--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Marvin Long, Jr." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Um, isn't there a certain metaphysical arrogance is defining the universe
> as "the organization of impressions of reality made by *human* minds?" I
> have no problem with a statement such as, "the human viewpoint will vanish
> when humans do" (perhaps barring the presence of extraterrestrial
> anthropologists)...but that ain't the same thing.
>
Well, the argument is that the universe we live in is just the human
viewpoint. There is a reality apart from the human viewpoint, but we don't
have a direct understanding of it.
> So here's another question--probably still yet to be definitively
> answered--which is: can the limitations of the human viewpoint be
>explained in purely phenomenal terms, i.e. by science?
Well, I don't think so. The strongest argument for this position, off the
top of my head, is the enormous trouble inherent in any self-referential
statement. Think of Godel's proofs.
>
>
> One could argue that I have no knowledge of the cat's real behavior, only
> of its phenomenal behavior, but then one really does begin to lapse into
> solipsism. Do I have knowledge of my own real behavior or only of my own
> phenomenal behavior, including merely phenomenal knowledge of my inner
> states?
>
Well, we have experiences of our inner states that are different from
phenomenon. Wittgenstein addressed this fairly well with his "beetle in a
box" metaphor in Philosophical Investigations. It is said that he destroyed
logical positivism with this last work, as he had founded it with Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus.
> Or one could argue that cats and dogs are "mechanistic," lacking any
> reflective self-awareness, but that would be irrelevant, since as
> mechanisms they must still manage the same reality/universe that human
> beings inhabit. (If we can explain percpetual structures in terms of
> evolution, is it necessary to posit them as conceptual categories as
>well?)
It depends on what you want to do. If you are a realist, you can explain
most of the world in a self-consistent realistic fashion. I do think you
would have to throw away most of the understanding we obtain from-self
reflection as worthless, since it is not reducible to external observations.
In particular, things like free will and the meaning of "ought" go away. I
think that ethics are reduced to something far less than they were thought
to be for 2000 years.
But, I wouldn't argue that you cannot put together a realist macroscopic
framework.
>
> So one could say: hey, if cats and dogs and humans all have the ability
> to navigate the same observed reality, despite their vastly different
> cognitive abilities, then maybe it's because they all evolved the same
> basic cognitive structures in response to something that exists quite
> independently of any one of them. That something must be both real and it
> must correspond very closely with the phenomenal world, otherwise their
> behaviors wouldn't mirror our own so precisely.
>
Well, all we have to do is be able to model it in terms of the phenomenal
world. We know it only has to be close enough to be an acceptable working
approximation. I've know
>
> > Well, there are some interesting clues in work that has been done over
the
> > past 50 years. For example, renormalization: do electrons really have
> > infinite charge? Or, virtual partons...do they really exist? Or, what
> > happens when we have two formulations of a theory with vastly different
> > ontological connotations for a realistic perspective; how do we decide
which
> > is right?
>
> Or should we decide that the ontological connotations stem from obsolete
> assumptions of language--worlds like "exist" and "reality" have embedded
> in them some commonplace and macrorealistic, if you will, assumptions that
>"matter" is made of "stuff" that's "solid" and so on.
I am not really clear what you mean here. Are you trying to go back to
macro-realism and micro non-realism?
Maybe I should clarify my point. Let us consider renormalization. The
problem faced by QM was that the vacuum polarization is part of the observed
charge of the electron. In order to obtain the same value for the observed
charge, after the polarization effects, Feynman had to assign just the right
infinite value to the charge of the electron.
To me, this has the feel of an arbitrary "fudge factor" which allows us to
calculate the observed value.
>Transcendentalism always seems to me to be saying, "Well, it turns out that
>stuff isn't as 'real' as we thought; therefore there must be some OTHER,
that >is behind stuff, and it truly exists and is real in a way that
gratifies the
>certainties that we are accustomed to investing in words like 'reality'
>and 'to exist.'"
>
We will, of course, always be language limited. But, I think that the
argument of Kant (or at least my argument) is that there is an inherent bias
in human observations that we cannot get away from. Our minds are good at
putting together internally consistent models of our every day observations.
But, as we probe deeper, we find more evidence that what we have are models
of observations, not reality apart from us.
> In other words, language is inaccurate, but instead of blaming language
> transcendentalism "blames" the universe.
>
Well, there are significant difficulties with this statement, as far as I
can see it. First, how do we see photons, quarks, leptons, gluons apart
from theories? We do not actually "see" any of these; we observe bubble
chamber tracks, numbers on computer screens, etc. and match these results
with models that include these fundamental particles.
Almost by definition, if our language (including math) is inadequate, then
they are inadequate.
> And this brings us back to the problem of mixing science and metaphysics,
> which is how can a theory like QM, which exists (as a theory) as a system
> of math and words, imply or suggest something that no words and no math
> can even begin to touch?
>
Only by showing the problems with the conventional assumptions of realistic
philosophies. There are other times that science has influenced
philosophical discussions: as with the arguments between neo-classicists and
Galileo or the influence of evolution on the acceptance of the proof of God'
s existence via the obvious need for a designer.
> One can respond that the transcendental is implied by the absence of a
> realistic description of QM phenomena, but that only works if one assumes
> that there are only two possible metaphysics, one of which *must* be true,
> and if one assumes that realism and transcendentalism (defined in specific
> ways) are those binary options.
>
In the last 2000 years, most metaphysics were either idealistic or
realistic. Kant is viewed by most philosophers that I know as someone
trying to develop a hybrid.
>As far as I know, transcendentalism must assume some kind of unknowable
>thing-it-itself; I'm not convinced that all possible realisms must assume
>things that violate QM or other branches of established science.
That's probably true. Indeed, the comment that realism is falsified was
something I wrote for an earlier philosophical discussion when I wanted to
get a good reaction. My original statement here, that the four
interpretations of QM that presently exist, including the two "realistic"
interpretations, is more exact.
>
> Ok, but if I can say that X exists without ever saying what exactly X is,
> then I can claim existence for anything I want, really, so long as I
> describe is as being beyond human knowledge. God, for instance.
>
Sure you can. You always could, and there is no way to either prove or
falsify what exists apart from our understanding. But, it should be clear,
then, that the existence of God is a matter of faith, and not knowledge.
>
>At the risk of going in circles, why does QM not fit the description of
>"can longer peer into the next layer of mechanisms?"
There are a few very critical differences. First, at the level of QM,
values, such as position and momentum, that had been assumed to be definite
for centuries, have been found to be indeterminate. Second, for 75 years,
there has been no hint of an layer underlying QM. Third, we are getting to
the point where its going to be hard to look much lower. Including cosmic
ray work, we are looking at energy densities comparable to those that
existed fractions of a second after the big bang now.
Ø
Ø
Ø Granted, we don't
> yet have a Grand Unified Theory (which wouldn't necessarily solve any
> metaphysical problems) but why can't it be said that we now have a new
> concept of what a mechanism can be, rather than assume that there are
only two possiblities, transcendentalism and the old mechanicalism?
>
> > >
> > > Suppose you reached a point at which you had tiny marble-like
> > > irreducible particles with mass and volume and maybe charge, and you'd
be
> > > faced with the contradition of a solid but indivisible item. We'd
wonder
> > > what's inside one of the little beasties and be endlessly frustrated
by
> > > the demonstrated impossibility of knowledge beyond this seemingly
> > > arbitrary point.
> > >
> >
> > I'm not sure we'd be endlessly frustrated.
>
> I don't see why not, in the metaphysical sense. Of course, the math would
> be simpler without QM, thus inviting less speculation, but the debate
> between Kant's Transcendental Idealism (which doesn't depend upon QM) and
>the realists would still go on.
Well, realists would have the same self consistent picture they've lived
with and will quite happily argue that it was self evident
>
> >
> > > The natural metaphysical steps would be either to say 1) that's all
she
> > >wrote, folks, or 2) to hypothesize an idealistic explanation for the
> > >mystery. It would be really hard to prove either position.
> >
> > Or, just say that's as far as we can see, for now.
>
> Like Copenhagen?
>
As Feynman said, we say "for now" but it appears to be forever.
>
> Which, again, could describe God, or the High and Almighty Grubensplat.
>
It could be, or it could not be. The nature of reality apart from us can be
seen as a matter of faith.
> If you have God, though, do you really need a noumenon? Why not suppose
> that QM supports a somewhat modified view of Berkley instead of a somewhat
> modified view of Kant?
Well, I think the main difference between idealism and Kant's view is the
concept that by knowing directly about God or the truer world of ideas, that
one can better understand reality than by observation. I think that one can
argue that both observation and introspection gives us partial, distorted
pictures, and that the rest must be taken on faith. We know what we see; we
don't know what is real.
Obviously, I'm taking a bit to answer, but Marvin's questions are good and
require some thought. I think the next thing I should do is describe why I
think the 4 interpretations refer to something close to nomenon.
Dan M.
