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• • Re: Electronic elections. Mark A. Herschberg
  • Re: Electronic elections. Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: Electronic elections. Dennis Glatting
  • Re: Electronic elections. Mark A. Herschberg
  • Re: Electronic elections. amir . herzberg
  • RE: Electronic elections. Trei, Peter
  • RE: Electronic elections. Harald Neymanns
  • RE: Electronic elections. Ray Hirschfeld
  • Re: Electronic elections. Steven M. Bellovin
  • RE: Electronic elections. Barney Wolff
  • RE: Electronic elections. Trei, Peter
• SST: Snake-oil? Dave Del Torto
• BBC Online 25/5/2000: "Watching while you surf" Caspar Bowden
• good cellphone hacking press Russell Nelson
• [FYI] European Union postponed decision on removing barriers to Export of Crypto Axel H Horns
• Lucre - with extra blinding! Ben Laurie
• Key Generation Security Flaw in PGP 5.0 John Gilmore
  • Key Generation Security Flaw in PGP 5.0 eugene.leitl
• WPI Cryptoseminar, Thursday, 5/25 R. A. Hettinga
• Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Enzo Michelangeli
  • RE: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Sergio Tabanelli
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Victor Duchovni
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Sergio Tabanelli
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Greg Broiles
• European Union sets free export of encryption products (fwd) P.J. Ponder
• [FYI] (Fwd) EU Echelon investigation knobbled? [OT] Axel H Horns
• Hidden "secret search" provision in the meth bill & two others John Gilmore
  • Re: Hidden "secret search" provision in the meth bill & two others Declan McCullagh
• htaccess help John Young
• IP: FBI insists it can tap e-mail without a warrant Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: IP: FBI insists it can tap e-mail without a warrant Steven M. Bellovin
• NAI & KRA Dennis Glatting
• Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Dennis Glatting
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Matt Blaze
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Will Price
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES John Young
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Dennis Glatting
  • RE: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Trei, Peter
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Peter Gutmann
• House commerce committee votes to ban radio-decryption gear Declan McCullagh
• VirtualBanking2000 R. A. Hettinga
• XML schema to define certificate and extension profiles for interoperability amir . herzberg
• Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Declan McCullagh
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES John Gilmore
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES John Young
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Russell Nelson
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES John Kelsey
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES David Honig
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES John Kelsey
  • Microsoft Condoms (may have pinholes) (Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES) David Honig
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Matt Blaze
  • RE: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Rodger, William
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Dennis Glatting
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Dennis Glatting
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Matt Blaze
  • RE: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Paul Kierstead
  • RE: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES David Honig
  • RE: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Arnold G. Reinhold
  • RE: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products John Gilmore
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Enzo Michelangeli
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Bill Stewart
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Matt Crawford
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Enzo Michelangeli
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
  • Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors John Young
  • Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors John Young
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products John Young
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Dan Geer
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Steve Reid
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Dave Emery
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products - "gaming the system" John Gilmore
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products eli+
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Jablon
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Alan Olsen
  • Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David A. Wagner
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of3DES Andrew Loewenstern
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Sandy Harris
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES John Gilmore
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Paul Crowley
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Derek Atkins
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES William Allen Simpson
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES David Honig
  • Re: Critics blast Windows 2000's quiet use of DES instead of 3DES Steven M. Bellovin
• NSA on AES2 John Young
• IPSEC performance salah
• Second Call, Change of Venue: EFCE 2000 R. A. Hettinga
• Re: Financial Standards Work group? Lynn . Wheeler
• Multicast of Whit Diffie on non-secret encryption and public-key cryptography Ian Brown
• PECSENC meets Tues 16May, DC: crypto export advisory council John Gilmore
• NBC Nightly News 6:30 EST Saturday - UK RIP Bill piece Caspar Bowden
• Pass phrases, Hushmail and Ziplip Peter Wayner
  • Re: Pass phrases, Hushmail and Ziplip David Honig
  • Re: Pass phrases, Hushmail and Ziplip Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: Pass phrases, Hushmail and Ziplip Marc Horowitz
  • Re: Pass phrases, Hushmail and Ziplip Arnold G. Reinhold
• DCSB: Paul St. Pierre; XML, Smartcard Wallets and Digital Commerce R. A. Hettinga
• Re: jya.com taken down? John Young
• NYT reporter looking for advice re: encryption products Lisa Guernsey
  • Re: NYT reporter looking for advice re: encryption products Sandy Harris
  • Re: NYT reporter looking for advice re: encryption products Declan McCullagh
  • Re: NYT reporter looking for advice re: encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: NYT reporter looking for advice re: encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
• Re: GPS integrity and proactive secure clock synchronization amir . herzberg
  • Re: GPS integrity and proactive secure clock synchronization Arnold G. Reinhold
• RSA admit that actually free software is quite good... Ben Laurie
  • Re: RSA admit that actually free software is quite good... Ben Laurie
• Interesting new covert channel Udhay Shankar N
  • Interesting new covert channel Lenny Foner
  • Re: Interesting new covert channel Rick Smith
• GPS and cell phones Flanagannn
  • Re: GPS and cell phones Lyle Seaman
  • Re: GPS and cell phones John R Levine
  • GPS and cell phones Lenny Foner
  • Re: GPS and cell phones Marc Horowitz
  • Re: GPS and cell phones Bill Stewart
  • Re: GPS and cell phones Eugene Leitl
• Re: Are these things crypto accellerators? (was Re: Edupage, 8 May 2000) R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: Are these things crypto accellerators? (was Re: Edupage, 8 May 2000) Paul Holman
• FIPR News Release: Report on 3rd Reading of "Internet Snooping" Bill Caspar Bowden
• PKZIP: any attacks other than Kocher plain text? Victor Duchovni
  • Re: PKZIP: any attacks other than Kocher plain text? staym
• cryptography w/CA Howard A. Gutowitz
  • Re: cryptography w/CA John Kelsey
• GPS integrity amir . herzberg
  • Re: GPS integrity Ian BROWN
  • Re: GPS integrity Eugene Leitl
  • Re: GPS integrity Phil Karn
  • Re: GPS integrity Greg Troxel
  • Re: GPS integrity Phil Karn
  • Re: GPS integrity Phil Karn
  • Re: GPS integrity Steve Cook
  • Re: GPS integrity amir . herzberg
  • Re: GPS integrity Derek Atkins
  • GPS integrity Lenny Foner
  • Re: GPS integrity Derek Atkins
  • Re: GPS integrity Phil Karn
  • Re: GPS integrity Phil Karn
  • GPS integrity Lenny Foner
  • GPS integrity Lenny Foner
  • Re: GPS integrity Dave Emery
  • Re: GPS integrity John Gilmore
  • Re: GPS integrity Phil Karn
  • Re: GPS integrity Dave Emery
  • RE: GPS integrity Vin McLellan
  • Re: GPS integrity Arnold G. Reinhold
• CAs as trapdoor on way functions Simon Aronson
• Security mechanism using out-of-band public keys Greg Hudson
• Aladdin eToken 3.3.3.x Hardware USB Key Private Data Extraction eugene.leitl
• [Fwd: Stambler patents] R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: [Fwd: Stambler patents] Axel H Horns
• Perfect Forward Security def wanted Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted Wei Dai
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted Jerome Etienne
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted William Allen Simpson
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted William Allen Simpson
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted John Kelsey
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted lcs Mixmaster Remailer
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted David Jablon
  • RE: Perfect Forward Security def wanted Mike Just
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted Sandy Harris
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted lcs Mixmaster Remailer

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