Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote:
So I'd argue that while x509, its CA's and its CRL's are a serious pain to deal** with, and seem add little value if you assume avery diligent and experienced operational team -- they do provide a useful 'procedural' framework and workflow-guide which is in itself very valuable, relatively robust and are a little bit organisationally "inherently fail-safe". The latter as you are forced to think about expiry of the assertions, what to do when a CRL is too old and so on.

I think there's a large gulf between the use case where the relying party and the CA are the same entity, and where they do not even have a contractual arrangement.

CAs within a corporate environment may well be a good idea in some cases, indeed. As you know, we've been pushing on this idea at the Apache Software Foundation for some time now, hindered only by our laziness :-)

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