----- Original Message ----- From: "Marvin Long, Jr." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Brin-L" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2002 8:38 AM Subject: Wittgenstein vs Popper
> On Mon, 4 Feb 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > OK lets duke it out. Are you a Popperite of a Wickstensteinian? It seems to > > > me that although the authors felt the tug of Wickstenstein ' charisma, that > > Popper was the more influential of the two in the general world and that this > > is exactly as each would have it. > > That's sort of the feeling I got from the book, too. For me, personally, > I'm really not sure. My instinct is to agree with Popper, to say that > there really are philosophical problems (morality, metaphysics, etc.). On > the other hand (don't ya love this about me? I always have two or three > or four hands for any argument) --- On the other hand, charisma aside, I > can imagine a person making an argument that all philosophy regarding > morality, for instance, simply involves the codification of social norms > into a metaphysical structure with invariably fails. > > I haven't read enough of Popper or Wittgenstein to do anything more than > speculate, but I wonder if a synthesis or reconciliation are possible? > For instance, if science is grounded in the falsifiability of theories, > would it make sense to restrict philosophy to those spheres in which it > can be verified in some way? W. might have been aiming at something like > this when he insists that philosophy is about the puzzles created by > language. If one restricts philosophy to a technical study of language, > something that (at first glance, anyway) is more tangible and real than, > say, a given moral imperative, then perhaps one takes a big step towards > making philosophy more of a science. Sort of. Maybe. > > The problem with doing that is that you take a bunch of human problems, > which are quite real IMO, and deprive them of a discipline devoted to > their study. Part of Popper's project was to prove that we can > meaningfully say that Nazis are bad, IIRC. Seems obvious, of course, but > if one accepts an argument that philosophy must remain silent on such matters, > then suddenly it becomes very hard to talk about such things at all except > in religious terms. That seems like abandoning one's post, to me. I find it interesting that, as a scientist, I tend to have a lot more respect for Wittgenstein than for Popper. I think it is that I consider Wittgenstein to have more intellectual honesty that Popper. That and the fact that he both founded and ended logical positivism. I have gotten into arguments with Popper enthusiasts on sci.physics in the past. Indeed, I bought one of Popper's books as a result. While Popper is not responsible for his followers, it is interesting that the person who used Popper as gospel was a highly educated crackpot. He was trying to use Popper to show that the aether really existed. The physicists on sci.physics were not that impressed with Popper, or Logical Positivism in general. Yes, falsification is used, but not really the way Popper expresses it. I think the easiest way of stating it (although a bit imprecise) is to say that there is a general agreement among physicists, at least, that science isn't about the Truth, while Popper wanted to make it about the Truth. As far as the Nazi's being evil, you can say it from a philosophical camp, but not without admitting to some sort of faith statements. Lets look at one popular attempt to ground morality in biology: considering things as evolutionarily favored or disfavored. Isn't it an evolutionarily favored behavior to wipe out groups that have the maximum variation from one's own genes and taking over their slots in the ecosystem. Isn't it also genocide and evil? Dan M.
