Puzzles re: Grutter and Korematsu

[Robert Justin Lipkin]

       I have a minor (I hope) question about strict scrutiny and Grutter.  Justice O'Connor maintains that the Court should defer to the University regarding whether diversity is essential to the University's educational mission. She then denies that this implies that the court's scrutiny is any less strict as a result. I seem to recall similar deference in Korematsu. My understanding of strict scrutiny is that when the test is applied deference is inappropriate. My question then is this: Is there a general account (or for that matter any account at all) of when (how?) deference is permissible when strictly scrutinizing government action.

            One quick additional question.  Is there literature specifically examining the justification of judge-made tests such as "strict scrutiny."  And, as a reporter asked yesterday, how do we know what the definition of "compelling purpose" or "narrow tailoring" is?   Thanks.  


Bobby Lipkin
Widener University School of Law
Delaware