on 10/3/01 6:33 PM, Dan Minette at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> There is no doubt that we can organize and model our observations in
> wondrous ways to get self-consistent models of observations with tremendous
> predictive power. But, those models do not and cannot address ontological
> questions.
>
They are the complete *useful* answer to ontological questions. They are
what we know. The rest is speculation.
>
> Now your argument is sufficient to show that the mapping has to be decent,
> at least. Thus, it seems fair enough to require that any view of reality be
> consistent with our models of empirical observations. But, since
> completeness isn't shown, then we are not restricted to that which is
> reducible to empirical observations. Thus, morality, free will, good, evil
> can all still exist; they just cannot be proven.
Bloop, fnargel and plimp can all still exist too[1], they just cannot be
proven.
>
>>
>> A mind isn't a clean formal system with a Godel sentence to send it into a
>> recursive tailspin, it is a mess of dirty competing heuristics.
>
> I was not saying it was a single formal system; I was pointing out the
> difficulty inherent in self-reference. Its so bad, it even exists in clear
> formal systems. Augustine even recognized the problem.
It is *much worse* in 'clear formal systems'. Epimenides' paradox is just a
gag *until* you try and formalize it.
[1] And possibly do in a bigger dictionary...
--
William T Goodall
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.wtgab.demon.co.uk
