> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On
> Behalf Of Gautam Mukunda
[snip]
> Well, the Geneva Conventions, for starters. Cheney is, legally, exactly
> correct.
Legally, yes, I can see the argument, although they beg the question whether
or not we are legally at war as in the precedents. And I'm not dogmatically
opposed to expediency. But I was seeking arguments for moral justification.
I'm wondering more about calling this by its right name than whether or not
we're doing the right thing. Whether or not we are legally at war, we're in
a dangerous situation, which calls for expediency. But just as much as I'm
dismayed by the "packaging" of George Harrison's death, for example, I'm
troubled by the elevation of this argument to something higher than the
expediency that is called for in times of danger. If one takes as a general
principle the notion that it is okay to have different standards, especially
when no war has been legally declared, then when is the double standard not
okay? It's the deliberate vagueness that is disturbing, I think.
> So do think about this the next time the right talks about moral
> relativism.
> Note how it's not being held here. We used military tribunals for Nazis -
> it seems rather surreal to argue that the Constitution prohibits them from
> being used in a similar situation. Not morally relativist at all.
Those are legal arguments, again. And they are morally relative; justice
*at the hands of the United States* in acts of war is different for U.S.
citizens and foreigners. Your example of Nuremberg is not apropos. The
Nuremberg trials were at the hands of a federation of nations, not the
United States acting alone. Certainly when we carry out justice in
collaboration with our allies, we have to compromise with them. But in this
case, we seem to want to do it ourselves, with a different standard, for
which the underlying argument should be, I think, nothing more than the
expediency of circumstances, not a general principle that might extend far
beyond present circumstances.
All of this debate about legal matters is critical now, I tend to think, so
that we know exactly why we are choosing to make justice relative to the
circumstances. Defining the circumstances is critical, so that we'll all be
likely to agree on when we return to the high standards of justice we
normally insist upon, at least within our own borders.
Sheesh, I'm sounding pompous, no?
Nick
