On Thu, 25 May 2000, Eugene Leitl wrote:
> Jim Choate writes:
>
> > Trying to avoid software compromises by using hardware is impossible since
> > you can't build the hardware without software.
>
> The point is to put the sensitive area (key ring, crypto engine) into
> a small, isolated system which can't be easily compromised by a remote
> exploit. It can be an embedded, it can be an ASIC as long as it is
> open (a chip with a clear layout, simple interface/protocol, full gate
> layout documentation, deliberately using large structures for ease of
> interpretation, packaged to be easily accessed for sample
> inspection). As long as we don't have nanolitho printers our our
> desktops, this will be probably the best compromise there is.
Actualy this isn't the point.
The point is that if the algorithm is sufficiently complex you can't
guarantee its security in software then you won't be able to do it in
hardware either.
You can't have your cake and eat it too.
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Cyber Positive
The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate
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