Good morning Chris, > > Looking at these equations, I realize that the incentives against > post-coinswap-theft-attempt still work even if we set K = 0, because the > extra miner fee paid by Bob could be enough disincentive.
This made me pause for a moment, but on reflection, is correct. The important difference here relative to v1 is that the mining fee for the collateralized contract transaction is deducted from the `Jb` input provided by Bob. > Unlike the v1 protocol, each CoinSwap party knows a different version of > the contract transactions, so the taker Alice always knows which maker > broadcast a certain set of contract transactions, and so can always ban > the correct fidelity bond. Great observation, and an excellent property to have. Will go think about this more. Regards, ZmnSCPxj _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
