Florian Weimer wrote:
If you've deployed two-factor authentication (like German banks did in
the late 80s/early 90s), the relevant attacks do involve compromised
customer PCs. 8-( Just because you can't solve it with your technology
doesn't mean you can pretend the attacks don't happen.

EU finread terminal was countermeasure to (widely held impression that) PCs are extremely vulnerable to compromise.

card authentication required pin entry to work ... and finread terminal had its own PIN-pad distinct the vulnerable PC keyboard. orientation was towards transaction authentication ... with the finread terminal also having its own display of what was being authentication. the transaction authentication orientation was countermeasure to session authentication orientation where PC compromises could operate within the boundaries of any authenticated session.

part of thread in sci.crypt mentioning finread terminal as countermeasure to (widely held view of) the ease of PC compromises
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006k.html#46 Keylogger resistance
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006k.html#52 Keylogger resistance

The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Reply via email to