Enzo Michelangeli writes: > And why should we trust hardware implementations, which are even more opaque > to analysis than binary-only software? It is harder to analyze (mostly, because you can't look at it easily, and can't trust what it tells about its inner state), but it has much less bits to look at than your average Unix box. Can one prove behaviour of small VHDL circuits these days, anyone knows?
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