Good Afternoon,
You are right, of course, I did nothing to differentiate between the
privacy of the connection of the node, the identification of the public
IP of the node, and the suspected original of a transaction.
If I understand, the reason for only the originating node to rebroadcast
was because only that node can be authoritative, but that logic is
fallible once the transaction is signed - none of the nodes apart from
the origin know about the transaction but they always manage to gossip.
Anyway, it is concept ACK from me and I know it has been a concern that
I have raised previously, I presume some pseudo-random and lengthening
per attempt length of time between receiving gossip about a transaction
and rebroadcasting attempts. I have always worked with
`mempoolexpiry=2160` and `maxmempool=900` and so far as I can presume
mempool has never been full.
Regards,
The Australian
LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH (& HMRH)
of Hougun Manor & Glencoe & British Empire
MR. Damian A. James Williamson
Wills
et al.
Willtech
www.willtech.com.au
www.go-overt.com
duigco.org DUIGCO API
and other projects
m. 0487135719
f. +61261470192
This email does not constitute a general advice. Please disregard this
email if misdelivered.
On 2021-12-11 08:21, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote:
It is that the solution to privacy is to use privacy-enhancing network
communications, such as TOR. I am not against a mechanism to
rebroadcast
transactions more robustly if the mempool of adjoining nodes has
forgotten about them, but the truth is, all transactions originate
from
some node, and there are methods that allow an individual node to be
identified as the likely source of a transaction unless
privacy-enabled
networks are utilised. Having a different method to cause rebroadcast
does not obfuscate the origin.
You're talking about distinct aspects of transaction privacy.
The rebroadcasting approach as it exists on the network, where wallets
are responsible for their own rebroadcasting, directly reveals to your
peers a relation between nodes and transactions: whenever any node
relays the same transaction twice, it almost certainly implies they
are the origin.
This is just a node-transaction relation, and not necessarily
IP-transaction relation. The latter can indeed be avoided by only
connecting over Tor, or using other privacy networks, but just hiding
the relation with IP addresses isn't sufficient (and has its own
downsides; e.g. Tor-only connectivity is far more susceptible to
partition/Eclipse/DoS attacks). For example seeing the same node (even
without knowing its IP) rebroadcast two transaction lets an observe
infer a relation between those transactions, and that too is a privacy
leak.
I believe moving to a model where mempools/nodes themselves are
responsible for rebroadcasting is a great solution to improving this
specific problem, simply because if everyone rebroadcasts, the
original author doing it too does not stand out anymore. It isn't
"fixing privacy", it's fixing a specific leak, one of many, but this
isn't a black and white property.
Cheers,
--
Pieter
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
