has bitcoins and wants to send them
with maximal privacy, so she creates a special kind of transaction. For
anyone looking at the blockchain her transaction appears completely
normal with her coins seemingly going from address A to address B. But
in reality her coins end up in address Z which is entirely unconnected
to either A or B.

Now imagine another user, Carol, who isn't too bothered by privacy and
sends her bitcoin using a regular wallet which exists today. But because
Carol's transaction looks exactly the same as Alice's, anybody analyzing
the blockchain must now deal with the possibility that Carol's
transaction actually sent her coins to a totally unconnected address. So
Carol's privacy is improved even though she didn't change her behaviour,
and perhaps had never even heard of this software.

In a world where advertisers, social media and other companies want to
collect all of Alice's and Carol's data, such privacy improvement would
be incredibly valuable. And also the doubt added to every transaction
would greatly boost the fungibility of bitcoin and so make it a better
form of money.

This undetectable privacy can be developed today by implementing
CoinSwap, although by itself that isn't enough. There must be many
building blocks which together make a good system. The software could be
standalone as a kind of bitcoin mixing app, but it could also be a
library that existing wallets can implement allowing their users to send
Bitcoin transactions with much greater privacy.

== CoinSwap ==

Like CoinJoin, CoinSwap was invented in 2013 by Greg Maxwell[1]. Unlike
CoinJoin it is relatively complicated to implement and so far has not
been deployed. But the idea holds great promise, and fixes many of the
problems of some kinds of CoinJoins. CoinSwap is the next step for
on-chain bitcoin privacy.

CoinSwap is a way of trading one coin for another coin in a
non-custodial way. It is closely related to the idea of an atomic swap.
Alice and Bob can trade coins with each other by first sending to a
CoinSwap address and having those coins then sent to Bob:

    Alice's Address 1 ----> CoinSwap Address 1 ----> Bob's Address 1

An entirely separate set of transactions gives Bob's coins to Alice in

    Bob's Address 2 ----> CoinSwap Address 2 ----> Alice's Address 2

Where the symbol ----> is a bitcoin transaction.

Privacy is improved because an observer of the blockchain cannot link
Alice's Address 1 to Alice's Address 2, as there is no transaction
between them. Alice's Address 2 could either be an address in Alice's
wallet, or the address of someone else she wants to transfer money to.
CoinSwap therefore breaks the transaction graph heuristic, which is the
assumption that if a transaction A -> B is seen then the ownership of
funds actually went from A to B.

CoinSwap doesnt break any of bitcoin's assumptions or features like an
auditable supply or pruning. It can be built on today's bitcoin without
any new soft forks.

CoinSwap can't improve privacy much on its own, so it requires other
building block to create a truly private system.

=== ECDSA-2P ===

The original CoinSwap idea uses 2-of-2 multisig. We can get a slightly
bigger anonymity set by using 2-of-3 multisigs with a fake third public
key. For a much greater anonymity set we can use 2-party ECDSA to create
2-of-2 multisignature addresses that look the same as regular
single-signature addresses[2]. Even the old-style p2pkh addresses
starting with 1 can be CoinSwap addresses.

Because the transactions blend in with the rest of bitcoin, an
application based on CoinSwap would provide much more privacy than the
existing equal-output coinjoin apps (JoinMarket, Wasabi Wallet and
Samourai Wallet's Whirlpool). CoinSwaps would also be cheaper for the
same amount of privacy, as CoinJoin users usually create multiple
CoinJoins to get effective privacy, for example JoinMarket's tumbler
script does between 7-12 coinjoins (which are bigger than regular
transactions too) when run with default parameters.

Schnorr signatures with Musig provide a much easier way to create
invisible 2-of-2 multisig, but it is not as suitable for CoinSwap. This
is because the anonymity set for ECDSA would be much greater. All
addresses today are ECDSA, and none are schnorr. We'd have to wait for
schnorr to be added to bitcoin and then wait for users to adopt it. We
see with segwit that even after nearly 3 years that segwit adoption is
only about 60%, and segwit actually has a sizeable financial incentive
for adoption via lower fees. Schnorr when used for single-sig doesn't
have such an incentive, as Schnorr single-sig costs the same size as
today's p2wpkh, so we can expect adoption to be even slower. (Of course
there is an incentive for multisig transactions, but most transactions
are single-sig). As schnorr adoption increases this CoinSwap system
could start to use it, but for a long time I suspect it will mostly be
using ECDSA for a greater anonymity set.

=== Liquidity market ===

We can create a liquidity market for CoinSwap very similar to how
JoinMarket works for CoinJoins. In our example above Alice would be a
market taker and Bob would be a market maker. The taker Alice pays a fee
to the maker Bob in return for choosing the amount of a CoinSwap and
when it happens. This allows an excellent user experience because Alice
can create CoinSwaps for any size she wants, at any time she wants.
Right now in JoinMarket there is liquidity to create CoinJoins of sizes
up to about 200 BTC, and we can expect a similar kind of thing with

=== Multi-transaction CoinSwaps to avoid amount correlation ===

This CoinSwap is vulnerable to amount correlation:

    AliceA (15 BTC) ----> CoinSwap AddressA ----> BobA (15 BTC)
    BobB (15 BTC) ----> CoinSwap AddressB ----> AliceB (15 BTC)

Where AliceA, AliceB are addresses belonging to Alice. BobA, BobB are
addresses belonging to Bob. If an adversary starts tracking at address
AliceA they could unmix this CoinSwap easily by searching the entire
blockchain for other transactions with amounts close to 15 BTC, which
would lead them to address AliceB. We can beat this amount correlation
attack by creating multi-transaction CoinSwaps. For example:

    AliceA (15 BTC) ----> CoinSwap AddressA ----> BobA (15 BTC)

    BobB (7 BTC) ----> CoinSwap AddressB ----> AliceB (7 BTC)
    BobC (5 BTC) ----> CoinSwap AddressC ----> AliceC (5 BTC)
    BobD (3 BTC) ----> CoinSwap AddressD ----> AliceD (3 BTC)

Now in the multi-transaction CoinSwap, the market taker Alice has given
10 BTC and got back three transactions which add up to the same amount,
but nowhere on the blockchain is there an output where Alice received
exactly 15 BTC.

=== Routing CoinSwaps to avoid a single points of trust ===

In the original CoinSwap idea there are only two parties Alice and Bob,
so when they CoinSwap Bob will know exactly where the Alice's coins
went. This means Bob is a single point of failure in Alice's privacy,
and Alice must trust him not to spy on her.

To spread out and decentralize the trust, we can create CoinSwaps where
Alice's payment is routed through many Bobs.

    AliceA ====> Bob ====> Charlie ====> Dennis ====> AliceB

Where the symbol ====> means one CoinSwap. In this situation Alice will
be a market taker in the liquidity market, and all the other entities
(Bob, Charlie, Dennis) will be market makers. Only Alice will know the
entire route, and the makers will only know the previous and next
bitcoin addresses along the route.

This could be made to work by Alice handling almost everything about the
CoinSwap on the other maker's behalf. The makers wouldn't have TCP
connections between each other, but only to Alice, and she would relay
CoinSwap-relevant information between them. The other makers are not
aware whether their incoming coins came from Alice herself or the
previous maker in Alice's route.

=== Combining multi-transaction with routing ===

Routing and multi-transaction must be combined to get both benefits. If
Alice owns multiple UTXOs (of value 6 BTC, 8 BTC and 1 BTC) then this is
easy with this configuration:

    (6 BTC) (8 BTC) (1 BTC)
       |       |       |
       |       |       |
       v       v       v
    (5 BTC) (5 BTC) (5 BTC)
       |       |       |
       |       |       |
       v       v       v
    (9 BTC) (5 BTC) (1 BTC)
       |       |       |
       |       |       |
       v       v       v
    (7 BTC) (4 BTC) (4 BTC)
       |       |       |
       |       |       |
       v       v       v

Where the downward arrow symbol is a single CoinSwap hash-time-locked
contract. Each hop uses multiple transactions so no maker (Bob, Charlie,
Dennis) is able to use amount correlation to find addresses not directly
related to them, but at each hop the total value adds up to the same
amount 15 BTC. And all 3 makers must collude in order to track the
source and destination of the bitcoins.

If Alice starts with only a single UTXO then the above configuration is
still vulnerable to amount correlation. One of the later makers (e.g.
Dennis) knows that the total coinswap amount is 15 BTC, and could search
the blockchain to find Alice's single UTXO. In such a situation Alice
must use a branching configuration:

                         (15 BTC)
                          /   \
                         /     \
             <-----------       ----------->
             |                             |
  (2 BTC) (2 BTC) (2 BTC)        (3 BTC) (3 BTC) (3 BTC)
             |                             |
             |                             |
             v                             v
          Charlie                       Dennis
  (1 BTC) (2 BTC) (3 BTC)       (5 BTC) (3 BTC) (1 BTC)
     |       |       |             |       |       |
     |       |       |             |       |       |
     v       v       v             v       v       v
          Edward                          Fred
  (4 BTC) (1 BTC) (1 BTC)       (4 BTC) (2 BTC) (1 BTC)
     |       |       |             |       |       |
     |       |       |             |       |       |
     v       v       v             v       v       v
           Alice                         Alice

In this diagram, Alice sends 15 BTC to Bob via CoinSwap who sends 6 BTC
on to Charlie and the remaining 9 BTC to Dennis. Charlie and Dennis do a
CoinSwap with Edward and Fred who forward the coins to Alice. None of
the makers except Bob know the full 15 BTC amount and so can't search
the blockchain backwards for Alice's initial UTXO. Because of multiple
transactions Bob cannot look forward to search for the amounts he sent 6
BTC and 9 BTC. A minimum of 3 makers in this example need to collude to
know the source and destination of the coins.

Another configuration is branch merging, which Alice would find useful
if she has two or more UTXOs for which there must not be evidence that
they're owned by the same entity, and so they must not be spent together
in the same transaction.

           Alice                         Alice
          (9 BTC)                       (6 BTC)
             |                             |
             |                             |
             v                             v
            Bob                         Charlie
  (4 BTC) (3 BTC) (2 BTC)       (1 BTC) (2 BTC) (3 BTC)
     |       |       |             |       |       |
     |       |       |             |       |       |
      \       \       \           /       /       /
       \       \       \         /       /       /
        \       \       \       /       /       /
         >------->-------\     /-------<-------<
                          \   /
                         (15 BTC)

In this diagram Alice sends the two UTXOs (9 BTC and 6 BTC) to two
different makers, who forward it onto Alice. Because the two UTXOs have
been transferred to different makers they will likely never be co-spent.

These complex multi-transaction routed coinswaps are only for the
highest threat models where the makers themselves are adversaries. In
practice most users would probably choose to use just one or two hops.

=== Breaking change output and wallet fingerprinting heuristics ===

Equal-output CoinJoins easily leak change addresses (unless they are
sweeps with no change). CoinSwap doesn't have this flaw which allows us
to break some of the weaker change output heuristics[3].

For example address reuse. If an output address has been reused it is
very likely to be a payment output, not a change output. In a CoinSwap
application we can break this heuristic by having makers randomly with
some probability send their change to an address they've used before.
That will make the heuristics think that the real change address is
actually the payment address, and the real payment is actually the
change, and could result in an analyzer of the blockchain grouping the
payment address inside the maker's own wallet cluster.

Another great heuristic to break is the script type heuristic. If the
maker's input are all in p2sh-p2wpkh addresses, and their payment
address is also of type p2sh-p2wpkh, then the maker could with some
probability set the change address to a different type such as p2wpkh.
This could trick a chain analyzer in a similar way.

=== Fidelity bonds ===

Anybody can enter the CoinSwap market as a maker, so there is a danger
of sybil attacks. This is when an adversary deploys huge numbers of
maker bots. If the taker Alice chooses maker bots which are all
controlled by the same person then that person can deanonymize Alice's
transaction by tracking the coins along the route.

A solution to this is fidelity bonds. This is a mechanism where bitcoin
value is deliberately sacrificed to make a cryptographic identity
expensive to obtain. The sacrifice is done in a way that can be proven
to a third party. One way to create a fidelity bond is to lock up
bitcoins in a time-locked address. We can code the taker bots to behave
in a way that creates market pressure for maker bot operators to publish
fidelity bonds. These fidelity bonds can be created anonymously by
anyone who owns bitcoin.

Fidelity bonds are a genuine sacrifice which can't be faked, they can be
compared to proof-of-work which backs bitcoin mining. Then for a sybil
attacker to be successful they would have to lock up a huge value in
bitcoin for a long time. I've previously analyzed fidelity bonds for
JoinMarket[4], and using realistic numbers I calculate that such a
system would require about 55000 BTC (around 500 million USD at today's
price) to be locked up for 6 months in time-locked addresses. This is a
huge amount and provides strong sybil resistance.

==== Who goes first ====

Fidelity bonds also solve the "who goes first" problem in CoinSwap.

This problem happens because either Alice or Bob must broadcast their
funding transaction first, but if the other side halts the protocol then
they can cause Alice or Bob's to waste time and miner fees as they're
forced to use the contract transactions to get their money back. This is
a DOS attack. If a malicious CoinSwapper could keep halting the protocol
they could stop an honest user from doing a CoinSwap indefinitely.
Fidelity bonds solve this by having the fidelity bond holder go second.
If the fidelity bond holder halts the protocol then their fidelity bond
can be avoid by the user in all later CoinSwaps. And the malicious
CoinSwapper could pack the orderbook with their sybils without
sacrificing a lot of value for fidelity bonds.

As a concrete example, Alice is a taker and Bob is a maker. Bob
publishes a fidelity bond. Alice "goes first" by sending her coins into
a 2-of-2 multisig between her and Bob. When Bob sees the transaction is
confirmed he broadcasts his own transactions into another 2-of-2
multisig. If Bob is actually malicious and halts the protocol then he
will cost Alice some time and money, but Alice will refuse to ever
CoinSwap with Bob's fidelity bond again.

If DOS becomes a big problem even with fidelity bonds, then its possible
to have Alice request a "DOS proof" from Bob before broadcasting, which
is a set of data containing transactions, merkle proofs and signatures
which are a contract where Bob promises to broadcast his own transaction
if Alice does so first. If Alice gets DOSed then she can share this DOS
proof publicly. The proof will have enough information to convince
anyone else that the DOS really happened, and it means that nobody else
will ever CoinSwap with Bob's fidelity bond either (or at least assign
some kind of ban score to lower the probability). I doubt it will come
to this so I haven't expanded the idea much, but theres a longer writeup
in the reference[5].

=== Private key handover ===

The original proposal for CoinSwap involved four transactions. Two to
pay into the multisig addresses and two to pay out. We can do better
than this with private key handover[6]. This is an observation that once
the CoinSwap preimage is revealed, Alice and Bob don't have to sign each
other's multisig spend, instead they could hand over their private key
to the other party. The other party will know both keys of the 2-of-2
multisig and therefore have unilateral control of the coins. Although
they would still need to watch the chain and respond in case a
hash-time-locked contract transaction is broadcasted.

As well as saving block space, it also improves privacy because the
coins could stay unspent for a long time, potentially indefinitely.
While in the original coinswap proposal an analyst of the chain would
always see a funding transaction followed closely in time by a
settlement transaction, and this could be used as a fingerprint.

We can go even further than private key handover using a scheme called
SAS: Succinct Atomic Swap[7]. This scheme uses adapter signatures[8] to
create a similar outcome to CoinSwap-with-private-key-handover, but only
one party in the CoinSwap must watch and respond to blockchain events
until they spend the coin. The other party just gets unilateral control
of their coins without needing to watch and respond.

=== PayJoin with CoinSwap ===

CoinSwap can be combined with CoinJoin. In original CoinSwap, Alice
might pay into a CoinSwap address with a regular transaction spending
multiple of her own inputs:

    AliceInputA (1 BTC) ----> CoinSwap Address (3 BTC)
    AliceInputB (2 BTC)

This leaks information that all of those inputs are owned by the same
person. We can make this example transaction a CoinJoin by involving
Bob's inputs too. CoinJoin requires interaction but because Alice and
Bob are already interacting to follow the CoinSwap protocol, so it's not
too hard to have them interact a bit more to do a CoinJoin too. The
CoinJoin transaction which funds the CoinSwap address would look like this:

    AliceInputA (1 BTC) ----> CoinSwap Address (7 BTC)
    AliceInputB (2 BTC)
    BobInputA   (4 BTC)

Alice's and Bob's inputs are both spent in a same transaction, which
breaks the common-input-ownership heuristic. This form of CoinJoin is
most similar to the PayJoin protocol or CoinJoinXT protocol. As with the
rest of this design, this protocol does not have any special patterns
and so is indistinguishable from any regular bitcoin transaction.

To make this work Bob the maker needs to provide two unrelated UTXOs,
one that is CoinSwapped and the other CoinJoined.

==== Using decoy UTXOs to protecting from leaks ====

If Bob the maker was just handing out inputs for CoinJoins to any Alice
who asked, then malicious Alice's could constantly poll Bob to learn his
UTXO and then halt the protocol. Malicious Alice could learn all of
Bob's UTXOs and easily unmix future CoinSwaps by watching their future

To defend against this attack we have Bob maintain a list of "decoy
UTXOs", which are UTXOs that Bob found by scanning recent blocks. Then
when creating the CoinJoin, Bob doesn't just send his own input but
sends perhaps 50 or 100 other inputs which don't belong to him. For the
protocol to continue Alice must partially-sign many CoinJoin
transactions; one for each of those inputs, and send them back to Bob.
Then Bob can sign the transaction which contains his genuine input and
broadcast it. If Alice is actually a malicious spy she won't learn Bob's
input for sure but will only know 100 other inputs, the majority of
which have nothing to do with Bob. By the time malicious Alice learns
Bob's true UTXO its already too late because its been spent and Alice is
locked into the CoinSwap protocol, requiring time, miner fees and
CoinSwap fees to get out.

This method of decoy UTXOs has already been written about in the
original PayJoin designs from 2018[9][10].

=== Creating a communication network using federated message boards ===

Right now JoinMarket uses public IRC networks for communication. This is
subpar for a number of reasons, and we can do better.

I propose that there be a small number of volunteer-operated HTTP
servers run on Tor hidden services. Their URLs are included in the
CoinSwap software by default. They can be called message board servers.
Makers are also servers run on hidden services, and to advertise
themselves they connect to these message board servers to post the
makers own .onion address. To protect from spam, makers must provide a
fidelity bond before being allowed to write to the HTTP server.

Takers connect to all these HTTP message boards and download the list of
all known maker .onion addresses. They connect to each maker's onion to
obtain parameters like offered coinswap fee and maximum coinswap size.
This is equivalent to downloading the orderbook on JoinMarket. Once
takers have chosen which makers they'll do a CoinSwap with, they
communicate with those maker again directly through their .onion address
to transmit the data needed to create CoinSwaps.

These HTTP message board servers can be run quite cheaply, which is
required as they'd be volunteer run. They shouldn't require much
bandwidth or disk space, as they are well-protected from spam with the
fidelity bond requirement. The system can also tolerate temporary
downtimes so the servers don't need to be too reliable either. It's easy
to imagine the volunteers running them on a raspberry pi in their own
home. These message board servers are similar in some ways to the DNS
seeds used by Bitcoin Core to find its first peers on bitcoin's p2p
network. If the volunteers ever lose interest or disappear, then the
community of users could find new volunteer operators and add those URLs
to the default list.

In order to censor a maker, _all_ the message board servers would have
to co-operate to censor him. If censorship is happening on a large scale
(for example if the message board servers only display sybil makers run
by themselves) then takers could also notice a drop in the total value
of all fidelity bonds.

== How are CoinSwap and Lightning Network different? ==

CoinSwap and Lightning Network have many similarities, so it's natural
to ask why are they different, and why do we need a CoinSwap system at
all if we already have Lightning?

=== CoinSwap can be adopted unilaterally and is on-chain ===

Today we see some centralized exchange not supporting so-called
``privacy altcoins'' because of regulatory compliance concerns. We also
see some exchanges frowning upon or blocking CoinJoin transaction they
detect[11]. (There is some debate over whether the exchanges really
blocked transactions because they were CoinJoin, but the principle
remains that equal-output CoinJoins are inherently visible as such).
It's possible that those exchanges will never adopt Lightning because of
its privacy features.

Such a refusal would simply not be possible with CoinSwap, because it is
fundamentally an on-chain technology. CoinSwap users pay to bitcoin
addresses, not Lightning invoices. Anybody who accepts bitcoin today
will accept CoinSwap. And because CoinSwap transactions can be made
indistinguishable from regular transactions, it would be very difficult
to even determine whether they got paid via a CoinSwap or not. So
CoinSwap is not a replacement for Lightning, instead it is a replacement
for on-chain privacy technology such as equal-output CoinJoins which are
implemented today in JoinMarket, Wasabi Wallet and Samourai Wallet.
Ideally this design, if implemented, would be possible to include into
the many already-existing bitcoin wallets, and so the CoinSwaps would be
accessible to everyone.

This feature of CoinSwap will in turn help Lightning Network, because
those censoring exchanges won't be able to stop transactions with
undetectable privacy no matter what they do. When they realize this
they'll likely just implement Lightning Network anyway regardless of the

Bitcoin needs on-chain privacy as well, otherwise the bad privacy can
leak into layer-2 solutions.

=== Different ways of solving liquidity ===

Lightning Network cannot support large payment amounts. Liquidity in
payment channels on the Lightning network is a scarce resource. Nodes
which relay lightning payments always take care that a payment does not
exhaust their liquidity. Users of Lightning today must often be aware of
inbound liquidity, outbound liquidity and channel rebalancing. There
even exist services today which sell Lightning liquidity.

This CoinSwap design solves its liquidity problem in a completely
different way. Because of the liquidity market similar to JoinMarket,
all the required liquidity is always available. There are never any
concerns about exhausting channel capacity or a route not being found,
because such liquidity is simply purchased from the liquidity market
right before it is used.

It is still early days for Lightning, and liquidity has been a known
issue since the start. Many people are confident that the liquidity
issue will be improved. Yet it seems hard to imagine that Lightning
Network will ever reliably route payments of 200 BTC to any node in the
network (and it doesn't have to to be successful), yet on JoinMarket
today as I write these words there are offers to create CoinJoins with
amounts up to around 200 BTC. We can expect similar large amounts to be
sendable in CoinSwap. The liquidity market as a solution is known to
work and has been working for years.

=== Sybil resistance ===

CoinSwap can support fidelity bonds and so can be made much more
resistant to sybil attacks. We saw in the earlier section that realistic
numbers from JoinMarket imply a sybil attacker would have to lock up
hundreds of millions of USD worth of bitcoin to successfully deanonymize

It's difficult to compare this to the cost of a sybil attack in
Lightning network as such attacks are hard to analyze. For example, the
attacker needs to convince users to route payments through the
attacker's own nodes, and maybe they could do this, but putting numbers
on it is hard. Even so it is very likely that the true cost is much less
than 500 million USD locked up for months because Lightning nodes can be
set up for not more than the cost of hardware and payment channel
capacity, while CoinSwap makers would require expensive fidelity bond

As this CoinSwap design would cost much more sybil attack, its privacy
would be much greater in this respect.

== How are CoinSwap, PayJoin and PaySwap different? ==

PayJoin can also be indistinguishable from regular bitcoin transaction,
so why don't we all just that and not go further?

The answer is the threat models. PayJoin works by having the customer
and merchant together co-operate to increase both their privacy. It
works if the adversary of both of them is a passive observer of the

PayJoin doesnt help a customer at all if the user's adversary is the
merchant. This situation happens all the time today, for example
exchanges spying on their customers. CoinSwap can help in this
situation, as it doesn't assume or require that the second party is your
friend. The same argument applies to PaySwap.

Obviously PayJoin and PaySwap are still very useful, but they operate
under different threat models.

== Conclusion ==

CoinSwap is a promising privacy protocol because it breaks the
transaction graph heuristic, but it cant work on its own. In order to
create a truly private system of sending transactions which would
improve bitcoin's fungibility, CoinSwap must be combined with a couple
of other building blocks:

* Liquidity market
* Routed CoinSwaps
* Multi-transaction CoinSwaps
* Breaking change output heuristics
* Fidelity bonds
* PayJoin with CoinSwap
* Federated message boards protected from spam with fidelity bonds

CoinSwap transactions could be made to look just like any other regular
bitcoin transaction, with no distinguishing fingerprint. This would make
them invisible.

I intend to create this CoinSwap software. It will be almost completely
decentralized and available for all to use for free. The design is
published here for review. If you want to help support development I
accept donations at https://bitcoinprivacy.me/coinswap-donations

== References ==

- [1] "CoinSwap: Transaction graph disjoint trustless trading"

- [2]

- [3] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy#Change_address_detection

- [4] "Design for improving JoinMarket's resistance to sybil attacks
using fidelity bonds"

- [5] https://github.com/AdamISZ/CoinSwapCS/issues/50

- [6] https://github.com/AdamISZ/CoinSwapCS/issues/53

- [7]

- [8]

- [9]

- [10] https://medium.com/@nopara73/pay-to-endpoint-56eb05d3cac6

- [11]

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