Rick Smith wrote:
>
> >Rick Smith wrote:
> >> It sounds like there are a number of interesting design questions. For
> >> example, the sender and recipient must obviously share a secret key.
>
> At 10:18 PM 01/26/2000 +0000, Ben Laurie wrote:
> >Why is that obvious? What's wrong with encoding with the recipient's
> >public key?
>
> It depends on what you're encoding.
>
> I expect we end up with a three step process: first, encrypt the data,
> second, stego it into the image or other file, and third, provide the
> recipient with information for recovering the hidden data.
>
> If we're talking about the first step, encryption of the raw data that's
> being stego'ed (is there a more legitimate verb for that?), then I'd prefer
> to use secret key encryption, since it introduces fewer uncertainties
> regarding the safety of the ciphertext.
>
> As to step 3, how this secret information is shared with potential
> recipients, public key techniques are fine. If we're talking about Russ
> Nelson's "forward stego" problem, then PK is overkill -- he just needs to
> publish the secret information and voila, the previously hidden information
> is uncovered.
>
> As to Russ' problem of how to keep the information "available," I suggest
> we look around our environments and take stock of what iconic images or
> files we all have and for some reason can't part with. Perhaps there's some
> really great crt wallpaper image that would do the job, or one could embed
> it in a Craig Shergold make-a-wish chain letter. Those things NEVER die.
I can't quite see the point of forward stego. Why not publish something
public key encrypted and publish the private key later?
If you want a lot of people to see it, you can't keep it secret. If you
can't keep it secret, you may as well just come out with it and publish
the bits without stego.
What did I miss?
Cheers,
Ben.
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