On the topic of MX fraud : could not an encryption algorithm be applied to answer the question of truth or falsity of a pdb/wwpdb/pdbe entry? has anyone proposed such an idea before?
for example (admittedly this is a mess): * a detector parameter - perhaps the serial number - is used as a public key. the detector parameter is shared among beamlines/companies/*pdb. specifically, the experimentor requests it at beamtime. * experimentor voluntarily encrypts something, using GPLv3 programs, small but essential to the deposition materials, like the R-free set indices (or please suggest something better), using their private key. maybe symmetric cipher would work better for this. or the Free R set indices are used to generate a key. * at deposition time, the *pdb unencrypts the relevant entry components using their private key related to the detector used. existing deposition methods pass or fail based on this (so maybe not the Free R set). * why do this : at deposition time, *pdb will have a yes-or-no result from a single string of characters. can be a stop-gap measure until images can be archived easily. all elements of the chain are required to be free and unencumbered by proprietary interests. importantly, it is voluntary. this will prevent entries such as Schwarzenbacher or Ajees getting past deposition - so admittedly, not many. references: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(algorithm) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie-Hellman_key_exchange -Bryan
