woo hoo. Now may Roberts turn out to be similarly proncipled.

Dana

On 7/26/05, Gruss Gott <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Former Bush Aide Turns Tough Critic
> As Iraq Inspector Mr. Bowen Finds Poor Controls, Waste in Reconstruction;
> Seeking Missing Millions Harsh Rebuke From Bremer
> 
> By YOCHI J. DREAZEN
> Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
> July 26, 2005; Page A1
> 
> During a routine audit last summer of an American office in charge of
> doling out reconstruction funding in Hillah, Iraq, U.S. government
> investigators made a series of startling discoveries.
> 
> The office had paid a contractor twice for the same work. A U.S.
> official was allowed to handle millions of dollars in cash weeks after
> he was fired for incompetence. Of the $119.9 million allocated for
> regional projects, $89.4 million was disbursed without contracts or
> other documentation. An additional $7.2 million couldn't be found at
> all.
> 
> To many officials in both Baghdad and Washington, the only thing more
> surprising than the problems was the identity of the man who had
> uncovered them: Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq
> reconstruction.
> 
> Mr. Bowen is a Texas lawyer who parlayed a job on George W. Bush's
> first gubernatorial campaign into senior posts in Austin and
> Washington. He began the Iraq war lobbying for an American contractor
> seeking tens of millions of dollars in reconstruction work. Last
> October, California Democratic Rep. Henry Waxman singled him out in a
> report on "The Politicization of Inspectors General" in the Bush
> administration. The report suggested that such auditors wouldn't be
> "independent and objective."
> 
> Instead, Mr. Bowen has become one of the most prominent and credible
> critics of how the administration has handled the occupation of Iraq.
> In a series of blistering public reports, he has detailed systemic
> management failings, lax or nonexistent oversight, and apparent fraud
> and embezzlement on the part of the U.S. officials charged with
> administering the rebuilding efforts.
> 
> White House officials declined to comment on Mr. Bowen. But he has
> drawn harsh criticism from other quarters.
> 
> Aides at both the State Department and the Defense Department have
> tried to curb the independence of his office. L. Paul Bremer, head of
> the Coalition Provisional Authority until June 2004, has criticized
> Mr. Bowen for "misconceptions and inaccuracies" and for expecting the
> occupation authority, amid postwar chaos, to follow accounting
> standards that "even peaceful Western nations would have trouble
> meeting." Newt Gingrich, the former House speaker, has called Mr.
> Bowen's staff "dramatically out of touch with the practical realities
> of waging war and setting up a new government in a war-torn country."
> 
> Mr. Bowen acknowledged in one report that "the CPA operated in a
> dangerous working environment under difficult conditions." But the
> report said the U.S. still should have "established controls and
> provided oversight over" reconstruction funds "precisely because there
> was no functioning Iraqi government."
> 
> In 1994, Mr. Bowen was a senior member of Mr. Bush's campaign team in
> his successful run for governor of Texas. After Mr. Bush took office,
> Mr. Bowen served as assistant general counsel in the governor's office
> and then deputy general counsel under Alberto Gonzales, now U.S.
> attorney general. Mr. Bowen crafted some of Gov. Bush's most
> controversial legal decisions, such as ousting a Democratic judge and
> dismissing widespread questions about the guilt of a death-row inmate.
> 
> When Mr. Bush ran for president, Mr. Bowen spent 35 days in Florida
> during the recount, and then served as deputy counsel to the Bush
> transition team. He rejoined Mr. Gonzales at the White House as
> associate counsel. In a 2002 ceremony marking the unveiling of Mr.
> Bush's official gubernatorial portrait in Austin, the president
> singled out Mr. Bowen as one of the aides who followed him to the
> presidency. "I truly believe America is better off as a result of the
> influx of Texans who showed up" in Washington, he said.
> 
> Mr. Bowen left the administration in March 2003 for a job at Patton
> Boggs, a prominent Washington law firm with a big lobbying operation.
> The U.S. launched the invasion of Iraq a few weeks later, and Mr.
> Bowen began lobbying for reconstruction work on behalf of URS Group
> Inc., a San Francisco-based company specializing in international
> construction planning and management. Mr. Bowen, one of three Patton
> Boggs attorneys on the account, says his only work for the company
> involved organizing an April 2003 meeting with a senior official at
> the U.S. Agency for International Development. URS didn't win any AID
> contracts as a result of that meeting, but the company ultimately won
> a series of CPA contracts valued at as much as $30 million to oversee
> reconstruction projects.
> 
> The effort to rebuild Iraq quickly became the largest U.S.
> reconstruction effort since the end of World War II. The funds
> eventually included $18.4 billion in U.S. money and more than $22
> billion in seized Iraqi assets turned over to the U.S. by the United
> Nations.
> 
> Strings Attached
> 
> In the fall of 2003, Congress created a CPA inspector general to
> oversee how the money was spent -- a post that eventually morphed into
> the job of inspector general for all Iraq reconstruction. The official
> would answer to Mr. Bremer, who headed the occupation authority, and
> present reports to Congress at least once every three months. The
> office was given a budget of $75 million.
> 
> At the request of the Bush administration, the job was created with
> many strings attached. Unlike other federal inspectors general, the
> new official was to be appointed by the secretary of defense, not the
> president, and wouldn't be subject to Senate confirmation. The White
> House also won the right to block the inspector general from releasing
> a report on national-security grounds -- though none have been blocked
> so far. Administration officials and many Congressional Republicans
> argued that the situation in Iraq was too chaotic to require normal
> oversight. They also cited the danger that an unfettered release of
> information could help insurgents plan more effective attacks against
> U.S. forces there.
> 
> Critics were skeptical that, under those conditions, the inspector
> general could offer real oversight. The skeptics weren't encouraged
> when, in January 2004, the White House tapped Mr. Bowen, perceived as
> a loyal Bush ally, to fill that position.
> 
> Mr. Bowen, 47 years old, has an athlete's build and the bearing of the
> Air Force captain he once was. He usually keeps packed bags in his
> office near the Pentagon, along with his bulletproof vest, handy for
> his frequent trips to Baghdad.
> 
> He traveled to Iraq for the first time in February 2004, riding from
> the airport to the heavily fortified Green Zone in an armored bus
> built to withstand direct hits from rockets and roadside bombs. He and
> his staff slept in trailers and crammed their entire operation into
> two small offices.
> 
> One of his flights out of Baghdad had to bank sharply and release
> flares to avoid an insurgent missile. An auditor on his staff resigned
> after seeing a friend decapitated in a rocket attack.
> 
> Mr. Bowen's arrival in Iraq coincided with a significant ramp-up in
> the pace of the American rebuilding effort. The U.S. had initially
> planned to maintain full control of Iraq for several years. But with
> violence raging and influential Iraqis expressing impatience with the
> American timetable, the Bush administration announced plans to turn
> over power to an interim Iraqi government by June 30.
> 
> Hoping to give the incoming government a public-relations boost, Mr.
> Bremer ordered American rebuilding officials to use captured Iraqi
> money to fund as many small-scale rebuilding projects as could be
> completed by the handover date.
> 
> Mr. Bowen's audits later found evidence that the push led contracting
> officials to take shortcuts that made it difficult to determine where
> the money actually went. In Hillah, for instance, a contracting
> officer told Mr. Bowen's investigators that he had been given $6.75
> million in cash on June 21 with the expectation that he would spend
> the entire amount before the handover, which ultimately took place two
> days earlier than planned on June 28.
> 
> He soon found other examples of apparently lax oversight. An employee
> of the CPA comptroller in Baghdad, for example, kept the key to a safe
> containing more than $140,000 in cash in an unattended backpack.
> 
> In one of his most attention-grabbing reports, issued on Jan. 30,
> 2005, Mr. Bowen concluded that the American occupation authority
> failed to keep track of nearly $9 billion that it transferred to Iraqi
> government ministries, which lacked financial controls and internal
> safeguards to prevent abuse. One Iraqi ministry cited in the audit
> inflated its payroll to receive extra funds, claiming to employ 8,206
> guards when it actually employed barely 600.
> 
> The report sparked harsh responses from both Mr. Bremer, the former
> occupation chief, and the Pentagon. Mr. Bremer chided the auditor for
> expecting conventional levels of accountability, saying that "given
> the situation the CPA found in Iraq at liberation, this is an
> unrealistic standard." The Pentagon also questioned Mr. Bowen's
> conclusions. Spokesman Bryan Whitman noted that "the CPA was operating
> under extraordinary conditions, from its inception to mission
> completion."
> 
> Mr. Bowen says that many of the management problems identified in his
> reports stem from structural failings in the broader reconstruction
> venture. He argues that the rebuilding effort has been understaffed.
> In one report, he noted that the central U.S. contracting office was
> unable to fill nearly a third of its authorized slots. That meant
> contracting personnel worked "13 to 15 hours each day, six days a
> week, with a shortened shift of six to 11 hours on the seventh day."
> 
> "An inspector general shouldn't play 'gotcha,' " he says. "My job is
> to help promote success in Iraq by identifying inefficiencies and
> helping correct them. I want to be part of the solution."
> 
> Taking On Halliburton
> 
> In a November 2004 report, Mr. Bowen took on the big contractor
> Halliburton Co. in two separate reports. He urged the Army to withhold
> nearly $90 million in payments to Halliburton because the company
> couldn't justify what it had charged the government. The report added
> that "weakness in the cost-reporting process" was such a problem that
> his investigators couldn't do a standard audit of Halliburton's bills
> to the CPA. Halliburton spokeswoman Cathy Mann says the Houston-based
> oil-services and contracting company is working with the Army to
> resolve the matter and "we expect to work through any remaining issues
> in a cooperative manner."
> 
> Mr. Bowen's audits have also described what appears to be outright
> criminal behavior by several government officials. In one case, an
> Army soldier serving as the assistant to an American boxing coach
> admitted to gambling away half the $40,000 he was given to cover the
> expenses of an Iraqi athletic team during a trip to the Philippines;
> his case was referred to the military's justice system for a
> court-martial. Mr. Bowen also recently gave the Justice Department
> information on possibly criminal behavior on the part of U.S.
> contracting officers in Hillah, the first time government officials
> have been implicated in potential fraud in Iraq. The officers left the
> country with no record of how they had spent nearly $1.5 million that
> couldn't be found by investigators.
> 
> With his caseload increasing, Mr. Bowen is hiring new investigators
> and lawyers in both Virginia and Iraq. He has numerous audits under
> way, including one looking at the efficiency of a military program
> that has allowed commanders to disburse hundreds of millions of
> dollars in cash without going through normal contracting channels. His
> aides recently began sending engineering teams to U.S.-funded
> reconstruction projects across the country to assess the actual
> quality of the work.
> 
> The future of Mr. Bowen's job has been embroiled in politics.
> 
> Shortly before the June 2004 handover of political sovereignty in
> Iraq, the State Department proposed folding Mr. Bowen's office into
> its own inspector-general system. Under heavy fire from Democrats, the
> plan was dropped.
> 
> Another bureaucratic fight erupted in the fall of 2004 as lawmakers
> debated a bill sponsored by Sen. Russell Feingold, Democrat of
> Wisconsin, that would convert Mr. Bowen into a standing special
> inspector general. The new job would probe the entire rebuilding
> effort while being only loosely overseen by the secretaries of defense
> and state. The Pentagon's inspector general warned Defense Secretary
> Donald Rumsfeld in a memo that such a bill would effectively leave Mr.
> Bowen "accountable to no one" and said he would prepare a directive
> tying him to the Pentagon's inspectors.
> 
> Nonetheless, the bill was signed into law on Oct. 29, 2004, expanding
> Mr. Bowen's role. Mr. Bowen assumed his new post immediately and
> currently has a staff of 32 in Baghdad and 70 in Arlington, Va.
> 
> Now defenders of Mr. Bowen's office are trying to keep it from being
> shut down next year. The bill that created Mr. Bowen's position
> empowered him to probe the rebuilding effort until 10 months after 80%
> of the reconstruction funds were contracted out. That point is likely
> to be reached this month, which means that the office will close next
> summer -- well before the money will actually have been spent. Earlier
> this month, Sen. Feingold introduced a bill extending the life of Mr.
> Bowen's office, but the measure's prospects are uncertain.
> 
> Despite endorsements from initially skeptical Democrats, Mr. Bowen
> insists that his work shouldn't be seen through the prism of partisan
> politics. He says he rarely hears from anyone in the White House these
> days -- either professionally or socially. He says he remains an
> admirer of President Bush. The only picture in Mr. Bowen's suburban
> Virginia office other than a photograph of his children is a framed
> shot of the two men at a White House dinner.
> 
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~|
Discover CFTicket - The leading ColdFusion Help Desk and Trouble 
Ticket application

http://www.houseoffusion.com/banners/view.cfm?bannerid=48

Message: http://www.houseoffusion.com/lists.cfm/link=i:5:166666
Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/threads.cfm/5
Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/lists.cfm/link=s:5
Unsubscribe: 
http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=11502.10531.5
Donations & Support: http://www.houseoffusion.com/tiny.cfm/54

Reply via email to