> Behalf Of John D. Giorgis
>
> And if Congress passes a declaration of war in 1940?
>
The US Congress could have declared war on Germany at anytime after 15 (?)
September 1939, when the first US citizens were killed on the passenger
liner "Athena", which was sunk without warning by a U-boat. Or when US
citizens were killed in many similar sinkings over the next few years.
However, the chances of the US declaring war were minimal, right up until
Pearl Harbour. Public opinion, and especially Republican Party sentiment, at
the time was strenuously opposed to US involvement in WW2.
A big part of the Republican campaign for the 1940 elections was based on an
America First policy of actively keeping out of WW2. FDR was heavily
criticised for providing weapons to Britain and France (much less so for
providing weapons to Finland in its war against the USSR), and took an
enormous political risk with setting up Lend Lease when the British and
Commonwealth countries were approaching the end of their gold reserves,
essentially bankrupting both countries.
He took even bigger political risks when replacing British troops in Iceland
(early 1941) and particularly for the undeclared US Navy provision of
anti-submarine escorts to British-bound convoys, also during 1941. This
resulted in at least one US destroyer being sunk by a U-boat months before
the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, with not a peep from Congress.
In fact, had not Hitler declared war on the US following Pearl Harbour,
there was a huge likelihood that the US would have been restricted itself to
fighting only Japan. Hitler's declaration is seen as one of his biggest
mistakes.
For all that America was making enormous amounts of money from World War 2,
as it had during the years 1914 to 1917 before entering WW1, there was very
little enthusiasm for becoming a combatant. Right and wrong didn't seem to
come into the equation, except in the Roosevelt White House.
Yet the US benefitted enormously from the European allies - Britain and
France. The P51 Mustang was designed to British requirements, and was an
aircraft the US Army had zero interest in until long after the Japanese
struck, and only after seeing the results of its use in the RAF. Similarly,
huge production lines had already been set up for:
* Curtiss P40s - which by 1941 were incorporating features highlighted by
use in the French and British air forces
* Lockheed Hudson medium bombers
* Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats
* Grumman F4F Wildcats
* Vultee Vengeance divebombers
* North American AT6 "Harvard/Yale" training aircraft
* Douglas A20/DB7 Boston attack bombers
Every one of these aircraft was used in large numbers by the US - except for
the Vengeance they were all in service in 1941 but in relatively small
numbers. However, having been ordered in 1939/1940 by Britain and France the
production rates increased tremendously which meant they were available in
quantity in 1942/43 and so saved many US lives when fighting Japan and
Germany.
And, desperate to protect its supplies, Rolls Royce had allowed Packard to
produce the Merlin engine. Without the Merlin being available in enormous
numbers, not only would the RAF bombing campaign have been drastically
hindered - every Lancaster BIII used US-built Merlins - so too would the US
bombing campaign, as the P51B/C/D escort fighters were all Merlin powered.
As well, design input from Europe and the Middle East had highlighted
improvements needed by not only those aircraft but many others. For example,
Boeing quickly realised that the B17B/C as used in the USAAF needed to be
much better armed. The B17E resulted and was available at the end of 1941.
It would not have been had the RAF not pointed out the faults of the early
B17s they used in 1940, which meant that the US bombing campaign from 1943
onwards would have been hampered by very obsolete aircraft.
Similarly, Seversky/Republic realised that the P43/P44 was hopelessly
inadequate compared to the Spitfire and Me109. A complete redesign resulted
in the P47, which became available from early 1943.
Totally inadequate aircraft, like the Brewster Buffalo, Curtiss P36, Vultee
Vindicator, Douglas Devastator and so on were also identified. Without this
sort of input, the US would not have been able to replace these aircraft
types nearly as quickly as they did because replacement designs were already
being developed.
Shipyards were already busy replacing British ships sunk in the Battle of
the Atlantic. All in all, hundreds of thousands of Americans got jobs
working to supply Britain, France (until 1940)and Russia (after June 1941)
with weapons. The depression vanished completely and started a boom in the
US economy that lasted for decades. It had all initially been funded from
Europe until the Europeans could no longer afford it, where Roosevelt
invented Lend Lease, probably the biggest Keynesian pump-priming ever
undertaken.
If Roosevelt had not provided so much help to Britain and Russia prior to
December 1941, there would probably be an even more bitter view in
Britain/Canada/Australia of the US coming in too late to yet another world
war.
The irony is, Japan had 4 choices in 1941:
1 Pull out of China, or at least lessen the extent of the Japanese
incursion, but lose "face" in the process. And anyway, the Army had started
the attack in 1931 and 1937 against the will of the Tokyo government, so why
would they obey now?
2 attack only British (Malaya, Burma, India) and Dutch (Indonesia)
possessions in Asia, keeping clear of the US and Philippines in the hope
that the US would not intervene - a highly likely prospect
3 attack British and Dutch possessions, but eliminate the US Fleet to buy
time to fortify the Pacific Rim to such an extent the US would negotiate
with Japan. While at it, take out the Philippines, too. The Imperial Navy
hated this idea, yet ended up planning for it.
4 attack Russia, although the Russians had comprehensively beaten the
Japanese Army along the Manchurian/Russian border in 1938
Option 2 was a risk but much less of a risk than the option they chose, 3.
There was a strong likelihood that, so long as direct US interests in Asia
and the Pacific were left alone the US would not intervene. Capturing
Malaysia and Indonesia would give Japan all of the strategic materials it
needed to complete the war in China, and would have negated the US oil
embargo. Would the US have gone to war in 1942 to protect European Empires?
I strongly doubt that the US would have gone to war even if Australia and
New Zealand had been invaded, let alone Malaya.
So what did the Japanese do? They attacked the US, which completely turned
around public opinion in the US. They took on an industrial giant that was
already in the middle of a massive rearmament, was almost totally
self-sufficient and which would not ever forget a "sneak attack" against it,
let alone let it pass by negotiation. And to top it all off, the major enemy
of the time, Nazi Germany, VOLUNTARILY came in and declared war on the US at
a time when the US was really only emotionally committed to a war with
Japan, and which had just tasted its first defeat outside Moscow.
After all that, had Japan not attacked the US and Germany not then declared
war against the US, I doubt that the US would have entered WW2. Claiming now
that the US entered WW2 to support freedom is a total misreading of the
CAUSES of US involvement, merely a spouting of the JUSTIFICATION of that
involvement. It is WW2 propaganda, still living.
Now, before anyone jumps down my throat I am very, very grateful that the US
did come into the Pacific War and the European War. Particularly the Pacific
one as my nation may no longer exist had it not done so. After all, almost
our entire military forces were located either in Europe or North Africa at
the time, and we had a hell of a fight with Churchill to get our army back
here to Australia and New Guinea.
And the growth of freedom and democracy after WW2 has lead to a much better
world, without any doubt, and that was driven primarily but not entirely by
the US. Just don't go thinking that the US would have come into the war in
1942 had not the Japanese and Germans made two enormous strategic blunders.
The chances of the US coming into the war in 1940 were absolutely zero.
Brett
