Colext/Macondo Cantina virtual de los COLombianos en el EXTerior --------------------------------------------------
La respuesta d�bil del gobierno ante los ataques recientes de la guerrilla demuestra que a pesar de tener unos helic�pteros y aviones de ventaja, las fuerzas militares Colombianas siguen siendo relativamente incompetentes. Yo aun estoy esperando noticias sobre que paso cuando el ejercito tenia completamente "rodeado" a varios millares de guerrilleros de las FARC hace un par de meces. Alguien supo algo de la derrota definitiva de las FARC que en esos d�as anunciaba el General Tapias en sus ruedas de prensa? Luego de leer el estudio de la Rand que envi� a la lista (ver abajo) me est�n entrando dudas de que las fuerzas militares pueden derrotar la guerrilla en una "guerra total" en el corto plazo (digo "guerra total" entre comillas por que pienso que ya estamos en una guerra total, aunque casi nadie quiere reconocerlo). La guerrilla parece estar mucho mas motivada que las fuerzas del gobierno, algo que en guerra (como en cualquier aspecto de la vida) vale mas que desventajas en n�meros o equipamiento. Saludos, Carlos > -----Original Message----- > From: Carlos Davila [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Saturday, February 09, 2002 11:24 PM > To: ColExt > Subject: Colext: El laberinto Colombiano > > > Colext/Macondo > Cantina virtual de los COLombianos en el EXTerior > -------------------------------------------------- > > El an�lisis del Instituto Rand (analiza temas de pol�tica en > EU) sobre la > situaci�n en Colombia tiene un prognosis mas bien grave para el pa�s: > http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1339/ > > Chapter Eight: COLOMBIAN FUTURES (75K) > > Scenario 1: Successful Peace Agreement > Scenario 2: Turning the Tide > Scenario 3: Stalemate > Scenario 4: The Peruvian Model > Scenario 5: Disintegration > Scenario 6: FARC Takeover or Power-Sharing > Scenario 7: Internationalization of the Conflict > Probable Future Path > > PROBABLE FUTURE PATH > The interaction of the trend lines described in the preceding chapters > will determine which of these Colombian futures ocurs. Although > the direction of the trends is not positive, the deterioration of the > Colombian government's position has not reached an irreversible > stage. Currently there is a stalemate, with all sides preparing for an > intensified level of violence. The catalyst is expected to be the > gov-ernment's > implementation of the "Drive to the South" anticipated in > Plan Colombia. Alternatively, the FARC could decide to preempt the > government's advance in Putumayo by escalating the war in other > parts of Colombia. This new phase of the war could witness the use > of surface-to-air missiles by the guerrillas to deny the government > use of helicopters and aircraft or inflict a major defeat on > one of the > new counter-narcotics battalions. Escalation of the fighting will > likely be accompanied by mobilization of the civilian population in > the guerrilla-controlled areas to oppose government counter-narcotics > operations. Through its international support network, the > FARC can also be expected to seek to deny international assistance to > the Colombian government. > > As noted earlier, a stalemate is not likely to be stable at > an intensified > level of violence, and over time the balance will tilt to one > side or the > other. The Colombian government, left to its own devices, does not > have the institutional or material resources to reverse unfavorable > trends, but the FARC also has weaknesses that could be exploited. > The FARC's political weakness-lack of support among the popula-tion > at large-raises the possibility that the guerrilla threat could be > contained or defeated if the government succeeds in enlisting active > popular support and seizing the strategic and operational initiative. > U.S. assistance to the Colombian government and armed forces in > developing an effective strategy and acquiring the capabilities to > implement it will be an important factor influencing Colombia's > path. That factor, together with Bogot�'s receptivity to innovation in > its politico-military approach, will have a major influence on > whether the Colombian government is able to turn the tide or > whether deterioration continues, leading to one of the downside > scenarios described above. > > In any intensified conflict scenario-regardless of which side holds > the advantage-the regional effects of the Colombian situation are > likely to become amplified. The next chapter analyzes the effect of > the Colombian conflict on neighboring states and the prospects that > it will metastasize into a wider regional upheaval. > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > with UNSUBSCRIBE COLEXT as the BODY of the message. > > Un archivo de colext puede encontrarse en: > http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ > cortesia de Anibal Monsalve Salazar > -------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with UNSUBSCRIBE COLEXT as the BODY of the message. Un archivo de colext puede encontrarse en: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ cortesia de Anibal Monsalve Salazar
