Couple things: If the Iraqis tried to challenge the Allies in the open we would have destroyed them in whole and in parts, just as we did in GW1. The Iraqis obviously knew this, so they wisely tried not to challenge the US forces. That much we're in agreement on.
However, if instead they withdrew into the cities, I feel that while the results are the same, the costs would have been much higher, and also the fighting much harder. Could the forces at hand have accomlished their goals if the Iraqi troops had more spine? More than likely. But there's more to war than just the battles. What if, say, the advance wasn't 2 months (or whatever it was) but 5 or 6? The problems we're facing now (extended field operations, manpower shortages, very high operational tempo) would be more acute. Because now, when we're scambling to activate Guard units and send them overseas for peacekeeping, we might be doing the same to relieve combat troops in theater. That's my point. Its one thing to pare back the military to a lean but capable force. However, the real problem is when the cuts go too far and start affecting the "meat" of the army. One of the reasons for the success of GW1 was because of obverwhelming force. With somewhere close to 500,000 troops in theater we were able to accomplish a great deal, literally overhwelm the enemy with violence, firepower, and strategic movements. Quite literally, the force we rolled int Kuwait in 1991 was as large, if not larger, than the entire active army today. Puts it into perspective. Trying to accomplish the same thing with a leaner army, however, is troublesome; mathematically, we can't put the same number of barrels on the enemy now, that we did then. My whole point is that the victory against Iraq was relatively easy, but our next battle may not be. Against an opponent that can bring more to the table than a 3rd bit army, I feel very uncomfortable with the forces we have now. I felt uncomfortable during GW2 with what we had, but then I also expected the Iraqis to put up more of a fight too. However, Gautam, I really disagree with your analysis of both the Germans and the Russians. The Germans had a first class command system, but both of these were disintegrating by the time the US began its movement into Germany. The Soviets, on the other hand, quite literally put men into uniform and pushed them into combat. If you survived you became a veteran. But that's after you survive such combat methodologies as "recon by combat" (literally, send some guys forward and see who shoots at them). There was nothing at all sophisticated about Soviet doctrine other than KISS and spraying everything with automatic fire. Damon. > Hi Damon. Obviously you have far more expertise on > this subject than I do. My sense is twofold. > First, > the Iraqi army could had shown some spine without > fighting in the cities. Had it done so and > attempted > to fight in the open field, I think the results > would > have been essentially the same. The battles of the > first Gulf War suggest that, to first order, the > numerical ratio between American and Third > World-caliber forces (like the Iraqis, who are > probably much better than Third World average) is > irrelevant to the outcome of the battle. And > American > forces now are far more capable than their > counterparts in the first Gulf War. > > Second, I would say that the fact that the Iraqi > army > folded the way it did (and it did, after all, fight > hard in several battles) was not an accident. The > first reason for this is that American intelligence > seems (for once!) to have been remarkably successful > in persuading large sections of the Iraqi army to > not > fight. At least in the first Gulf War, they showed > no > lack of fighting spirit - not a lot of skill, but > they > didn't lack spirit. The second is that the sheer > speed of the American advance seems to have stunned > Iraqi forces. They might well have intended to drop > back into the cities and fight - but we moved so > fast > that they didn't have time to do it. > > Finally, if neither of those two things had > happened, > many of the same factors that make us so effective > in > the open field might have helped in cities as well. > The Israeli experience in Jenin suggests that First > World caliber forces fighting Third World caliber > ones > in cities actually do quite well. Much of our > mental > model of city fighting is based on Western, Russian, > and German forces fighting in the European Theatre > in > the Eastern Front. But all of those armies were > extraordinary - well trained, well equipped, and > highly experienced. The Iraqis were none of those. > Meanwhile our soldiers (as you know, and were part > of, > of course) are better than any other such group > since > at least the pre-WW1 British Army, and quite > possibly > since the Roman Legions. > > So, if the opposition had fought more effectively, > would there have been more casualties and would the > war have taken longer? Of course there would have > been. Would it have been any less decisive a > victory? > I doubt it. > > So that's my non-professional and unexpert opinion. > > ===== > Gautam Mukunda > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > "Freedom is not free" > http://www.mukunda.blogspot.com > > __________________________________ > Do you Yahoo!? > Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free web site building tool. > Try it! > http://webhosting.yahoo.com/ps/sb/ > _______________________________________________ > http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l > > ===== ------------------------------------------------------------ Damon Agretto [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum." http://www.geocities.com/garrand.geo/index.html Now Building: ------------------------------------------------------------ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free web site building tool. Try it! http://webhosting.yahoo.com/ps/sb/ _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
