At 12:39 AM 5/25/00 -0700, Eugene Leitl wrote: >less bits to look at than your average Unix box. Can one prove >behaviour of small VHDL circuits these days, anyone knows? You can prove that two descriptions (e.g., C & RTL & gates) are functionally equivalent; harder to prove they don't do anything else :-) Formal verification is a holy grail. There's a few commercial chip strippers that have the reverse-engineering tool flow understood, who can go from microscopy to netlists. E.g., chipworks.com IIRC
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