At 09:54 PM 5/24/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: >As to inserting a trapdoor in an FPGA, I don't see any reason at all that >a trapdoor can't be inserted with the appropriate understanding of the >state space and chosing a rare state to trigger your bypass. Yes but *once* you've verified the RTL (and from them the masks) you don't have to worry about some stray applet hosing your security. You do with software. A hardware bump in the wire (link encryptor), for instance is very hard to get around (short of out of band 'tempest' et al. attacks)
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
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- Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors John Young
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith