On Monday, March 17, 2003, at 01:32 PM, Gautam Mukunda wrote:
--- "Marvin Long, Jr." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Ha! I group you three as people who have advanced persuasive pro-war arguments that made me stop and think about my prejudices and fears. Which remain, but their accuracy remains to be seen.
Marvin Long
Why thank you Marvin. I'm not posting right now (except for this) I did 110+ hours at the office last week (including 2:00am Saturday, which _sucked_, let me tell you) and would be looking at the same this week, except I leave for Denmark on Friday.
But if you think you're scared - I'm so jittery right now I can barely think straight. As far as I can tell, the battle plan looks like a template for 4th generation warfare - OODA loops, engagement at multiple levels, information dominance, the works. Lots of very smart people came up with those ideas. A fair number of less smart people have been arguing that they were a good idea for a while now (count me in that second group). But they're just theories. No one, in the entire history of the world, has ever tried anything remotely like this. There are about a million ways things can go wrong, and we have _no_ margin for error. In my lifetime the stakes have never been so high, for the US and the world.
Gautam
I recently read a paper by an associate of John Boyd outlining what a military force organized on his principles of strategy would look like. One of the interesting comments made was that Sherman's campaign after leaving Chattanooga and entering Savannah a form of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW). Sherman's strategy of avoiding battle, converging columns around entrenched Southern troops, and disregard for his rear confused the Southern military authorities so much, that they replaced the general who had an idea what Sherman was up to with one who had no clue. Consequently Hood sent his army into four battles against Sherman, losing all of them and leaving the way open to Atlanta and Savannah afterward. By December, 1864 Sherman was on the coast, threatening Lee's rear.
What I can glean from the public statements made by our strategists, the plan is to get inside the Iraqi's "decision cycle" (the OODA loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) by setting up multiple threats in different areas. When Saddam reacts to one of those threats, he will be weakened in some other area, and our opportunities in that area will be enhanced. Also, there is a strong element of psywar involved in 4GW, and I believe we can see some evidence of this in the President's appeals to Iraqi troops to not resist, and in the general's statements about how we will have instructions for any Iraqi force that wants to on how to make itself a non-target.
It's a bold concept, requiring among other things, total battlespace awareness and troops who can quickly seize unforeseen opportunities. If it works, the war is over quickly, with a minimal loss of lives and property. That would also be an event similar to the sea battle between the Monitor and Merrimac, or the development of the phalanx.
john
_______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
