On Wed, 24 May 2000, Eugene Leitl wrote:
> Rick Smith writes:
>
> If NSA/MS are not doing it, they must be pretty stupid, because I'd do
> it in their place. The prudent assumption is hence: your online system
> can't be completely trusted, whether OpenSource, or not. Encryption
> should be done in hardware.
Bull, the hardware companies aren't any more trustworthy.
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